TURKEY: THE GOT ON LEDRA STREET BRIDGE REMOVAL:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000057 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP MOPS TU CY SUBJECT: TURKEY: THE GOT ON LEDRA STREET BRIDGE REMOVAL: IT'S TALAT'S DECISION TO MAKE REF: NICOSIA 000021 Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Although GOT officials were not supportive of "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's decision to dismantle the Ledra Street footbridge at the Green Line in Nicosia, they nonetheless stated in the end it was Talat's decision to make. While Talat had broached the subject in late November/early December with Ankara, GOT officials here apparently believed they had agreed to push off a decision on the matter until early in the new year. Thus, Talat's December 28 announcement of his intent to move forward with the demolition caught them off-guard. Although senior Turkish General Staff (TGS) officials in particular opposed Talat's decision, in the end, Talat's vehement defense of his prerogative to make such a decision won the day. However, PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) may pay the price for Talat's insistence. Opposition parties are taking full opportunity to paint Erdogan and the AKP as being "soft" on key national security issues as election season gets underway. END SUMMARY TALAT CONFERRED...AND DIDN'T LIKE THE ANSWER -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA First Secretary for Cyprus Affairs Can Oztas described to us January 10 the circumstances surrounding "TRNC President" Talat's decision to dismantle the Ledra Street footbridge in Nicosia and Talat's interaction with GOT officials in making that decision. According to Oztas, Talat had initially broached his idea of taking down the bridge in late November/early December. At that time, MFA and the Turkish General Staff (TGS) counseled against a unilateral concession from the Turkish side because, from the GOT perspective, such concessions have not been reciprocated in the past. Oztas added that, in the Turks' view, the memory of the international community has been lamentably short in recognizing steps the Turks have taken in recent years in support of a comprehensive settlement and has been equally short-sighted in its failure to put adequate pressure on the Greek Cypriots to reciprocate. ¶3. (C) Oztas intimated that following the initial exchange between Talat and the GOT on the issue, GOT officials were expecting to continue the discussion of Talat's proposal after the holidays. This would be part of a broader discussion on how to move forward on an overall settlement in light of a new UNSYG and the transition to the German EU presidency. Although Oztas did not admit it explicitly, Talat's December 28 announcement that he was moving forward with the removal of the footbridge appears to have caught everyone off-guard. ¶4. (C) Turkish media reports indicate the local Turkish force commander, Lieutenant General Hayri Kivrikoglu, remained steadfast in his opposition to Talat's proposal and pressed for support from Ankara. Oztas noted that although the troops patrolling along Ermou/Hermes Street perpendicular to Ledra are actually Turkish Cypriot security forces, Kivrikoglu maintains overall command of the security presence in northern Cyprus. Talat traveled to Istanbul and to Ankara January 4-5 to press his case with PM Erdogan, FM Gul, and TGS CHOD General Yasar Buyukanit. According to media reports, and as noted in reftel, Talat reportedly threatened to resign if the Turkish Army maintained its opposition to his decision. GOT DECIDES IT'S NOT WORTH THE FIGHT... -------------- ¶5. (C) Oztas declined to confirm the media accounts concerning Talat's threat. Rather, he emphasized the GOT view that the issue was one for Talat to decide. Oztas admitted that GOT officials believed the bridge held no significance from a security perspective. Adding that to the fact that even after the demolition the opening of a new crossing at Ledra Street anytime soon is highly unlikely made going along with Talat's decision somewhat more palatable. A mid-level officer at the TGS who recently served in Cyprus confirmed to us that the bridge itself was of little importance but suggested the manner in which Talat handled the affair had raised hackles. He said the TGS now considers the issue closed. ...THOUGH SOME BELIEVE TALAT JUST DOESN'T GET IT -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Retired General Kuloglu at the Global Strategy Institute think tank described TGS' concerns with the ANKARA 00000057 002 OF 002 destruction of the bridge as three-fold: - Without the bridge, the separation between the military and civilians will be lost; - Since the purpose of the bridge was to separate the civilians and military, Talat should have consulted the military first; and - Most importantly, after already destroying the wall on the Turkish side, and now taking down the bridge, TGS believes the Greek Cypriots will continue to demand more unilateral concessions from the Turkish Cypriots such as removal of the Turkish flag and withdrawal of Turkish troops. They believe that the demolition of the bridge should have been done in conjunction with the destruction of the wall on the Greek Cypriot side. ¶7. (C) Retired General Kucukoglu (protect) of the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) said that Talat was not a military person and did not understand the strategic, historical, and emotional importance of Cyprus to Turkey. He views Cyprus from a Cypriot point of view, assuming that Turkish and Greek Cypriots should work together towards a solution. However, Turkey views itself as the "mother country" of Cyprus and expects Talat to consult with all elements of the Turkish government before taking such a decision. ¶8. (C) Despite those concerns, Talat could perhaps be forgiven for thinking he could move forward on removal of the bridge without encountering too much resistance from Ankara. According to an Ankara University professor and former advisor to the Turkish parliament with close ties to the TGS, Talat had raised this issue earlier in 2006 with former TGS CHOD Ozkok, who had signaled his support. THE DAY OF "TRNC INDEPENDENCE," AND BASHING ERDOGAN -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Following the January 9 removal of the footbridge, Turkish media proclaimed it as the day when the "TRNC" proved its independence. PM Erdogan was quoted as saying that although he believed Talat had perhaps moved in haste in taking down the bridge unilaterally, "he had to be honored as president of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'." The political opposition, meanwhile, seized upon the confusion surrounding Talat's declaration as well as Erdogan's eventual decision to give in to Talat. Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal said the developments in Cyprus reflected a lack of coordination among national institutions and characterized the demolition of the bridge as "a challenge." True Path Party (DYP) deputy chairman Nuzhet Kandemir charged Erdogan's government with "declining to undertake responsibility in Cyprus," while National People's Party (MHP) deputy chairman Mehmet Sandir stated the MHP fears the next step would be the demolition of the Turkish Cypriot "state" and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Erkan Mumcu said he is disturbed by Erdogan's conclusion that Turkey must respect Talat's decision, adding that he views this as Erdogan "distancing himself from developments in Cyprus." ¶10. (C) COMMENT: It is less than convenient for Erdogan's AKP that Talat pressed forward with unilateral concessions as AKP enters an election campaign in which it is likely to come under the most pressure from nationalists who characterize the AKP's record on Cyprus (and the PKK) as "soft." Nevertheless, neither AKP nor the TGS was willing to create the political crisis in northern Cyprus that would have ensued had Talat made good on his threat to resign. The TGS did, however, lay down a marker that it will continue to insist upon its role as the ultimate protector of Turkish national interests, one of which remains, certainly, the Cyprus issue. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eu/ankara/ WILSON