TURKEY'S KURDS ALARMED BY GROWING EXTREMISM;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000461 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ SUBJECT: TURKEY'S KURDS ALARMED BY GROWING EXTREMISM; CONCERNED ABOUT GOT ATTITUDES TOWARDS NORTHERN IRAQ Classified By: Consulate Adana Principal Officer Eric Green for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Heading into the traditionally with thQ Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) (or even IQaqi president Talabani) as disrespectful, particularly given Turkey's readiness to defend Iraqi Turkomans. Baydemir said the escalation of tension, particularly the prospect of a Turkish military operation against the PKK in Northern Iraq, comes at an unfortunate time since there is now an opportunity to wind up the conflict and demobilize the PKK, provided the GOT allows for the reintegration of fighters into society. The GOT, however, is not likely to "soften" its stand on PKK with presidential and parliamentary elections looming. End summary. Fear of Extremist Wave -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with Adana PO February 22, Diyarbakir Mayor Baydemir expressed concern that the Dink assassination, in which elements of the state may have colluded with the assailant, could be the harbinger of a new pattern that would also target prominent Kurds. He said that, by "outsourcing" murders to private individuals, the culprits can be arrested and tried while those sharing responsibility within the state can distance themselves from the crimes. This, he said, is a new variation on the dirty war of the 1990s in which the state directly attacked opponents. Baydemir said that he does not believe actions such as the Dink killing are state policy, but that elements within the state are involved. ¶3. (C) He noted that he and his family have received a number of death threats in recent months and at least one individual confessed to authorities that he was involved in a plot to kill the mayor. This man subsequently withdrew his allegations, apparently under pressure from his co-conspirators. ¶4. (C) Rojbin Tugan, an activist lawyer from Hakkari, told us she feels much less secure in the wake of Dink's death. Following a brief article in the Economist about her work two weeks ago, Tugan said she received a number of threatening phone calls. She voiced alarm about media stories featuring new ultra-nationalist groups that single out Kurds as enemies of Turkey. One such racist, Cenk Tozkoparan, was quoted calling for measures, i.e. sterilization, to stop the growth 
of Turkey's Kurdish population. Tugan lamented that violent Turkish nationalism will inevitably produce violence on the Kurdish side, "no one will win, only blood will win." (Comment: if a prominent Kurdish leader were assassinated, the response would not likely be peaceful and dignified, as was the case following Dink's murder .) GOT and KRG -------------- ¶5. (C) Baydemir expressed disappointment about the continued rift between the GOT and the KRG in Northern Iraq. He noted tha (particularly those around Kirkuk),but ev)nces no constructive interest in the Kurds of Northern Iraq, who have strong cultural links with Turkey's Kurdish citizens. When the GOT refuses to receive Iraqi President Talabani or insults members of the KRG, Turkey's Kurds feel their own government is disrespecting them as well, reinforcing the perception that they are second-class citizens. (Comment: Although President Sezer refuses to invite Talabani, effectively barring him from Turkey, Talabani frequently meets with Turkish officials in Iraq.) ¶6. (C) Following our meeting with Baydemir, the DTP Diyarbakir provincial chairman, Aydin Aydogdu, stirred controversy - and was later charged - when he was quoted saying that "an attack (by Turkey) on Kirkuk would be tantamount to an attack on Diyarbakir." Baydemir aide Seymus ANKARA 00000461 002 OF 002 Diken told us that Aydogdu's statement was poorly timed and had "exploded like a bomb." Diken stressed that Aydogdu's motivation was to underscore the deep cultural links between Kurds in Turkey and Iraq and express the frustration of Turkey's Kurds with the disrespectful attitude of the GOT towards their cohorts across the border. Cease-fire Should Continue Unconditionally -------------- ¶7. (C) Baydemir was emphatic that the PKK should continue its cease-fire unconditionally and indefinitely because "we will not achieve anything with violence." He noted that the PKK and the DTP both stand for the same - legal - objectives. One of the two organizations, the PKK, should be redundant. He addedt most PKK fighter in the mountainQ so this is a manageable problem. "They are ready to come home if the opportunity is there." But GOT Attacks will Set Back Progress -------------- ¶8. (C) Baydemir said, however, that the process of marginalizing the PKK would be set back if the GOT conducts an operation against the PKK in Iraq. Tugan also noted that many grass-roots supporters of the PKK are starting to question the continued usefulness of the organization, leading to a long-overdue internal debate within the Kurdish community. Like Baydemir, Tugan said that military action against the PKK in Northern Iraq would strengthen militants in the movement who argue that the military wing is still necessary. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Though Baydemir's motives in discouraging military action against the PKK are far from pure, many other interlocutors have told us that the PKK and DTP are losing support in the southeast, lending credence to the idea that some in the Kurdish community are questioning the dead-end strategy of the PKK. Despite these signs of nascent pluralism within Kurdish politics, the PKK and DTP remain powerful political forces in the region. Military action against the PKK in Northern Iraq will inevitably generate a strong backlash in Turkey's southeast. The question is whether such an action would create space for a genuinely non-violent alternative or merely cause Turkey's Kurds to rally again around the tattered PKK flag. Given that the GOT in this election year is not willing to give ground to nationalists or the Turkish military by pursuing a "softer" policy toward the PKK, the prospects are not promising. End comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON