TURKEY: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON

UNCLAS ANKARA 002848 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC AND DHS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING REF: STATE 133921 ¶1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified. Please handle accordingly. Post responses are keyed to reftel questions. ¶2. (U) A. Watchlisting (see para 10, below) ¶3. (U) B. Traveler Information Collection. -- Who collects traveler information? Turkish National Police (TNP) Foreigners Police maintains a machine-readable computer system in order to collect data on entry and exits of travelers with machine-readable passports (MRP) and maintains a database on entry and exit of travelers with non-MRPs, which includes Turkish citizens. ¶4. (U) C. Border Control and Screening. -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of security interest? The Turkish National Police has a computerized database that is used to screen travelers, but we do not know how TNP uses this system or what sources they use to feed intelligence into this system. -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host-country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits? All travelers, both inbound and outbound, regardless or national origin, to include Turkish citizens, are tracked electronically at all points of entry. We believe "waived through" seldom occurs at Turkish border Points of Entry. The TNP checks all individuals' identification information for validity, including entry visas, and compares traveler information against TNP's database. An estimate of non-reported border crossings is unknown at this time, but the Turkish Security Directorate has informed the UNHCR and the IOM that approximately 100,000 persons per year enter/exit Turkey illegally by land and sea. -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc). Unknown at this time. The EU is working with Turkey on a "Twinning Project" to train and equip border police, which includes enhancing infrastructure and automated equipment and is working closely with them to upgrade border controls. The Twinning Project's primary aim is to form a constituting basis for the financial contribution of the EU for the necessary legal and institutional reforms, training activities, infrastructure and equipment for integrated border management. -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? The Border Police officers make the decision to accept or deny entry to any individual based on the validity of their entry documents and information contained in the Turkish database. The TNP, Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Foreigners, Border, and Asylum work together on acceptance or denial of entry, depending on the nature of each case. -- How well does information sharing function within the host government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? Unknown at this time. ¶5. (U) D. Biometric Collection. (see para 11, below) ¶6. (U) E. Passports. -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments? Turkey does not issue machine-readable passports. The TNP, however, does use a computer system that can collect data from machine-readable passports. For the past three years, the GOT has announced plans to issue machine-readable passports, but they have not begun to issue these passports. Most recently, on 15 November 2007, the Turkish MOI announced it will issue in 2008 E-passports that operate with an electronic chip and that have pages with figures and pictures that can be seen only under UV light, a measure to reduce use of fraudulent passports. -- Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? The GOT only issues normal passports. Turkish citizens purchase the period of time they want to have a passport, up to five years. This will be increased to ten years for full validity when the GOT issues the new machine-readable passports. GOT does not issue limited-validity passports, but a Turkish citizen may opt to request a one-year passport, which is extendable for additional years, up to five years, upon request and payment. -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen multiple times? We do not know if Turkey has special procedures for dealing with habitual losers of passports. -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? There are no emergency partial duration passports. -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? No, the same amount of fields as the normal blue passport book because the GOT does not issue emergency replacement passports. -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? No. The GOT issues red passports to diplomats; official green passports to certain GOT employees and other family members with certain restrictions. Since the government pays for these passports, they are often lightly used. In the case of regular blue Turkish passports, however, it is up to the individual how often he wants to replace it, up to the maximum validity. Since the fees are very high for Turkish blue passports, with a fee based on a yearly rate, passports are extended only when the individual intends to travel. In the past three years, post has perceived no change in the number of "clean" passports. Also, many visa applicants bring their cancelled passports with them to the visa interview to show the record of previous travel. -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified? No. ¶7. (U) F. Fraud Detection. -- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of fraud involving documents followed up? Post believes that Turkey has robust fraud detection measures in place, and the U.S. Consular Section in Embassy Ankara has coordinated numerous anti-fraud training exchanges with the GOT. The TNP maintains a Document Forensic Unit which uses modern technology to inspect documents. The GOT has a history of detaining not just Turkish nationals that it believes are traveling on fraudulent documents, but has detained other nationals, including U.S. citizens, believed to be traveling on fraudulent documents. As recently as April 2007, the Consular Section coordinated an exchange and training visit of DHS officials to meet with their counterparts in the TNP. In addition, in 2006, the U.S. Consular staff - American and locally engaged staff - visited the headquarters of the TNP Document Forensic Unit to exchange views on trends in fraud detection. -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use? Unknown. ¶8. (U) G. Privacy and Data Security. -- What are the country's policies on records related to the questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? How are those records stored, and for how long? Records of people questioned and detained upon arrival in Turkey are filed in hardcopy for a minimum of five years. Terrorist suspects' files are maintained for longer (NFI). -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data? There is no comprehensive privacy and data security regime in Turkey. The Turkish-US legal assistance treaty would govern US access to collected information. Wiretaps require a warrant from the courts; however, in addition, wiretaps are frequently done by circumventing the courts. There are legal prohibitions against profiting from the exploitation of personal data and against revealing confidential information. The relatively new Turkish Republic Identity (T.C. Kimlik) database maintains a record on every citizen, including a national identity/tax number; it is publicly accessible via the internet (see below). Civil servants are required to submit a confidential Financial Disclosure form every five years to their agency's personnel department. The country's top 100 taxpayers are publicized in the media each year, but it is unlikely that such information is accessible on anyone. Medical records are confidential. -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records? We are unaware of formal public notification requirements; however, the public is well-informed about some databases relevant and in use by the public. It is unlikely that government agencies would disclose information about databases to which the public does not have access. -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information? We are unaware of laws related to computer security features. Every government agency has an IT department responsible for safeguarding and updating protection tools, with varying levels of success. -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them? Every individual may petition any agency to release information under the Law on Access to and Evaluation of Information (2003). Should the agency refuse to disclose the information, the individual may appeal to an oversight board of 11 (Committee on Access to and Evaluation of Information). Court cases are in principle open to citizens, and individuals may obtain information on the records, but the lack of centralization and the suspicion on the part of court recordkeepers make access cumbersome. -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)? The rules are agency- or database-dependent. Raw data on personal information is confirmable on the publicly available website tckimlik.nvi.gov.tr; access to information requires name, date of birth, father's name, mother's name, province and county. Records on enforcement actions are obtainable by the citizen in question who may present his identity card and obtain his own legal record (these are routinely included in job applications). The Registry of Deeds is technically available to the public, but there are some obstacles, such as the fact that access can depend on developing personal relationships with the people working there. -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data? A non-citizen would have the same right to petition (and appeal) for information under the Law on Access to and Evaluation on Information. Non-citizens may use the courts in the host country, but should be aware of bias of the court system in favor of the state. ¶9. (U) H. Immigration Data Bases. -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries and exits? The TNP Passport Control Branch keeps a record of all entries and exits of Turkish citizens and visitors through all ports of entry, including land, sea and airports. -- Is the immigration database available at all ports of entry (POEs)? Collection is done at all ports of entry, including seaports, land border crossings and airports. -- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? All POEs collect data. Data on visitors is also collected by hotel staff when visitors check into hotels in Turkey. -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? Unknown, but all of the problems listed above probably impact the collection system. The entry/exit data record is held for ten years only. When Turkish visa applicants are asked by a Consular officer to provide a record of exits and re-entries to Turkey, the TNP Passport Control Officer provides that record to the applicant in one day. -- How often are national immigration databases updated? Records are maintained for 10 years. Please note that each refugee or asylum seeker is registered by the Foreigners and Border Police. They keep an open record on refugees and asylum seekers until such time as they depart Turkey. ¶10. (U) I. Watchlist and Information Sharing. -- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers at POEs? Both the TNP and Turkish customs have name-based lists used to screen travelers. -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants? Not known at this time. -- What international watchlists do the host government use for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.? The only international watchlist currently known to be used by the host government is the TSA No Fly list. Private security companies at Istanbul's Ataturk Airport also have access to this list. The FBI recently offered the TNP an MOU which would allow for the sharing of watchlisting databases and give the TNP access to the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between host government and its neighbors? No known bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between Turkey and its neighbors, although Legatt has been advised by TNP contacts that Turkey is attempting to coordinate such regional cooperation which would include sharing of watchlisting databases. ¶11. (SBU) J. Biometrics. The GOT does not currently collect biometrics information from travellers. The TNP maintains a biometric database, which it is trying to expand. In April, 2007, the FBI proposed a biometrics sharing agreement with the TNP that would allow direct access to the FBI database for known or suspected terrorists. The FBI is waiting for a reply. ¶12. (SBU) K. Identifying Appropriate Partners. Turkey would be an appropriate and valuable partner in data sharing; FBI is already pursuing data sharing arrangements through the Terrorist Screening Center. As a NATO ally with a long-standing indigenous terrorist problem, Turkey is already experienced both in dealing cooperatively with us and in combating terrorism. As an international terrorist transit country and the site of major al-Qaeda attacks in 2003, Turkey is also a rich source of information on the fight against terror. At the same time, differences of definition and priorities may complicate a data sharing relationship. Internal sharing may also be a problem. -- Are there political realities which would preclude a country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the U.S? No. -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information? Yes. -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for example? If not, do different ministries share information amongst themselves? Information sharing across agencies can be a problem. There is no single consolidated database. Institutional rivalries, particularly among the police and intelligence service, can complicate information sharing and bilateral cooperation. -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes that do so? Terrorism is defined in the Anti-Terror Law #3713 (TMK, 1991). "Terrorism" is any kind of criminal act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the individual unity of its State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal or external security of the State, public order or general health using force and violence and by means of pressure, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat." Thus, the definition of terrorism in Turkey is both too broad and too narrow, per US interests. It is too broad in that it characterizes many non-terrorist conducts as terror; it is too narrow in that only actions that damage Turkey's own national interest are included. Therefore, it may be difficult to bring about action against internationally recognized terrorist groups that do not pursue terrorist goals within Turkey. In addition, Turkey's definition results in a narrow terrorism finance definition, leaving out fundraising by international terrorist groups that do not target the state of Turkey (such as Hamas). Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON