STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH

S E C R E T ANKARA 000257 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR T - TIM KATSAPIS AND EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2027 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH TURKEY: U/S ROBERT JOSEPH'S VISIT TO ANKARA, FEBRUARY 11-13, 2007 REF: ANKARA 0183 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 b/d. Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Turkey has embraced the objectives of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI). A participant in every major non-proliferation regime and a strong supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Turkey has acted against proliferators and blocked shipments of concern to Iran. The Turkish parliament's January 24 ratification of our bilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation (aka EXBS) Agreement will enable us to provide concrete assistance. Your visit also provides an opportunity to engage the Turks bilaterally on ways we can work together to confront Iran's nuclear ambitions. A critical element you might address is the proliferation risk posed by Iran's nuclear program and how Turkey can organize a more coherent approach to securing its border with Iran. The Turks may express frustration about the delay in U.S. ratification of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement. End summary. Leadership Against Nuclear Terrorism -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOT has embraced the objectives and workplan of the Global Initiative. By hosting the second GI meeting in Ankara, Turkey hopes to show leadership on this issue. Toward that end, the MFA has orchestrated an unprecedented intergovernmental review and discussion on nuclear terrorism with six Turkish government agencies. You will want to express appreciation to U/S Ertugrul Apakan for Turkey's initiative to host this event and urge the GOT to contribute more of its experience and expertise as the GI expands its membership after the Ankara meeting. Engaging on Iran -------------- ¶3. (S) As outlined reftel, we believe that it is time to initiate in-depth consultations with Turkey on the defense and security implications of a nuclear-armed and missile-equipped Iran and we hope you can move this forward in bilateral meetings during your visit. Turkey is implementing UNSCR 1737 sanctions, but strongly favors a sustained diplomatic effort to contain the Iranian nuclear program. The GOT is alarmed by growing Iranian influence in the region and does not want a nuclear-armed neighbor. At the same time, Turkey does not wish to jeopardize trade and energy relations or Iranian cooperation on countering PKK terrorism emanating from Iraq. Iran is also the major conduit for Turkey's growing trade with Central Asia. The result is Turkish inertia. ¶4. (S) To counter this, we need to engage the government on specifics. One element you might address is the regional proliferation risk posed by an Iranian nuclear program. Turkey is a participant in every major non-proliferation regime, supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and has had important successes in stopping the export of dual-use items to Iran. Finding ways to tie together these and other efforts, including the GI and our newly ratified NP Agreement (see para 10),would help Turkey organize an overall approach to Iran-related proliferation concerns. Such a discussion could also identify potential gaps and address Turkish reluctance to monitor and interdict suspected Iranian arms transshipments across Turkish territory to Syria. ¶5. (C) You may also wish again to raise the need for laws targeting the financial dealings of proliferators. The GOT has not taken significant actions in support of Executive Order 12282 on the freezing of proliferators' assets since you raised this issue with Finance Minister Unakitan in September 2005. Status of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Turkish officials have inquired repeatedly since your 2005 visit about the status of U.S. ratification of the agreement and have expressed frustration with the delay. Lack of a ratified agreement will hinder our ability to work with Turkey on development of a reliable and safe nuclear power program. Officials here tell us that they have begun to focus on countries that face no such limits, including Russia, France, South Korea, and Canada, all of whom have reportedly met with Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) officials recently and are said to have offered assistance proposals. You should be prepared to provide Turkish officials an update on the status of the ratification of this agreement. Taking Action Against Proliferators -------------- ¶7. (C) Prosecution continues against the 10 individuals charged with smuggling and export documentation forgery for their alleged role in the export of nuclear equipment to Libya and the AQ Khan network in 2003. The authorities are monitoring the two Turkish firms that were implicated. Other important actions since your September 2005 visit include Turkish Customs' seizure of trucks attempting to transport Italian-made heavy aluminum alloy into Iran in December 2005 and the uncovering of an effort to re-export dual-use missile guidance parts to Iran in April 2006. Turkish Customs has worked closely with U.S., Italian, British and other customs authorities to determine how these activities were conducted and to prevent them from occurring in the future. You may wish to praise Turkey's efforts in these cases and urge continued cooperation. Active in PSI -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Turkey has continued to be an active participant in PSI. In May 2006, Turkey hosted one of the largest PSI exercises, Anatolian Sun, that included the U.S., France, and Portugal as well as observers from Kazakhstan, Iraq and the Gulf states. Turkey sent a delegation to the PSI-supported Proliferation Finance Workshop that began in Washington January 29. EXBS: New Opportunities for NP Cooperation -------------- ¶9. (C) Parliamentary approval in January of our bilateral NP Cooperation Agreement reaffirms Turkey's intent to accept our assistance to enhance its border security capabilities. The Agreement will allow us to provide to Turkish Customs nuclear detection kits, a mobile x-ray unit, and a full upgrade of Department of Energy second line of defense equipment. It will facilitate bilateral coordination in this area. You will want to congratulate U/S Apakan and Deputy U/S Akgunay for the MFA's success in getting the NP Agreement ratified by Parliament, despite strident complaints from the opposition that the Agreement's end-use monitoring provisions violate Turkish sovereignty. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON