GENERAL BUYUKANIT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000253 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR LT COL JOE COLLINS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER MARR IR IZ TU SUBJECT: GENERAL BUYUKANIT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 14-16 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Yasar Buyukanit ascended to the top of Turkey,s military just six months ago in September 2006. His actions since then have positioned him as one of the most dominant players in this political scene. He has spoken out aggressively in public fora about Turkey,s foreign policy, its domestic priorities, and what he sees as the military's role in advancing both. Gregarious, hard hitting, and charismatic, Buyukanit is revered by his troops and widely respected by the Turkish public, for whom the military remains one of Turkey,s most prestigious institutions. This is Buyukanit,s second visit to the US in a little over a year (he previously visited in late 2005 as head of Land Forces) and he will arrive with a focused agenda and blunt messages on two key issues. First, on the PKK, he will criticize lack of concrete USG action thus far. If none is forthcoming, he will insist on Turkey,s right to defend itself via a cross border operation into northern Iraq. Second, on the possibility of a Congressional resolution on Armenian Genocide, he will underscore the damage this would cause to bilateral relations -- both political and military -- and may hint at specific punitive steps the TGS would undertake, to include possible suspension of US operations at Incirlik Air Base and the Habur Gate. The modalities of Buyukanit,s visit -- how he is received and by whom -- will be scrutinized here in agonizing detail by press and politicians alike. Turkey,s electoral campaigns are already in high gear and the nuance of his interactions in DC will be magnified and likely distorted here to suit various partisan agendas. End Summary. Cross Border Operation Against PKK -------------- ¶2. (SBU) PKK/KGK: PKK terrorist attacks against Turkey from strongholds in northern Iraq killed over 600 Turkish civilians and military in 2006 alone. A surge in PKK attacks last summer prompted the Turkish government to threaten a cross-border operation (CBO) into Iraq. To forestall this and seek concrete ways to reduce PKK attacks from northern Iraq, the US appointed General (ret) Joseph Ralston as Special Envoy for Countering PKK Terrorism in August. The Turks named retired General Edip Baser as Ralston,s 
counterpart here. Ralston has conducted a number of discussions with Iraqi and Turkish officials, the most recent occurring in late January 2007. ¶3. (C) Although the January 30-31 Ralston visit gained us some time, political and military leaders in Turkey remain frustrated by the perceived lack of concrete results. Turkey has entered an election year and, with the PKK likely to resume attacks in the spring, the government and military will find themselves under pressure to take unilateral action against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. Our Turkish military contacts suggest that if the CHOD returns from his visit with no US commitment to take kinetic action against the PKK in northern Iraq, the bilateral military relationship will begin a downward spiral and a Turkish cross border operation in the spring will become all but inevitable. Iraq and Kirkuk -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Turkey is concerned about growing instability in Iraq, increasing Iranian influence in the region, and the potential for the country to splinter along ethnic lines. The prospect of a 2007 referendum on Kirkuk exacerbates Turkish fears of a Kurdish annexation of the oil-rich province that will lead to massive inter-communal violence and ultimatelythe dissolution of the country. Ankara looks to the US to maintain a unified Iraq, prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish state, eradicate the PKK presence in northern Iraq, and prevent Kirkuk from falling under Kurdish political control. Fragile Civil-Military Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) Upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 will test civil-military dynamics as the Turkish military continues to voice its opposition to PM Erdogan,s possible election to the presidency. In public remarks aimed at the Erdogan government, Buyukanit has proclaimed Islamic fundamentalism the biggest threat facing Turkey and affirmed the military's constitutional duty to combat this threat. His views were echoed by his service chiefs and current President Ahmet Sezer in other public statements. While military intervention along the lines of past coups is unlikely, the military will continue to use the media and other channels to remind the AKP of its limits. Armenian Genocide Resolution -------------- ¶6. (C) Turkish government and military officials have stated that the passage of an Armenian genocide resolution by the U.S. Congress would have serious negative consequences for bilateral relations. In the context of already strong public disapproval of US policies in Iraq, Turkish officials will have to confront an outpouring of public disappointment and anger at the US should such a resolution pass. The French experience may be illustrative for us. Following the French Assembly vote in favor of a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide in October 2006, the Turkish military announced the suspension of bilateral military relations with France. Invitations for France to participate in Turkey,s 2007 International Defense Equipment Fair (IDEF) and the annual Air Force Exercise Anatolian Eagle were withdrawn. Hostile protesters pelted the French embassy with rocks and eggs and hampered their daily operations for several weeks. We could expect that the cargo hub and air-refueling operations at Incirlik, as well the Habur Gate Ground Line of Communication -- both essential logistics elements supporting OEF and OIF -- could be adversely affected for an indeterminate amount of time. Iran's Regional Ambitions -------------- ¶7. (C) Turkey has cultivated increasing economic ties with Iran and PM Erdogan has made four official trips to Tehran. Approximately 35,000 trucks and 90 percent of eastbound Turkish Airline flights cross Iranian territory annually on the way to Central Asia. More than one million Iranian tourists visit Turkey visa-free each year. Turkish and Iranian military and border officials routinely exchange information and intelligence on PKK activities on their borders with Iraq. Despite this cooperation, both the Turkish government and military distrust Iran's political ambitions in the region and do not want to see an Iran armed with nuclear weapons and delivery means. Seeing growing Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, TGS officers speak with trepidation of an Iranian-controlled Shia "arc of influence" from Turkmenistan to the Mediterranean. ¶8. (C) The Turkish military looks to NATO for protection against a nuclear Iran. TGS has received government approval to fund a missile defense system and a tender is expected to be issued early this year. Ultimately, both government and military officials urge a resolution to the Iran nuclear issue through diplomacy. The Turkish government does not favor sanctions as an effective tool against Iran but has stated it will support UN sanctions under UNSCR 1737. Support Against Terrorism -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Turkey is an important partner in the GWOT. Some key elements of cooperation are enumerated below. Some would likely be adversely affected by passage of an Armenian genocide resolution. ¶10. (C) Iraq: By allowing use of Incirlik Airbase as a transit point for logistical support to OEF and OIF, Turkey has saved the US millions of dollars. Turkey has offered troops, overflight permission, and ground access to transport cargo. Turkey authorized 10 KC-135 tanker aircraft to refuel aircraft in Incirlik on support missions for both OEF and OIF. Since 2003, 35 million gallons of fuel have been delivered and 3,400 sorties flown. By using Incirlik as a cargo hub, the U.S. saves $160 million per year in transport costs. Since May 2005, the U.S. has moved 234 million pounds of supplies; flown 4,000 C-17 sorties; received 1700 wide-bodied cargo aircraft; and facilitated the emergency medical evacuation of U.S. soldiers from Iraq. Politically, Turkey provides training in Turkey for Iraqi diplomats and Iraqi Security Forces. To date, it has trained over 300 Iraqi diplomats and political party members and 90 Iraqi military officers, and pledges to provide more such training in the future. ¶11. (C) Afghanistan: Turkey has twice led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most recently from February to August 2005, and currently participates in the rotating command of ISAF Region Capital. Turkey has also offered a battalion of howitzers (subject to US end use permission) and associated training. Turkey opened a PRT in the province of Wardak in early November ¶2006. To date, Turkey has pledged $100 million for reconstruction efforts, with money allocated to build schools, clinics, hospitals, and wells throughout the country. However, claiming that the Turkish military is stretched due to peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans and Lebanon, the government has not responded to NATO calls for more maneuver forces for ISAF. Turkey also maintains substantial national caveats on its ISAF forces which restrict their use outside of Turkey,s AOR. The TGS remains opposed to using NATO forces in counter-narcotics missions. ¶12. (C) Lebanon: Turkey demonstrated its commitment to the region at the onset of fighting in Lebanon last summer by approving the evacuation of foreigners through the port of Mersin and Adana. These included over 1700 US citizens and dependents who were evacuated via Incirlik airbase. Despite heavy political opposition, Turkey has committed some 900 troops, a frigate, a personnel transport ship, and a tank landing craft to UNIFIL. It has opened Mersin and Iskendurun seaports and Aksaz naval base for logistic support and maintenance and uses Istanbul airport for the transit of UNIFIL forces to/from Lebanon. It has also offered C-130 air transport and sea transport to friendly and allied countries on a case-by-case basis. ¶13. (SBU) Other: In addition to the high profile peacekeeping missions, Turkey has contributed troops to SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR both in Macedonia and Bosnia. In Darfur, Turkey contributed five planeloads of humanitarian supplies, including a $5.2M field hospital and related equipment and medicine. The Ministry of Health is supplying the doctors and nurses to staff the hospital. CFE Flank Entitlements -------------- ¶14. (C) In order to conduct joint training and exercises in Romania and Bulgaria, we have requested tank, artillery and ACV flank entitlements from Norway, Greece and Turkey according to their available headroom under the CFE treaty. Turkey offered to cover our tank requirements and pledged 63 tank entitlements. We then asked the Turks to consider a blended contribution in order to cover a shortfall of 75 ACV entitlements. Turkey responded January 29 with a new offer of 35 tanks and 20 ACVs, arguing it can go no further given its limited (82) ACV headroom. Bilateral Military Cooperation -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The Turkish Navy and Air Force conduct routine exercises and exchanges with the U.S., while bilateral engagement between the two armies has been less robust. Senior Turkish military leaders desire closer mil-to-mil partnership with the U.S. GEN McKiernan has proposed to Land Forces Commander GEN Basbug visits and coordination between experts from USAREUR Headquarters, Joint Multinational Training Command and the Turkish Land Forces training and simulation centers. The US and Turkey agreed at the December 2006 HLDG to enhance action officer cooperation between HLDG meetings through the establishment of a Combined Planning Conference (CPC) at the Colonel (06) level. EUCOM will host seven Turkish officers during the initial 11-15 March 2007 exchange. The Turkish General Staff will host an officer exchange in 2008. The Anatolian Eagle exercise is Turkish Air Force Command's (TAFC) flagship event. Initially billed as Red Flag East, USAFE helped TAFC create the exercise as we know it today. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON