FORMER TURKISH PRESIDENT DEMIREL ON ARMENIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000252 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PREL TU UZ AM IZ SUBJECT: FORMER TURKISH PRESIDENT DEMIREL ON ARMENIA RESOLUTION Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Turkish President Demirel is worried about the "extremely negative" impact of an Armenian genocide resolution on the Turkish public and on US-Turkish relations. In a private lunch with Ambassador and Demirel advisor Mehmet Ali Bayar on February 5, the former president predicted wide-scale, probably violent protests against the United States and a boost to extreme nationalist/chauvinism that will be destructive of our relationship and of democratic development in Turkey. He urged a full-court Administration effort to defeat/prevent passage of a resolution to protect US interests here and in the region, and he noted that such an effort should lessen the negative impact should a resolution pass. Demirel also said that a resolution will compromise Turkey's relations with Israel and will certainly set back prospects for normalization of relations with Armenia for years, if not decades. He remarks on Armenia resolution issue in the context of an appeal for strong US leadership in the region and success in Iraq, without which that country will become "hell." End Summary ¶2. (C) Demirel said that passage of an Armenia resolution will have an extremely negative impact on US-Turkish relations. It will seriously undermine Turkey's ability to work with the US on Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, the Caucasus and energy issues, and Afghanistan. At a time of great risk in the Middle East and strain on the US, our one democratic ally in the region will be alienated, and the costs will be immense. Relations with Israel would be affected. Whatever we have planned regarding Iran will be far more complicated without Turkey. The government may want to modulate the response to passage, but as a practical matter will not be able to -- especially in light of presidential and parliamentary elections this year. ¶3. (C) Iraq was a particular concern for Demirel. Tensions are already very high with Turkey over the PKK, Kirkuk and the general perception that the war has weakened Iraq and fostered instability on Turkey's border. Demirel said he supports the President's new Iraq strategy and sees no real alternative, but also believes sectarian violence is getting out of control. US failure there would be "hell," and he worried that a dramatically worsened US-Turkish relationship would further undermine prospects in Iraq for success. The right course, Demirel argued, is for the US to exercise the leadership expected of it and protect its interests and allies in the region. While acknowledging the negatives associated with the March 2003 parliamentary vote against a US invasion of Iraq from Turkey, Demirel said that the US gets strong cooperation from Turkey and will certainly need it as Iraq remains a giant problem and Iran looms as a bigger and bigger headache in the years to come. The US should not put that help at risk. ¶4. (C) Harkening back to what he said were his own discussions in the early 1990s with then-Armenian president Ter-Petrossian, Demirel wondered what the Armenia resolution advocates want to achieve. If it is prosperity for Armenia based on an integrated region and open borders, or reconciliation among Turks and Armenians here and elsewhere, passage of a resolution is one sure way to prevent it. Demirel also worried about the fate of Turkish-Armenians in this country, who could become the target of reprisal attacks from the nationalist fringe that killed Dink. Such violence will set back tolerance, liberalization and democracy in Turkey for years, to the detriment of US interests here and in the region. ¶5. (C) Violent protests against the US and US interests will likely follow passage of an Armenia resolution, Demirel predicted. The sense of "outrage and betrayal" will be greater and far different from when such countries as France or Germany adopted resolutions on the issue. Public anger will target official USG establishments as well as US businesses; a 2004 McDonalds bombing in Trabzon carried out by an associate of the murderer of Hrant Dink is an example. Though the government will try to prevent such violence, it will be unable to do so and will find its own responses driven by public anger, especially in light of the upcoming elections here. He and Bayar predicted that access to Incirlik Air Base might be reduced or eliminated, harming our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cooperation across the board would be affected, and members of Congress should understand the dire consequences they would be voting for if they pass this resolution. ¶6. (C) Demirel urged a vigorous Administration effort against the resolution. He said that "not too many" officials should be speaking to Turkey for the Administration on the matter; the message should be targeted and conveyed at a high level. ANKARA 00000252 002 OF 002 A dual message to Congress by the US Secretaries of State and Defense in 2000 had a positive impact in Turkey in 2000 and would do so again. He urged a Presidential statement on the matter as soon as possible. When the Ambassador noted that legislative advisors are likely to want to save presidential intervention for the optimal moment, probably relatively late in the process, Demirel demurred. If we think there is a high likelihood the resolution will pass anyway, then it is better to use presidential ammunition early -- for its effects on Turkish public opinion. In the event of passage, a visible and high-level Administration campaign against the resolution should blunt public anger and give Turkey's US friends ammunition to use in counseling against over-reaction. ¶7. (C) Bayar, who was serving as a counselor at Turkey's Washington embassy during the last Armenia resolution debate in 2000, said that an appeal against the resolution at that time signed by a large number of former Secretaries of State and Defense and retired military officers also had impact. Though not in itself decisive, it helped create the context in which President Clinton's appeal, made to Speaker Hastert, to shelve the resolution after the USS Cole bombing was positively received among Congressional leaders and members. He agreed that even if Administration efforts fail, having tried hard should lessen somewhat the negative impact that passage will bring. ¶8. (C) Regarding steps that Turkey could take toward normalizing relations with Armenia, Demirel was dismissive. The government will not be able to do anything serious now given the rise of nationalism/chauvinism in Turkey and the 2007 elections here. Whereas Ter-Petrossian seemed willing to explore normalization with Turkey as a first priority, President Kocharian had been blunt with Demirel that Turkey must first recognize genocide -- without which nothing would be possible. Bayar commented that Turkey's 2005 initiative to establish a government-to-government commission was a good opening not utilized by Armenia. Ambassador expressed the view that neither side had really negotiated on this effectively, but that some progress had been made in the days following Dink's funeral. He added that if the government of Armenia thought that a real normalization, opening of the border, etc., were doable in the near term, it might be more flexible, but that Turkey had not tested this proposition. ¶9. (C) Comment: Demirel and Bayar have baggage from their work in the early 1990s with post-independence Armenia and in the 2000 resolution derby that ended surprisingly successfully from Turkey's point of view. As the doyen of the Turkish political establishment, Demirel has for decades been a leader of denial that anything whatsoever occurred at the end of World War I. But he is also a voice here for tolerance, democracy and the US-Turkey relationship. Both Demirel and Bayar are strong and longtime friends and defenders of the US-Turkey relationship, and they are deeply concerned about the negative impact of a resolution on that relationship and on Turkey itself. End Comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON