TURKISH PRESIDENT GUL: RISKS, CHALLENGES,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002234 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2022 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR TU SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESIDENT GUL: RISKS, CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES REF: A. ANKARA 2223 ¶B. ANKARA 2213 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Abdullah Gul comes to office as Turkey's president already experienced on the international scene. His victory is one of personal and political tenacity; many had written him off after the military's e-memorandum derailed the attempt to elect him president in April. Looking ahead, Gul's greatest challenges will lie at home, where he must consolidate his leadership, especially with a highly skeptical military, in order to pursue his agenda of normalization and moderation. End summary. From the Jaws of Defeat and Crisis -------------- ¶2. (C) One has to blink twice to be sure it really happened. Abdullah Gul's August 28 election and installation as Turkey's 11th president mark a victory for his Justice and Development Party (AKP),and for grit and determination in Turkish politics. It is also an amazing personal victory for Gul himself, snatched from the jaws of crisis, defeat and humiliation last April when many here wrote him off. It was widely thought that PM Erdogan would eventually opt for a "consensus" candidate for president. There was even talk that a dispirited Gul would resign from politics rather that reprise his role as foreign minister. But just as he insisted on his presidential candidacy in April if it was not to be Erdogan, so he insisted upon it again now ... and won. ¶3. (C) In hindsight, Gul appears to have maintained his resolve throughout: For much of the general election campaign, Gul was paired with Erdogan as a star attraction. The undemocratic interruption of the presidential election was an AKP campaign centerpiece. Gul personified AKP determination to stand up to the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and overcame a concerted military/Republican People's Party (CHP) assault on democracy and representative political institutions. Despite the old elite's efforts to define the debate as secularism versus Sharia, Gul (and AKP) successfully framed the issue as one of democracy and stability versus militarism and the past. Who is Abdullah Gul? -------------- ¶4. (C) Prior to entering national politics, Gul earned degrees in economics from Istanbul University and studied in the UK. He taught university-level economics in the early 1980s and gained international experience as an economist for the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983-1991. First elected an MP in 1991 with Necmettin Erbakan's pro-Islam Welfare Party, he was re-elected in 1995, and served as state minister and government spokesman in Erbakan's short-lived government. One of AKP's founding members in August 2001, Gul has been both Erdogan's closest political partner and rival. His humble family origins and energetic rise in politics reflect the entrepreneurial spirit of his central Anatolian hometown, Kayseri. Gul is personable and understands how to talk about things in a way he thinks will get listened to. ¶5. (C) Gul's brief stint as prime minister -- from December 2002 until March 2003 when Erdogan took over the AKP government reins -- faltered when he miscalculated the March 1 vote to authorize a US invasion of Iraq from the north. Since then, as foreign minister, Gul has generally valued his relationship with the US, worked hard to communicate regularly and built an effective partnership with Secretary Rice. He has been a leading proponent of the political reforms needed to pursue EU accession, the case for which his August 28 inaugural remarks reasserted. When thorny issues have arisen over the past four years, Gul has approached them calmly and pragmatically, at times in stark contrast to PM Erdogan's more off-the-cuff, emotional style. But he can deliver the tough messages, too. He sees himself as a problem solver. And What Does He Bring to the Presidency? -------------- ANKARA 00002234 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Gul brings to the presidency a good international reputation, including friendships and acquaintances with a wide range of world leaders. He brings English language skills that his predecessor and Erdogan himself have lacked, an activist inclination, and the support of the government (which his predecessor also lacked). President Gul will act more like Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel on the world stage and back stage at home. His world role will bolster his credibility and help protect himself vis-a-vis secularists, the military and others who do not wish him well. He will supplement and work in tandem with Erdogan; in some cases, he may eclipse his friend the PM. ¶7. (C) On issues that matter to the US, Gul will be an important partner. He wants to be helpful on Iraq, a portfolio on which he was active as FM. He will likely extend the invitation to Iraqi President Talabani that predecessor refused to provide. Gul has made clear his personal interest in helping broker Middle East peace, and his associations in the region and status as a pro-US president can be positive factors; he will look to the US for guidance. One of Gul's early forays is likely to be to Islamabad. Gul has also been helpful on the Iran nuclear issue, and his new presidential status may give him new opportunities in this effort, as well. To be most effective, his relationship with his just-announced successor as FM, Ali Babacan, will be key. ¶8. (C) The domestic side will be more of a tightrope as Gul seeks -- in a still contentious atmosphere -- to help normalize Turkey and Turkish life, including on issues like the role and status of religion (Islam, but Christianity as well); Turkey's diversity and minorities (including Kurds); the role of the military and proper civil-military relations; and the judiciary and judicial reform, which is key to strengthening the rule of law in this country. Any one of these sets of issues is problematic; in combination, they are a big challenge and potentially dangerous for Gul and for Turkey's future. ¶9. (C) Gul's new role as part of Turkey's national security triumvirate will be key. The president can be an influential player, along with the National Security Council and the TGS. President Demirel played this behind-the-scenes role well; President Sezer did not. Gul's first challenge will be to consolidate his leadership, especially with the military. The TGS boycott of his swearing-in, virtually an act of insubordination, was a bad start, as was CHOD Buyukanit's strongly-worded Victory Day statement (ref B) a day before the final round of presidential voting. The next test will come at the August 30 Victory Day ceremonies. As foreign minister, Gul enjoyed a respectful relationship with the military, but it will not be easy to overcome the TGS revulsion with what it regards as an Islamist in the presidential palace. ¶10. (C) The new president, who now lacks the parliamentary immunity he enjoyed for years, may also confront judicial challenges, particularly from prickly secularist prosecutors. He will need to re-calibrate his relationship with PM Erdogan and balance fulfillment of his transformational ambitions for Turkey with the need to avoid a harsh reaction from the secularist street, the military and Kemalist hard-liners who could still bring the reform Turkey project crashing down. ¶11. (C) Gul, Erdogan and to some extent Turkey as a whole have taken an enormous risk with a Gul presidency. But progress rarely comes without risk. Gul's rise represents a watershed. The opportunity is in the new president and AKP's hands to move toward the more equal and tolerant society Gul,s inaugural remarks called for and toward the final end of the "deep state." If the reformers succeed, their success will belong to them and the Turkish people. Failure will rest on their shoulders alone. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON