TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS: VOLATILE BUT RESILIENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000222

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON MARR KWBG IS TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS: VOLATILE BUT RESILIENT

REF: A. ANKARA 150

B. TEL AVIV 319

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkish-Israeli relations, especially over
the past 15 years are perhaps best described as one academic
put it: "...(C)ompare it to a late-life love affair. Two
parties who have known each other for years suddenly develop
a near-passionate relationship, to the astonishment of their
friends -- and their enemies. However, after awhile, passion
cools and one party may be playing the field." No final
chapter to this story has yet been written. The second
intifada and the coming to power of the pro-Islamist Justice
and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 were major factors behind
a cooling of relations in recent years. Despite ups and
downs over the past 50 years, the relationship between
Turkey and Israel remains solid and is recognized as mutually
beneficial by both countries. The fact that the two remain
the only two truly functioning democracies in the region
certainly plays a role. Whereas defense cooperation largely
drove the warm bilateral ties that developed in the 1990s,
today it is business and economic development that plays the
largest role in maintaining an even keel in the relationship,
even when the occasional political spat arises. END SUMMARY

TURKEY AND ISRAEL HAVE A FLIRTATIOUS HISTORY
--------------


2. (SBU) Turkey and Israel share a long history of relations
dating back to the beginning of the Israeli state. Turkey
was among the first countries to formally recognize the State
of Israel in March 1949, about 10 months after Israel's
declaration of its establishment, and the first majority
Muslim nation to do so. Many scholars argue Turkey's
decision at the time was largely a reflection of the poor
state of Turkish-Arab relations. Turkey's Arab neighbors
remained leery of their former Ottoman colonial masters and
Turks and Arabs found themselves in opposing camps throughout
the Cold War. Despite that, Israel's fervor for closer ties
to its nearest non-Arab neighbor went unrequited. David Ben
Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, was quoted as having
complained, "The Turks have always treated (us) as one treats
a mistress, and not as a partner in an openly avowed
marriage."


3. (SBU) For years Turkey's political leaders were unable to
fully commit themselves to Israel for several reasons. The
long historical tradition of welcoming Jews fleeing
persecution in Europe into the Ottoman Empire
notwithstanding, the vast majority of Turks still viewed
Israeli actions vis-a-vis Palestinians, especially after
1967, negatively. Turkish reliance on Arab oil supplies also
argued against a full embrace of Israel. Nevertheless, for
Israel, it seems a half-hearted hug was better than none.


4. (SBU) The bilateral relationship improved dramatically in
the 1990s. The end of the Cold War and the progress made in
Madrid and Oslo in the Middle East Peace Process eased both
domestic opposition to, and the threat of Arab retaliation
for, closer ties between Turkey and Israel. The bilateral
economic relationship began to develop rapidly, with two-way
trade quadrupling between 1991 and 1995.

MIL-MIL TIES DROVE THE RELATIONSHIP TO NEW HEIGHTS
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Perhaps more significant at that time was the degree
to which the bilateral defense relationship blossomed.
During the 1990s, the two countries signed over twenty
military-related agreements covering a broad swathe of
bilateral defense cooperation. Among the highlights: the
countries agreed in 1995 to allow for the training of air
force pilots in each other's airspace; in 1996, Israeli
Defense Forces advised and equipped Turkish security forces
on the borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria; in 1996-97 they
agreed to jointly produce air-to-ground missiles; and Israel
agreed to upgrade 54 Turkish F-4 Phantom jets. Similar deals
followed in 1998 for Israel to upgrade 48 Turkish F-5s and in
2002 to upgrade 170 Turkish M-60A1 tanks. Turkish defense
forces began participating in a trilateral
(Turkish/Israeli/U.S.) military Search and Rescue (SAR)
exercise (Reliant Mermaid) in January 1998. Follow-on
exercises have generally been held annually since then.
(NOTE: Reliant Mermaid was postponed in 2005 for
scheduling/asset availability reasons and was again postponed
in 2006 due to the Lebanon crisis.)

BUT THE HONEYMOON ENDED WITH THE SECOND INTIFADA...
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6. (C) Serhat Erkmen at the Center for Eurasian Strategic
Studies (ASAM),an Ankara-based think tank, points to the
second intifada in Gaza and the West Bank as a turning point
in recent Turkish-Israeli relations. The effect of media
coverage of the violence on Turkish public opinion and the
GOT was notable. Then-Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit publicly
scolded Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon during a joint
press conference in Ankara in November 2001, rejecting
Sharon's claims that Yasser Arafat "supports terror." Ecevit
further enflamed tensions in April 2002 when he stated that
Sharon's policy toward the Palestinians was tantamount to
"genocide."

...AND THE AKP BEGAN TO PLAY THE FIELD
--------------


7. (C) The election of the pro-Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayip Erdogan in November
2002, had a further impact on the Turkish-Israeli
relationship. Upon assuming power, the AKP began slowly to
shift the direction of Turkey's foreign policy to include a
greater focus on its Middle Eastern neighbors, including both
Arab states and Iran. The AKP believed Turkey, a member of
NATO for over 50 years, with long-term aspirations of joining
the European Union, had for too long neglected its neighbors
to the south and east. In line with the vision laid out in
"Strategic Depth," a book published in 2000 by PM Erdogan's
foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu, the GOT began
engaging Iran, Syria, and others on a more regular basis,
seeking to strengthen bilateral ties and increase Turkish
influence throughout the region. According to Erkmen at
ASAM, there is a camp within the AKP that is ideologically
opposed to Israel and is anti-Semitic at its core. Erdogan
has been known to make anti-Semitic comments on occasion.
Even Vahit Kirsci, and AKP MP and chairman of the
Turkish-Israeli Parliamentary Friendship group, admits that
some AKP members came into parliament with a definite
anti-Israel bias.


8. (C) Kirisci emphasized to us the importance AKP placed on
fostering its relations with all of its neighbors after 2002,
especially for the Turkish economy. He said the AKP saw the
need to improve not only political but also commercial and
cultural ties in the region. This effort called for a more
"dynamic" foreign policy than that pursued by previous
governments in Ankara. The result is that Turkey, according
to Kirsci, has a better platform from which to address the
most difficult issues in the bilateral relationships with its
neighbors. Turks point to the facilitative role they played
in organizing the first official, public meeting between
Israeli and Pakistani officials in September 2005 as evidence
that it can help bridge the divide between the Islamic world
and the West, including Israel.

BUT THE RELATIONSHIP LIVES ON
--------------


9. (C) MFA Department Head for the Middle East, Sedat Onal,
and Kirisci both argue that Turkish-Israeli relations are
deep enough to withstand the most difficult challenges.
Recent history supports that conclusion. The relationship
was tested in 2004 when Erdogan blasted Israel's killing of
then-Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin in March, calling it "a
terrorist act." One month later, Erdogan described Israeli
policy in Gaza as "state-sponsored terrorism." By summer
2004, however, then-Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade
Ehud Olmert was visiting Turkey for a meeting of the
Turkey-Israel Joint Economic Council and an $800 million
contract had been signed by Turkey's Zorlu Group to build and
manage three energy plants in Israel. PM Erdogan visited
Israel in May 2005, announcing the development of 17 new
joint Turkish-Israeli military projects. After Hamas won the
January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, AKP
officials, including FM Abdullah Gul, met "in their political
party capacity" with Damascus-based Hamas leader Khaled
Meshal in Ankara, in February. The meeting garnered fierce
criticism from Israel as well as the United States. But by
May, new Israeli FM Livni was visiting Turkey on her first
official overseas trip, saying that "the issue of the Hamas
visit in Turkish-Israeli relations has been closed."


10. (C) Israel often must overlook outbursts or politically
embarrassing insults from Turkey. The Israeli DCM here told
us Israel has accepted this aspect of the relationship and
sees it for what it generally is: Turkish politicians playing
to a domestic audience. She added, "They yell and scream and
we choose to forgive and look the other way. The important
thing is maintaining the relationship as best we can." Onal
described the relationship with Israel as "one of the two
main pillars" of Turkey's Middle East policy. Although
events in the Middle East can impact "the speed at which we
progress in our relations, they cannot impact the basis."

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Onal admitted privately to constantly having to do "damage
control" when fiery rhetoric is unleashed in reaction to
events in Israel and the Palestinian territories, but
emphasized that no government in Ankara can unilaterally
reverse the bilateral ties that bind Turkey and Israel.

BILATERAL BUSINESS TIES PLAY A KEY ROLE
--------------


11. (SBU) The sharp increase in defense trade beginning in
the 1990s played a large role in taking the bilateral
economic relationship to new levels of cooperation. Prior to
the warming of relations, the bilateral trade balance was
generally tilted in favor of Israel, which exported
technology and industrial products to Turkey, while importing
agricultural goods and raw materials. However, the
self-sustaining nature of strong bonds established between
the business sectors in both countries led to increasing
trade volume between Turkey and Israel outside of the defense
field. And in recent years, the balance has turned
dramatically in Turkey's favor. Bilateral trade in both 2005
and 2006 totaled over $2 billion, a twenty-fold increase
since 1990, with Turkish exports outstripping imports from
Israel by a ratio of nearly two-to-one. Compared to 1990
figures when the level of Israeli imports was a third larger
than Turkish exports to Israel, the turnaround has been
dramatic.


12. (C) The economic relationship will likely continue to
grow. About 400,000 Israeli tourists (a record number)
visited Turkey in 2006, while Turkish business interests in
Israel (as well as potentially in Gaza) continue to expand.
In December 2006, the two countries signed an ambitious
memorandum of understanding agreeing to build pipelines that
would transport oil, gas, water, and electricity from Turkey
to Israel under the Mediterranean Sea. Although the economic
and technical reality of this project is not at all clear,
the Turks place great importance on this potential
north-south link which could send oil and gas to Asian and
global markets. GOT officials have indicated their intention
is not only to establish the connection with Israel as a
bilateral economic link, but also to help contribute to
regional development and peace by linking in Jordan and the
Palestinian territories to receive water and electricity as
well. In April 2006, FM Gul signed an MOU with Palestinian
officials with a view toward reopening an industrial zone at
Erez in the Gaza strip. Despite the political uncertainty
surrounding the future of the Palestinian Authority at the
moment, Turkish officials remain committed to the project and
the $5 million donation the GOT promised to help rehabilitate
the industrial park.

TRUE TO FORM: A STORM, A LULL, THEN A FLURRY
--------------


13. (C) The events in Lebanon during summer 2006 touched off
a difficult period in the bilateral relationship. Following
Israeli air strikes in Lebanon, the Turkish public mood
turned fiercely anti-Israeli. AKP officials responded
predictably, condemning Israeli actions. Parliamentarians
were especially critical. Of 293 members who belonged to the
bilateral parliamentary friendship group before the summer,
by September, 256 had resigned. Vahit Karisci said it had
not been easy for him over the past five months after he
decided to remain as chairman of the group, noting many
voters (and even his friends) in his district had expressed
their displeasure with his decision; he added that he had
received anonymous threats. He stayed because, as he put it,
"We (the AKP) administer a country. It's our responsibility.
We can't ignore what has happened, but we need to be
realistic in foreign policy. And as a major regional actor,
we need to remain engaged."


14. (C) The subsequent five months have played out in much
the same way as past spats. An expected visit by PM Olmert
to Turkey at some point during Fall 2006 (a return visit for
Erdogan's 2005 trip to Israel) was continually pushed off by
the Turks, despite Israeli requests for specific dates. The
Turkish General Staff decided in August 2006 to postpone
Exercise Reliant Mermaid until 2007, citing "current
developments in the region and the evacuations in the eastern
Mediterranean." evertheless, by December 2006, Turkish
Deputy Chief of Defense General Saygun was holding high-level
defense talks with his counterpart in Israel. A February 15
date has been set for PM Olmert's visit to Ankara. MFA
Undersecretaries will meet the week of February 7 for annual
political consultations, and Trade Minister Tuzmen will lead
a Turkish delegation to the annual meeting of the bilateral
joint economic cooperation council in early March. Finally,
GOT officials tell us Erdogan will likely visit Israel, as
well as Gaza/West Bank, this spring, prior to the May
presidential elections in Turkey. And, as reported in ref a,

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the GOT has offered its good offices in helping to facilitate
a prospective meeting involving Olmert, PA President Abbas,
and Secretary Rice in the future. In short, the pragmatic
relationship is on track.


15. (C) COMMENT: Turkish-Israeli ties, like any relationship,
require a degree of compromise, both between the parties, and
at times between each party and its own priorities. Israel,
admittedly, seems most often to swallow hard and put on a
brave face in response to the occasional Turkish outburst.
And the margin of error can be slim in how far a misstep can
set back the overall relationship. For example, the Israeli
DCM worried recently about the impact a possible decision by
El Al to withdraw from the Tel Aviv-Istanbul route might have
on the relationship as Turkish officials might read more into
that purely commercial decision than is warranted. After the
January 30 announcement that El Al will cease its operations
in Istanbul beginning in March, the GOT expressed concern
about the decision, but it remains to be seen whether there
will be any long-term impact on relations. However, if past
experience is a guide, regardless of what politicians might
say or do, in the end the relationship will continue to
deepen, to the benefit of both countries.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON