GOT REITERATES TO SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON THE NEED FOR CONCRETE ACTION AGAINST PKK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000219 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2032 TAGS: PTER PREL PREF MOPS TU IZ SUBJECT: GOT REITERATES TO SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON THE NEED FOR CONCRETE ACTION AGAINST PKK REF: 06 GENEVA 1385 Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Turkey is still waiting for concrete action against the PKK, GOT leaders and officials told visiting Special Envoy Ralston Jan. 30-31. Ralston's interlocutors acknowledged progress on the Makhmour refugee camp, but emphasized that they have higher priorities. The GOT agreed to work with us to identify several deliverables for a trilateral meeting with the Iraqis in the relatively near future. End summary. ¶2. (C) FonMin Gul, CHOD Buyukanit (reported septel), counterpart Gen. (r) Baser, and Turkish MPs all told visiting Special Envoy for Countering the PKK Gen. (r) Joseph Ralston Jan. 30-31 that Turkey appreciates progress on closing the Makhmour refugee camp in northern Iraq, but is still waiting for concrete steps to deal with the PKK's presence in northern Iraq. Gul and Baser reminded Ralston of the great importance that the Turkish public places on addressing the issue, Baser adding that many remain skeptical that the special envoy process will succeed. Reading from prepared talking points, Baser criticized President Bush's Jan. 10 speech on Iraq for calling out Syria and Iran on supporting terrorism in Iraq, but only referring indirectly to the PKK as an Iraq-Turkey border issue. ¶3. (S) Baser asserted that public opinion on the PKK issue has put both him and the GOT in a difficult position. He said the GOT retains the right to take action in the absence of evidence that the Iraqis will do so. But, he continued, the GOT has charged him with seeking solutions together with the U.S. and Iraq. The GOT will continue to factor in the effect unilateral Turkish action might have on Turkey's relationship with the U.S., Iraq, and the region. ¶4. (S) Regarding the President's speech, Ralston explained that we wanted to send a positive signal to Turkey on the PKK issue, but as the American public neither knows nor understands the PKK issue, a direct reference to the group in the speech would have been confusing for the domestic audience. Indeed, Ralston confirmed that since he and Baser last met on Dec. 11, he has been able to focus the attention of the highest levels in the USG on the problem. Makhmour: Real Progress -------------- ¶5. (S) Ralston briefed both Gul and Baser on his Jan. 29 visit to the Makhmour Camp. Ralston said he had been surprised by some of what he had seen: the camp is not isolated, but hard by Makhmour village; it is difficult to distinguish where the camp ends and the village begins. The buildings are not in excellent condition and have no running water, but the people are well-fed, clean, well-clothed, and appear unafraid. Ralston reported that the UN's census -- while not yet official -- showed that of the camp's 11,500 residents, about 6,000 are children. Of the remaining 5,500, a large majority are women. Most men present in the camp are older. He emphasized how important it is to move to close the camp ASAP. The older children in the camp are a prime recruiting ground for the PKK, and only closing the camp will ensure that the PKK loses this pool of potential fighters. Turkey should move right away to sign the Tripartite Agreement with the GOI and UNHCR so the process can move forward. ¶6. (S) The first steps have been accomplished, Ralston continued. The Jan. 17 ISF operation to search for weapons and ensure PKK elements were removed from the camp was a success. A company of U.S. soldiers monitored the operation and remain in place with the ISF battalion; the U.S. personnel told Ralston that the ISF has performed professionally. It is also important that this is the first action ISF have taken to deal with the PKK; it sets a precedent for more. Ralston also briefed on his meeting with KRG President Barzani. Barzani pushed for Turkey to provide amnesty for PKK fighters; Ralston responded that this was not realistic. Ralston told Baser that he believes Barzani is coming to realize that the PKK is a liability for the KRG. ¶7. (S) In the Baser meeting, MFA Director General for Security Affairs (S/CT-equivalent) Guven complained that under the terms of UNHCR's operation plan, Turkish officials were to be granted access to the camp following the expulsion of PKK elements. Thus, Guven went on, Turkey still has "question marks" about whether the civilian nature of the camp has indeed been restored. Baser added that there are intelligence reports indicating that the PKK-front Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party still maintains an office in the camp. Ralston emphasized that the ISF, MNF-I, and UN were satisfied that the camp has been cleared of terrorist elements, and that ISF will continue to surround the camp to ensure PKK elements do not slip back in. ¶8. (S) Baser underscored that the ISF search was a good step. He noted intelligence reports that Abdullah Ocalan may have instructed PKK fighters to leave the camp in advance of the ISF operation, but conceded that whatever the reason may have been for the absence of fighters in the camp, the important thing is that they are not there now. ¶9. (C) Gul stated that the camp is not Turkey's top counter-PKK priority, but it is important. He understood the need to make progress on the Tripartite Agreement, but argued that Turkey must proceed carefully. Turkey will receive its citizens "as agreed," but must also take steps to ensure they will be loyal citizens. Noting the census numbers, he wondered openly where the children's fathers might be. Gul also emphasized the importance of ensuring that the facilities in the camp will not be available for the PKK's use after it closes. Ralston responded that this is an Iraqi decision, but given the camp's proximity to the village of Makhmour, perhaps the facilities could simply be turned over to the mayor there. The Search for Deliverables -------------- ¶10. (S) The non-paper conveyed by the Turkish embassy in Washington to the Ralston on January 10 (full text in para. 18) was reviewed during the Ralston-Baser meeting. EUR/SE Deputy Director Hunt reported that we have raised many of the items it identifies with GOI and KRG authorities. While they have shown a willingness to assist on some of them, many are simply not possible to accomplish. Hunt noted that an Iraqi court has ruled that the Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party is a legal political party, and ordered that its offices be allowed to re-open. Unfortunately, the PKK has used this ruling to re-open many of the front offices that the Iraqis had shut down. ¶11. (S) Despite these difficulties, Ralston suggested that Turkey and the U.S. move toward a trilateral discussion with the GOI. It would be useful first to have identified several items that we can be assured all three sides would agree to as concrete deliverables. He underscored the need to elicit concrete, verifiable actions from the Iraqis, and added that we well understand that a trilateral meeting that produces no result is worse than not having one at all. Gul and Baser agreed to this. Gul: Action Necessary -------------- ¶12. (C) In his meeting with Ralston, FonMin Gul reiterated a number of the same points he made in their Oct. 12 meeting: While the GOT is still waiting for concrete results from the process, it views Ralston's appointment and subsequent work as a sign of U.S. determination to deal with the issue. He understood that while the PKK may be the GOT's number one issue, it is only one of "thousands" of issues the U.S. must deal with. The dramatic political reforms that have opened up Turkish society mean that the PKK has no basis for continuing its terrorist acts. GOT efforts to develop the southeast economically continue: In Diyarbakir province four years ago, only 150 villages had running water, while now over 1,000 do. ¶13. (C) Gul understood that the GOI faces many significant challenges, but emphasized that Barzani and Talabani must understand that the PKK will be a threat to them as well. He said he cannot explain to the Turkish people that while Syria half-heartedly attempted to hide Ocalan's presence there in the 1990s, PKK leader Murat Karayilan is allowed to appear on Iraqi Kurdish television. Gul on Kirkuk: Message Received -------------- ¶14. (S) Ralston requested Gul to cool GOT public rhetoric on the Kirkuk issue. He encouraged the GOT to express its concerns on this issue with the GOI in a private setting rather than through the press. We have observed that Turkish rhetoric has caused a backlash in Iraq. Gul responded that he understood that the PKK and Kirkuk are different issues, but that Turkish commentators and politicians tend to mix them. He agreed that recent rhetoric has been counterproductive, and he had warned people about this. Gul recited Turkey's concerns about Kirkuk at length. He asserted that Saddam eventually fell because he pursued "maximalist" policies, and worried that the Iraqi Kurds were pursuing the same maximalist approach vis-a-vis Kirkuk. These demands could expand the ongoing violence in Iraq from a sectarian basis to an ethnic one as well. A referendum on a territorial issue such as this is fine if 90% of the population agrees on a certain item. But if the vote is only 55-60% in favor, this will force the losers to resist the outcome. Violence will follow. ¶15. (C) Despite its concerns, Gul continued, Turkey wants to do more for Iraq. Thousands of Turks work there, and Turkey is working to change its laws so it can export even more electricity to Iraq. The two nations need each other, but the PKK and Kirkuk issues get in the way of improving our relations. Kurdish MP Emphasizes Dialogue -------------- ¶16. (C) Ralston also met with MPs Mehmet Dulger and Turhan Comez (ruling Justice and Development Party--AKP) as well as Onur Oymen and Esat Canan (opposition Republican People's Party--CHP). All except Canan followed the GOT's line of urging action ASAP against the PKK. Canan, a Kurd from the far southeastern province of Hakkari, emphasized the need for dialogue with the GOI and the KRG. Why, he asked, will Turkey invite Iranians and Syrians here, but not Iraqi President Talabani? He asserted that 20 years of military action against the PKK has not solved the problem, only dialogue will. ¶17. (S) Comment: Ralston's meetings here moved the ball forward, but his conversations were testy and reconfirmed Turkish impatience on the PKK. Turkish officials acknowledged our progress -- in particular on Makhmour -- but still want to see direct action to deal with the PKK's continued presence in northern Iraq. The next steps are to finalize Makhmour's closure and to work out a small package of achievable deliverables that could come from a trilateral that should occur by late March. End comment. ¶18. (S) Text of GOT non-paper of Jan. 10 on PKK (as received): BEGIN TEXT January 10, 2007 ANKARA 00000219 004 OF 005 MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED TO COUNTER THE PKK/KONGRA-GEL ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ The PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists are deployed in northern Iraq. The terrorists reside in the camps that are located in northern Iraq and they supply their logistic needs, arms and ammunition, generate financial support and find the opportunity to do propaganda in this region without any difficulties. The threat of terror against Turkey can not be eliminated unless PKK presence in northern Iraq is cut off. Turkey and the US have discussed the steps to be taken on this matter in two bilateral meetings as well as two trilateral meetings with the participation of Iraq, but achieved no results. The expectations of the Turkish public from the trilateral negotiations process have further increased especially after the level of this platform has been elevated. For this reason, if a new tour of trilateral meeting is going to be held, subsequently certain decisions must be taken with a view to implementing and sharing them with the public opinion. To this effect this list of Measures to be adopted to terminate PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities in northern Iraq was submitted to the US authorities on August 1, 2006. This list is still valid. The special Envoys who were appointed have already met four times and consulted with each other. We believe that in the period ahead, a trilateral meeting which could be held should result in a common understanding regarding the following measures at least as a first step: a) Declaration by the US and Iraqi Government to the effect that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL not only poses a threat to the future security of Iraq, but will also seriously jeopardize Iraq's bilateral relations with its neighbors as well as regional peace and stability and that all measures, including military ones, will be taken to eliminate this threat. b) Proclamation of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL as a terrorist organization by the Iraqi Government. c) Joint declaration defining the objective of the trilateral talks as "terminating the terrorist activities and presence of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq". d) Avoiding a language by US and Iraqi authorities which excludes military measures while publicly referring to the steps that are considered to be taken against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL presence in Iraq. e) Conclusion of the draft Agreement on Combating Terrorism submitted to the Iraqi Government. f) Full implementation of the pledge made by President Talabani regarding the PKK. Accordingly: i. The KDP and the PUK will issue a warning to the PKK calling on it to disarm itself immediately, ii. The PKK's ability to mobilize itself in northern Iraq will be curtailed, iii. Security forces will be deployed to the areas of PKK activity, iv. PKK affiliated parties and other such formations as the PCDK (Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party),DCP (Democratic Construction Party),HAW-PAR will be shut down. g) Elimination of PKK/KONGRA-GEL camps starting with Sinath- Haftanin region, in the direction from West to the East along the areas adjacent to the Turkish-Iraqi border, and joint verification afterwards. h) Destruction of the ammunition storage facilities at Mergasish and Nazdur camps from which the PKK/KONGRA-GEL provides its explosive materials. i) Capturing and extradition to Turkey of the PKK leaders in northern Iraq, in particular Murat Karayilan, Duran Kalkan, Mustafa Karasu, Cemil Bayik and Fehman Huseyin, about whom detailed information was submitted to the Iraqi authorities together with copies of INTERPOL arrest warrants. j) Control of all routes of access to the PKK camps by the Iraqi security forces. k) Effective control of the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraqi border by the Iraqi security forces. l) Timely and relevant intelligence sharing by the US and Iraqi authorities. m) Prevention of the Kurdish regional authorities from making provocative, inflammatory and pro-PKK statements. n) Revocation of all travel passes and other identification documents issued by the Kurdish groups to the members of the PKK. o) Detention of individuals entering Iraq, by legal or illegal means, to enlist in the PKK and the enforcement of strict border controls at Erbil Airport to prevent traveling of PKK elements from Iraq to Europe or vice versa. p) Prohibition of the PKK's media activities for propaganda purposes in northern Iraq, in particular prevention of the broadcast by the Roj Radio located at Qandil. q) Effective termination of the logistic support from which PKK elements benefit in Iraq. END TEXT ¶19. (U) Gen. Ralston did not have an opportunity to clear this message before departing Ankara. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON