TURKEY: OPPOSITION CHP BLAMES ELECTION RESULTS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001981 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: OPPOSITION CHP BLAMES ELECTION RESULTS ON DEBT, DE FACTO VOTE-BUYING Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b,d) This cable was written jointly with Istanbul Consulate. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Incoming opposition deputies on the center-left shared their views with Ambassador that the July 22 election result -- a soaring win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and a piddling increase for so-called center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) -- was due to high levels of debt and to AKP's shameless exploitation of government resources and religious propaganda. Deputies believe that the presidential election will invite greater tensions with the military. One deputy expressed doubts about Turkey's European Union membership bid, and asked for "a US handshake" on a host of regional issues. END SUMMARY. Election Readout: Fear of change, uneven playing field, and dirty tricks -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) CHP Vice Chairman and deputy for Bursa Onur Oymen and Istanbul deputies Ilhan Kesici and Ahmet Tan shared their views with Ambassador about the elections. Oymen, part of CHP Chairman Deniz Baykal's immediate circle, gave no credit to AKP beyond stating that they had bought millions of votes. He attributed the results to four factors: the collapse of the center-right (begun in the 2002 election and affirmed last week); AKP's excessive exploitation of religious themes that caused many voters who complained about the government to vote for them anyway; AKP's bribes of free coal and foodstuffs; and the blatant support of the media and big business for the ruling party. He insisted that in local terms, CHP had done better than in "all previous elections," but that CHP's "impressive gains" were obscured by MHP's entrance into parliament. (Comment: CHP and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) had an electoral alliance that claimed 20.9 percent of the vote, less than 0.3 points higher than their combined respective 19.4 and 1.23 points from the 2002 election.) ¶3. (C) Center-right politician and CHP latecomer Ilhan Kesici acknowledged AKP's success in presenting a strong leadership team, conveying an impression of being in touch with the people, and keeping the focus on economic progress. Privately, he observed that CHP had mishandled economic issues in the election campaign, giving nothing but vague 
promises of future economic achievement. Kesici was concerned about an abnormally strong Turkish lira and claimed that both public and household debt had increased drastically since 2003; if the exchange rate were suddenly to revert to historic levels, those holding debt would be seriously affected. This situation contributed to economic fears among voters who thus did not want to change the government in Ankara. Seventy percent of Turkish voters are center-right and, while center-left voters may occasionally vote center-right, center-right voters consider it a "sin" to vote center-left, Kesici argued. CHP leaders, who wanted to garner a doable 25 percent of the vote, were very disappointed with CHP's 20.9 percent showing. The CHP party apparatus simply does not have the capability to move the electorate the way AKP does, Kesici said. ¶4. (C) Ahmet Tan, former Secretary General of the DSP, which obtained 13 CHP seats in parliament through its election alliance, professed he was "surprised but not shocked" by AKP's electoral success. He said that in Turkey, clear majorities are always given a second chance; Turks don't like to take risks. He attributed AKP's result to a dynamically changing economy in which 20 percent of the people live under the poverty line but 50 million citizens now hold credit cards. AKP "brainwashing" also played a role, he said. Presidential Election Likely to Lead to Problems -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Commenting on the challenge of electing Turkey's next President, Oymen emphasized that the PM had committed himself to compromise -- in other words, not to impose his own ANKARA 00001981 002 OF 002 preferred candidate. If Foreign Minister Gul insists on becoming president, "there will be problems in society." ¶6. (C) Kesici felt AKP has the ability to elect Abdullah Gul or whoever they wish, but electing Gul or someone like Erdogan would further heighten political problems. AKP could "impose" Gul on the country, depending on the power balance within AKP itself, he said. He termed the military's reaction "unpredictable. They will hate anyone from within AKP ranks." But the military found itself in new circumstances with AKP win of over 46 percent of the July 22 vote. The international community, too, would oppose military intervention. "They're in a difficult situation." Kesici could only foresee continuing and building tension with the military, adding there would be absolutely no normalization in political circles if AKP elected one of its own to the presidency. Even if the military could take no action, there would be political tension in every single day - a bad situation for Turkey, Kesici observed. The EU and Beyond -------------- ¶7. (C) Kesici said EU relations will be difficult, with no hope of full membership for at least 20 years. Turks need to understand forthrightly that, despite strong U.S. backing, full membership is many years away - if ever. No superficial, false hope should be created; it would only lead to further tension in the country. Observing that the EU and Turkey need each other, he suggested that a less insistent approach may yield a more favorable response from the EU. Turks will understand a clear debate on membership without it fueling anti-EU or anti-American attitudes. Ambassador encouraged such a debate, which would likely result in a more unified, focused effort by all segments of Turkey's polity. ¶8. (C) Kesici noted that Turkey could abandon EU membership altogether, but said such a decision should be made only after full consultations with the United States and major political leaders in the EU. Because of Europe's concerns over Turkey's membership, Kesici thought Turkey could not insist on full membership for the time being. Again, "full, comprehensive consultation with the U.S." would be important. The U.S. is Turkey's most important ally and the best partner for such discussions. "I believe Turkey will lose if not hand-in-hand with the U.S." Citing great opportunities and risks in Iraq - where unity and success are vital and a "Kurdistan" most aggravating - Iran, the Caucasus, energy, Middle East and Cyprus, Kesici said Turkey (not AKP) needs a "U.S. handshake" on these issues for at least the next 20 years and preferably 50 years. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ MCELDOWNEY