TURKISH CUSTOMS TARGETING AND RISK MANAGEMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001941 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/ECC NJOHANSON CBP FOR RWATTS, BPICKETT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OTRA PARM TU SUBJECT: TURKISH CUSTOMS TARGETING AND RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW AND AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION ¶1. Summary: Turkish Customs places great importance on accurate and timely targeting and risk management of shipments coming to, leaving, and passing through the Republic of Turkey. Due to the high volume of cargo which does pass through Turkish Customs areas, Turkish Customs has been working to improve its targeting approaches. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently conducted a second Targeting and Risk Management Workshop focused on land border crossings. Following the workshop, CBP personnel held detailed discussions with Turkish Customs Headquarters targeters in order to gain a better understanding of the Turkish system and identify possible areas of future cooperation. Overview ¶2. Turkish Customs places great importance on accurate and timely targeting and risk management of shipments coming to, leaving, and passing through the Republic of Turkey. Due to the high volume of cargo which does pass through Turkish Customs areas, Turkish Customs has been working to improve their targeting approaches. While the systems currently being utilized by Turkish Customs are effective, contributing to over 2 tons of heroin being seized in 2006 and over 1 ton so far this year, Turkish Customs officials recognize that they can be improved. ¶3. Last summer, CBP conducted a sea port targeting and risk management workshop at the Port of Mersin. This was followed up with a visit to CBP facilities by a high level delegation of Turkish Customs officials this past November. The visit included a tour of the National Targeting Center and presentations on US methods. This summer another targeting and risk management workshop was conducted in Ankara for land border targeting. Turkey has also been working with EU nations, specifically Germany and the Netherlands, to incorporate their ideas and practices. Targeting and Risk Management Workshop ¶4. US Customs and Border Protection Service conducted a Targeting and Risk Management Workshop for 24 Turkish Customs officials in Ankara from July 9 - 13, 2007. The focus of the workshop was the targeting of shipments through a land border crossing. Members of Turkish Customs Headquarters along with representatives from key border locations were in attendance at the workshop. The course included a day of practical exercises at the inland clearance station in Ankara. Initial feedback from those in attendance was that the information was very useful and will be valuable as Turkish Customs continues to develop and improve its targeting and risk management procedures. ¶5. Following the one-week workshop, CBP instructors conducted meetings and discussions with members of Turkish Customs Headquarters operations and targeters. Turkish officials were open in their discussion of their policies and procedures in regards to Targeting and Risk Management. Turkish Customs currently conducts targeting for two distinct reasons: 1) Customs Enforcement - to stop the illegal entry of goods into the Republic of Turkey; 2) General Directorate of Customs - to ensure that proper duties are paid for goods which are shipped to Turkey. These two systems work independent of each other, with a very small amount of information being shared. While these two systems have been successful in the detection of violators, they incorporate a significant amount of duplicative man-hours and could be improved. Risk Analysis - Directorate of Customs Enforcement ¶6. The Risk Analysis Department of the Directorate of Customs Enforcement was established seven months ago. Prior to the establishment of this dedicated department, risk analysis was conducted by the customs enforcement headquarters watch officer following a review of information submitted by the shippers. Now this new department is dedicated to reviewing not only information contained on the submitted manifest, but also information on companies, drivers, and from other relevant sources. The computer system which is being used to collect and flag shipments of concern is about 6 years old and utilizes information input by the border locations and headquarters. ¶7. The Directorate of Customs Enforcement utilizes two information systems to develop its list of high risk vehicles. These systems are the Land Border Information System and the Intelligence Information System. The Land ANKARA 00001941 002 OF 003 Border Information System provides basic information concerning the driver, companies, the product and other key information. This information is screened against high risk criteria and provides a score. If the score is above the allowable threshold, the vehicle is required to go through additional inspection. ¶8. There appear to be no standard rules for entering exam information and results. Line inspectors may enter written exam results without the benefit of codes or a standard method, possibly leading to misinformation. Results for negative exams are not always entered into the various systems. CBP instructors commented that a significant historical data base and information can be gained from the negative exams as well as the positive exams. This information can assist targeters in selection of the higher risk shipments, if a shipper has a strong record of negative results. It was also noted that information not entered into the system was information that was lost for future evaluations. ¶9. The Directorate of Customs Enforcement also utilizes a vehicle tracking system for high risk trucks transiting through Turkey. This system utilizes a GPS tracking device being attached to the truck by a Customs official as the truck crosses the Turkish border. The device provides a signal which is transmitted back to Customs Headquarters. The truck is then tracked as it proceeds through Turkey. Shipments that deviate from their intended routes are subject to additional inspections when they attempt to cross the border leaving Turkey. The transmitting devices are then removed as the truck is processed out of the country. Risk Analysis - General Directorate of Customs ¶10. During meetings with members of the risk analysis department of the General Directorate of Customs, CBP instructors were given a presentation of the methods which are used to conduct risk analysis. The process used by the General Directorate includes: a. Information is currently being collected via paper forms which are manually input into an Excel database for storage and future review. b. Individual targeters manually review the database for anomalies or other information which raise certain flags of concern. The shipments that do become shipments of concern are then identified and this information is passed to the border location. If the shipment has not already cleared the crossing, it is subject to additional inspections. Because all reviews are done manually through the large databases, there have been cases where possibly at risk shipments have cleared the crossing before being identified by Custom Headquarters. c. The database tracks inspections which uncover violations of Turkish laws or regulations but does not track negative inspections as reported from the field inspectors. d. The database utilized by the General Directorate of Customs is not linked to any of the databases being utilized by Customs Enforcement. Suggested Areas of Future Cooperation ¶11. Improvements to the database storage and access. The data which is being collected and stored by the General Directorate of Customs needs to be migrated from the current Excel files to a more modern database system. CBP has developed a system which can access old databases to draw from this important historical information to assist in improving targeting. If possible, a model or prototype of the US system could be shared with Turkish Customs which would greatly assist in their targeting procedures. ¶12. Information sharing is an important step in the targeting and risk management process. Turkish Customs would benefit from the linking of their targeting database information. Information collected by Customs Enforcement officers could benefit the General Directorate of Customs in their targeting of shipments that are trying to elude taxes or tariffs. Also, border locations would be able to receive one list of high risk vehicles which would allow them to focus more attention on the actual actions at the border location, which also could raise suspicions on a particular shipment. CBP could provide additional information on the positive results of sharing of information and ways which ANKARA 00001941 003 OF 003 have succeeded in the US in improving results without diminishing authorities. ¶13. Collection methods for negative result inspections need to be implemented. Turkish Customs now actively collects positive results information from inspections, however negative information is not collected. This negative information is just as important as the positive inspections and needs to be collected and incorporated into historic files. Turkish Customs would greatly benefit from assistance from IT experts in the development of databases which would allow easier collection and access to historic information. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON