TURKEY: CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001938 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE REF: A. SECSTATE 102187 ¶B. ANKARA 1188 ¶C. BELGRADE 1050 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Kelly Degnan for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Although Turkey remains committed to resolving Kosovo,s final status, the GOT has expressed apprehension about moving forward without the legal mandate of a UNSCR. The GOT maintains that, in the absence of a UN resolution, any multilateral or unilateral action would establish a perilous legal precedent. Turkish officials fully expect an independence outcome, however, and reiterated that GOT Kosovo policy closely parallels that of the U.S. and EU. Other contacts have told us that Turkey will "not be at the front of the line" to offer immediate recognition to Kosovo, but the GOT will inevitably join the international community in fully supporting independence once the dust has settled. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Post drew upon REF A to discuss Turkey's Kosovo policy with MFA Department Head for the Balkans Ilhan Saygili. Saygili assures us that Turkey's support for Kosovo independence remains unchanged (REF B). The GOT has utilized every opportunity to engage Pristina and Belgrade in this issue. Recent Russian behavior in the UNSC and the discussion of Kosovo independence outside a UNSCR has left the MFA ill at ease and hesitant to get very far ahead of U.S. and EU policy. ¶3. (C) Saygili explained the GOT deeply desires the legal precedent provided by a UNSCR. Under its strict interpretation of UNSCR 1244, the MFA contends that independence without a UN resolution is an illegal challenge to Serbian sovereignty. Such an action would also establish a paradoxical precedent for other independence or separatist conflicts. Furthermore, according to the MFA's legal interpretation, the absence of a follow-on UNSCR would negate any international mission's operational mandate. Saygili warmly received the provided points concerning KFOR and UNMIC's continued authority under UNSCR 1244, but opined that the MFA is unlikely to alter its view on Serbian sovereignty. ¶4. (C) The legal debate aside, the GOT maintains that its Kosovo policy remains in-line with that of the U.S. and EU. Turkey eagerly wants to play a key role in any post-independence international civilian oversight body, construct or lead agency notwithstanding. ¶5. (C) Other contacts agree with Saygili that, in the end, the GOT will support an independent Kosovo regardless of the means. Ankara-based Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) Kosovo watcher Erhan Turbedar commented that support for Kosovo's independence cuts across party lines. The several million Turks of Albanian decent constitute a sizable voting block that every party, including the ruling AKP, readily acknowledges. Saygili also noted that the AKP, fresh off an election victory, might now be more willing to support a unilateral declaration of independence due to this perception of a common heritage. ¶6. (C) Comment: Despite recently validated MFA suspicions that Serbia would lash out at any nation supporting a unilateral declaration of independence (REF C),a variety of sources have assured us that, while Turkey will not be one of the first countries to formally support an independent Kosovo, the GOT will inevitably provide full official recognition once the lead nations have taken the brunt of the backlash from Serbia and Russia. End Comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON