TURKISH AMBIVALENCE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001816 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM IR TU SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBIVALENCE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM REF: A. ANKARA 1520 ¶B. 06 ANKARA 6526 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Two Embassy-organized videoconferences and a recent Turkish roundtable reveal continued ambivalence about Iran's nuclear program among Turkey's non-governmental policy elites, including academics, think-tankers, and columnists. Turkish opinion-makers do not want to see Iran, a neighbor and historical rival, armed with nuclear weapons, though many believe it is inevitable. Some view Iran's nuclear program as defensive and designed to bolster and protect the regime, while others fear it will strengthen Iran's quest for regional hegemony. Some contrast Iran's support to Turkey against PKK terrorism with perceived lack of support from the West. Of most concern is the widespread perception that the conflict is principally between the U.S. and Iran, accompanied by the fear that the regional instability following a military confrontation with Iran is more dangerous than Iran's possession of nuclear weapons. End Summary Turkey, Iran...and Iraq -------------- ¶2. (C) Faruk Logoglu, President of Ankara's Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) and former ambassador to the United States, described Turkey's conflicting concerns at a recent ASAM roundtable on Iran. While a long-time ally of the West, Turkey remains Iran's neighbor and trade partner. Echoing the views of most Turkish analysts we have spoken to, Logoglu said Ankara does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons and supports Iran's compliance with IAEA safeguards, but considers UN Security Council sanctions ultimately ineffective and harmful to Turkey. While acknowledging that Iran tried to export its Islamic revolution to Turkey in the 1980s, Logoglu claimed that Tehran has abandoned that strategy and does not currently pose an ideological threat to Turkey. ¶3. (C) Citing Iran's cooperation with Turkey against PKK terrorism in the tri-border area, several analysts have asked why Turkey should endanger support so important to its own security, at a time when PKK terrorists operating from northern Iraq attack Turkish military and civilians daily. Turkish opinion-makers have told us it is difficult for Turks to sympathize with U.S. and European requests for Turkey to take a harder line on Iran while those same allies are perceived as doing far less than Iran to help Turkey counter PKK terrorism. Views on Iran's Internal Dynamics -------------- ¶4. (C) Many Turkish analysts reject what they consider the dominant Western view: that the Iranian leadership is irrational, unreasonable, and stubbornly defiant. International Relations professor Idris Bal cited Iran's support for Armenia (as opposed to its Shiite neighbor Azerbaijan) in the 1992 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as evidence that Iranian policy is calculated and pragmatic. Turkish observers are of two minds on the motivations for Iran's nuclear program. Some say it is defensive and designed to increase support for the current regime among the population. ASAM Iran expert Arif Keskin maintains that Iran keeps the nuclear issue on its agenda to maintain unity, control internal pressure for reform, and divert international criticism from its terrorism and human rights records. Others, such as retired ambassadors Faruk Logoglu and Resat Arim, posit that Iran intends to use a nuclear weapons capability to enhance its efforts to obtain political hegemony over the region. Even here, however, Turkish analysts see Iran pursuing nuclear weapons less as a tool for blackmail than as a demonstration of Iranian leadership, designed to gain it broader support among Muslims as a credible counterweight to Western influence in the Middle East. Israel's Nuclear Program -------------- ¶5. (C) Turkish observers frequently point to Israel's undeclared nuclear weapons program as a threat to Iran and motivation for Iran's nuclear ambitions. In this context, some have noted that pious Turks remain uneasy about Israel's ANKARA 00001816 002 OF 002 weight in the Middle East and therefore tend to sympathize with Iran. As a result, Turks are more likely to ask why Iran should trust the U.S. and Israel, rather than why the West should trust Iran. It's a U.S.-Iran Problem -------------- ¶6. (C) The most troublesome aspect of the Turkish analysis is that it promotes the widespread belief that the Iran nuclear issue is essentially a bilateral U.S.-Iran dispute. This results in a passivity and fatalism as Turkey and other nations are effectively relegated to the status of helpless observers. Ambassador Logoglu's prescription for solving the problem focuses entirely on U.S. actions, including: abandoning the perceived U.S. goal of regime-change in favor of changing Iranian "behavior," offering incentives that ensure Iran's political and economic legitimacy, and negotiating directly with Iran at the highest levels. While paying lip service to the notion that it is Iran's responsibility to convince the whole international community of its peaceful intentions, most Turkish elites put the onus on the U.S. to solve the problem. Instability is the Greater Threat -------------- ¶7. (C) As a result of this attitude, most Turkish elites would agree with Logoglu that a military intervention by the U.S. and/or Israel is "not an option" and would lead to "catastrophic regional consequences," far out of proportion to the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program. There is a widespread belief that the U.S. and Israel are not capable of mounting a "clean" and precise attack on Iran, nor managing the regional consequences of such an attack, accompanied by a persistent fear that planning for such an attack is already underway. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON