TURKEY: KURDS ARE NOT A MONOLITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001781 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2022 TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: KURDS ARE NOT A MONOLITH Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is a message from Consulate Adana. ¶2. (C) Summary: In the Western media, Turkey's Kurds -- about 15 percent of the total population -- are frequently described as "restive," implying that members of this minority are all disaffected and favor separating from Turkey. This misperception is strengthened because -- despite the diversity of perspectives within the population -- Kurdish politics is still dominated by the terrorist PKK, which for nearly 20 years has blocked moderate alternatives to its violent strategy. In fact, Kurds in Turkey are as politically diverse as their compatriots and can be roughly divided into three groups: --First are hard-core nationalists who demand that ethnic differences require political separation (either independence or federation). This group rejects both the cultural and civic aspects of Turkish identity. --A second group wants the Turkish state to acknowledge and accommodate Kurds' distinct cultural and linguistic identity while accepting their status as Turkish citizens. Their ideal is the U.S. model of mixing cultural and civic that produces "hyphenated Americans." --Members of the third group fully embrace both Turkish civic and cultural identities, considering themselves Turkish in every respect, even if they were raised speaking Kurdish. In this respect they resemble other groups (such as Balkan or Caucasian-origin Turks) who moved to Anatolia and fully adopted the new Turkish identity without interest in gaining recognition for their other culture. ¶3. (C) The EU accession process, Turkey's fitful democratization and developments in Northern Iraq are making Kurdish politics more fluid and dynamic, particularly among the second group, which in many respects has been a silent majority. A moderate, more representative generation of leaders may be emerging now, both within the PKK-affiliated Democratic Society Party (DTP) and among civil society organizations that are especially active in Diyarbakir. The coming elections, in which 20-30 DTP-endorsed candidates are expected to win seats in parliament, could start a process of political maturation and moderation. But in order to gain strength, the moderates need GOT help in the form of accelerated democratization and some concrete evidence that the state will acknowledge, accommodate and respect those who want to show their distinct Kurdish identity. End summary. Kurds in Turkey: A Few Facts -------------- ¶4. (C) Many news stories mistakenly suggest that all of Turkey's Kurds live in the southeast and have a collective interest in breaking away from the central government to establish an independent state or join Northern Iraq to form a "Greater Kurdistan." The reality is more complicated: while some Kurds indeed favor radical solutions, the vast majority of Turkey's Kurds have no interest in dividing Turkey or leaving the relative stability and prosperity of their home country for the violent uncertainties of Northern Iraq. ¶5. (C) The GOT does not collect data on the ethnicity of its citizens, but a recent survey conducted by a polling company (KONDA) estimates that those identifying themselves as Kurds now number about 15 percent, or 11.5 million, of Turkey's population of 73 million. Although 12 southeastern provinces have Kurdish majorities (in addition to large numbers of Turks and Arabs as well as a small Christian minority),Kurds are spread throughout the country. Istanbul is home to about three million Kurds, making it the largest "Kurdish" city on earth. The Kurds can be divided into three basic groups: the incorrigibles, the moderates and the assimilated. The "Incorrigibles" -------------- ¶6. (C) The hard core followers of PKK founder Abdullah ANKARA 00001781 002 OF 004 Ocalan represent the most destructive of the three Kurdish identities in Turkey. Inspired by 1960s-era national liberation movements such as ETA and the IRA, the PKK is a highly centralized, tightly disciplined terror organization. Founded on the principle that ethnic differences require political separation, followers of the PKK reject both civic and cultural Turkish identities. ¶7. (C) In common with such movements, the PKK's original objective was the establishment of an independent (and socialist) Kurdistan. Over time, its public demands have moderated and are now limited to establishing greater Kurdish rights within a more democratic Turkish state and securing amnesty for themselves. One constant throughout the PKK's history has been supporters' unyielding allegiance to Ocalan and his proclamations. Current PKK leader Murat Karayilan's statement to the media, "To abandon Abdullah Ocalan is to abandon Kurdishness," expresses the extent to which Ocalan has succeeded in merging the struggle for Kurdish rights with his own all-encompassing personality cult. Even moderate Kurds who abhor his methods and megalomania credit him with awakening a sense of ethnic pride in the 1980s when, in the wake of the 1980 coup, the Turkish state was aggressively eliminating all vestigial expressions of Kurdish identity. ¶8. (C) While millions of Kurds vote for parties and politicians associated with the PKK and Ocalan, the actual number of PKK members is now well under 10,000 and its political viability is waning (though its criminal enterprises may sustain it for a longer period). Even ardent defenders of the organization openly state that their top goal now is to secure an amnesty for the fighters along with political reforms within the Turkish system, i.e. an honorable defeat. ¶9. (C) Part of the PKK's survival is undoubtedly related to its criminal activities -- ideology aside, the PKK's business empire includes links with drug and human trafficking through Turkey and extensive mafia-type enterprises in Western Europe. As with other violent, intolerant forms of ethnic nationalism, reducing the influence of this group will require a combination of military strength, intelligent law-enforcement, improved economic prospects and a viable political process that includes an exit strategy for those who have taken up arms. The Moderates -- "Happy is He Who Calls Himself a Turkish Citizen" -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The existence and proliferation of moderate, middle-class Kurds (who one journalist dubbed "Diyarbakir" Kurds, given the influence of that city) belies the perception that Turkish Kurds are uniformly poor and infatuated with separatist dreams. Ethnicity is not destiny. Bedrettin Karaboga, a successful Mardin businessman, told us, "Every day I thank god that I'm not an Iraqi, Iranian or Syrian Kurd. I'm fortunate and proud to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic. But I want respect in exchange for that." Turkey,s Kurds do not feel unconditional love for Ankara; they recognize that Turkish citizenship's economic, political and cultural benefits -- however imperfect -- represent the best potential for their future. Yilmaz Akinci, a journalist in his late 20's who frequently free-lances for American newspapers, echoed this sentiment, saying that the GOT should not worry about preserving itself as a unitary state because Kurds accept that they are Turkish citizens, but bristle at being forced to assume a Turkish cultural identity. ¶11. (C) As a pragmatic matter, middle-class Kurds recognize that Turkey's meritocratic education system and market-driven economy offer the best opportunity for upward mobility in the region. As a result of this upward mobility, nearly every successful Kurdish family has close relatives living in Istanbul and wants to send their children to one of the top universities in western Turkey. These moderate Kurds, many of whom are lawyers, are also firm believers that the European process will bring Turkey's Kurds the cultural and political benefits they crave in the same way that Catalans and other minorities in the EU have enjoyed expanded opportunities. ANKARA 00001781 003 OF 004 ¶12. (C) Ocalan's capture and the five-year lull in terrorist activity that followed created space for this moderate strain of Kurdish identity to gain a political foothold to a far greater extent than in the 1990s, though it is currently manifest in NGOs and business groups rather than in parties that directly challenge the PKK. The GOT's modest steps -- partly taken under EU pressure -- to relax restrictions on political and cultural expressions of Kurdishness have also improved the environment. By the same token, the current strain in Turkish-EU relations, a spike in ultra-nationalism among Turks and increased assertiveness by the Turkish military is leading some moderate Kurds to question the GOT's capacity to democratize and could eventually lead them to adopt more extreme positions. Assimilated Kurds -------------- ¶13. (C) The final group can best be described as "Turks with Kurdish parents." These citizens have embraced Turkishness to an extent that their Kurdish identity is largely invisible. In many respects, this erosion of traditional cultural follows the global pattern of urbanization: migrants to large cities in western Turkey adopt the dominant language, their children intermarry and within a generation or two assimilation is complete. In Turkey, the assimilation ethos is so strong that, in the KONDA survey, four percent of those who self-identified as Turks said that their mother tongue is Kurdish. This ethos is strongest in western Turkey, but exists in the southeast as well: the Kurdish chairman of Van's AK Party denied that Turkey has a Kurdish problem (contrary to what party leader PM Erdogan declared in 2005) and the Kurdish mayor of Bingol denied altogether the existence of a separate Kurdish identity. Another example is AKP vice chair Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat, a Kurd from a prominent family in Adiyaman, whence they were forced out in 1925 in the aftermath of the Sheikh Said rebellion. They settled in Mersin and, as a result, Firat did not learn Kurdish growing up -- only at university from fellow students. ¶14. (C) Columnist Burak Bekdil noted that it is a mistake to talk about Turkey's Kurds as a monolithic bloc because so many are completely assimilated, in the Cabinet and parliament, as stockbrokers in Istanbul, workers in Izmir and journalists in Ankara. These assimilated Kurds, Bekdil wrote, would certainly not subscribe to the assertion by DTP vice chairman Leyla Zana that their three leaders are Ocalan, Talabani and Barzani. Members of this group are as politically diverse as the Turkish public as a whole. ¶15. (C) In this sense, it is inaccurate to accuse the GOT (and Turkish society generally) of relegating Kurds to second-class citizenship since it is commonplace for Kurds to attain positions of great influence -- but full acceptance into the top echelons of official society requires Kurds to fully embrace the cultural elements of Turkishness and not openly acknowledge any association with their Kurdish identity. Elections: Step Toward Normalcy? -------------- ¶16. (C) While there is considerable diversity of opinion among Turkey,s 11 million Kurds, the "incorrigibles" have dominated Kurdish politics through the PKK, which has waged war both against the state and moderates within its own community (witness the murder of Hikmet Fidan in Diyarbakir in 2005, a Kurdish politician who openly spoke out against the PKK). This domination has fanned the worst instincts of the Turkish establishment to regard the Kurdish issue as an existential struggle of us versus them rather than as a problem that can be resolved through the political process. (The fact that PKK head Ocalan runs a terrorist organization from solitary confinement when all communications are monitored has understandably raised questions about the extent to which he is manipulated by or in collusion with the GOT.) ¶17. (C) The most important current development in Kurdish politics is the internal battle between "Apo-ists" (those ANKARA 00001781 004 OF 004 loyal to Ocalan) and moderates who favor working within the system to extend the limits of Turkish democracy to enhance minority rights. Challenging Ocalan is difficult given the PKK's resources and willingness to use force. A deeper problem is the highly personalized style of Kurdish (and Turkish) politics, in which loyalties attach to charismatic leaders or clans rather than to organized parties or policy platforms. By fielding independent candidates, the Kurds may start a process that could further weaken Ocalan's influence. Members of parliament -- either within the DTP structure or by breaking from it -- could establish a rallying point for moderates willing to move away from violence. Many analysts argue that getting DTP members elected to parliament is an indispensable prerequisite to making progress on the Kurdish issue because it will demonstrate the state's willingness to engage with them and challenge them to behave more responsibly. Key to success of this effort, however, will be the DTPers' willingness to act as a positive political force -- not simply to respond to the orders of the PKK. ¶18. (C) But even if the DTP is unable to transform itself quickly into a genuinely democratic player, the continuing maturation of "Diyarbakir" Kurds through their work in civil-society NGOs (many supported by the EU),the emergence of a middle class of entrepreneurs and professionals likely, sooner or later, will result in a moderate, constructive alternative to the confrontational nationalism exemplified by the PKK. The Turkish establishment, for its part, has thus far appeared incapable of distinguishing between radical Kurds and their moderate brethren and as a result has been unwilling to countenance political liberalization lest it be viewed as granting concessions to terrorists. But in order to defeat PKK terror the GOT needs to develop the confidence to give Kurdish moderates the power to rise to leadership positions from which they will be able to jettison the albatross of PKK terror. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON