AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CYPRUS WITH TURKISH MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001749 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2017 TAGS: PREL CY TU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CYPRUS WITH TURKISH MFA Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (c) Summary: Ambassador encouraged Turkey, in conversations with MFA U/S Apakan and Deputy U/S Berk July 6 and 7, to look for ways to avoid the appearance of intransigence on Cyprus and take advantage of Papadopoulos' vulnerability at home and in some EU capitals. He also urged a forthcoming attitude toward proposed Papadopoulos/Talat meetings and cautioned against continued sniping by Ankara at UNSYG Special Representative Moller. Berk repeated Turkish boilerplate. Apakan reiterated Turkey's hard line on the July 8 process, but seemed to appreciate that a more nuanced, tactical approach could be useful looking toward autumn difficulties in the EU and maneuvering the Cypriots toward real negotiations in 2008. We will continue to push this theme. End Summary. ¶2. (c) During a meeting July 7 on various subjects (septels),Ambassador asked Apakan's views on mooted Papadopoulos/Talat meetings connected with the anniversary of Gambari's July 8 process and with the work of the Committee on Missing Persons. Apakan had just received a report on the meetings idea, which he ascribed to Moller, and indicated Ankara would be sorting out its views in coming days. ¶3. (c) Ambassador urged that Turkey consider how best to use the current situation tactically. He said Papadopoulos is under pressure at home and in some European capitals for being too intransigent. This had led him to take certain actions that, whether fair or not and whether Ankara likes it or not, have made him and the Cypriot government appear to be more flexible -- and Turkey less so. The appearance of Turkish intransigence will not serve Turkey's interests in the Cyprus negotiations and even less in its EU accession work. While Turkey's options may be limited now by parliamentary elections that are only two weeks away, it should have more maneuvering room after. ¶4. (c) Looking past those elections, Ambassador continued, Ankara has an opportunity to wrong foot Papadopoulos just as he is now wrong footing Turkey. Pressure on him to be more forthcoming is likely to continue as Cypriot elections approach early next year. Agreeing to a formula that would enable the Gambari process finally to move forward is more likely to expose Papadopoulos' underlying inflexibility than Ankara's current stonewalling ever will. Perhaps Turkey could use this to lock in something it seeks. At a minimum, it could confront and perhaps reverse the perceptions game which it is now losing and which could be dangerous for Turkey as it looks toward an EU progress report in November and an EU summit in December. ¶5. (c) Ambassador also urged a positive response to the proposed Papadopoulos/Talat meetings. If, as may be reasonable, Turkey's July 22 parliamentary election makes this inopportune now, then perhaps an adequate course would be to do nothing and avoid responding until after July 22. He strongly urged against any immediate, negative reply. ¶6. (c) Apakan replied with some distaste about the Gambari process and Moller. He complained that the Cypriots insist on raising property issues where they don't belong. The Greek Cyprots want to ensure that the Gambari process is a charade and that settlement negotiations never take place. However, Apakan did express interest in the tactical arguments. He noted the challenges Turkey will face late this year in the EU. Decisions will depend on the next government. Ambassador noted that constant sniping at Moller has the perverse effect, perhaps especially in New York, of ensuring that the SYG's special representative stays on. The UN institutionally does not like the reality or appearance of one side vetoing its mediators. If Turkey would shut up on the matter, normal personnel rotations might take their course, Ambassador suggested. ¶7. (c) In a separate conversation July 6, Deputy U/S Berk complained that small confidence building measures (CBMs) which some (including the US) are pushing cannot be separated from a comprehensive solution, where all issues will be on the table. Short term, the Greek Cypriot election cycle prevents such a negotiation, but all efforts and preparation should still be focused on comprehensive discussions. Berk was not optimistic on the long run either. Polls of youth attitudes on both sides of the island now show support for a two-state solution. In principle, the two governments on Cyprus support a confederation, but differ on what this means. In Turkey's case, he said, the Annan parameters are still valid when the negotiation process resumes. It is impossible to start from zero, though some parts can be re-negotiated. Berk appealed for continued US interest and efforts with the Greek Cypriots and the UN. ANKARA 00001749 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Ambassador said the US is interested in exploring ways to move the process forward. CBMs may be problematic, but they are options. He made the same points as noted above with Apakan on the importance of Turks not letting themselves be portrayed as intransigent or unwilling to negotiate at a time when the Greek Cypriots are looking more flexible. Berk appreciated US efforts and advice. He said the GOT will look for creative ways to keep the Greek Cypriots from exploiting the situation. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON