STAFFDEL MAKOVSKY'S MEETINGS WITH MFA OFFICIALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001732 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR MARIA TREJO E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017 TAGS: OREP PREL PBTS PGOV PINS PTER AJ AM IR IS TU, XF SUBJECT: STAFFDEL MAKOVSKY'S MEETINGS WITH MFA OFFICIALS Classified By: Acting Polcouns Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In separate July 2 meetings, HCFA Senior Staff Member Alan Makovsky discussed the Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR),Middle East and regional issues and Cyprus with MFA U/S Apakan, Deputy U/S Cevikoz and Deputy U/S Berk. Apakan reviewed his recent consultations in Israel, noting that Turkey's relations are based on common interests of regional peace and stability. He said Turkey supports and is implementing both UNSC resolutions against Iran, and emphasized his view that the Iranian nuclear program is a threat to the region. Turkey supports the current U.S. strategy in Iraq, Apakan said; Iraq's division, and the chaos that would ensue, would constitute failure. Apakan understood Israel's position on Hamas, but warned of the risks of isolating Palestinians. He stressed GOT support for the territorial integrity of Lebanon, its government and army, and described Turkey's Syria policy as trying to pull Syria away from Iran and toward the west. Cevikoz identified a number of recent unilateral steps by Turkey to improve Turkey-Armenia relations, and regretted Armenia's lack of reciprocity. Both Berk and Apakan called for more U.S. support on Cyprus. END SUMMARY AGR Passage Would be a Tragedy for U.S.-Turkey Relations -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) U/S Apakan called on Makovsky to take a lead in stopping House passage of AGR, expressing serious concern that passage would damage Turkey's western orientation. Anti-U.S. forces in Turkey will use this resolution to curb US-TU relations, Apakan said, adding that the resolution would also damage Turkey-Israel and Turkey-EU relations. While the resolution should not negatively influence relations, Turkey and the region are "not in normal phases." A stable, self-confident Turkey should be able to address such issues, but AGR passage will prevent Turkey from acting confidently in its foreign policy. Apakan would not speculate on Turkey's response to AGR passage, but said it would be serious. In a separate meting, Dep. U/S Berk warned Makovsky not to see the relatively muted response to the French parliament's passage of its bill as a precedent. The United States is far more important to Turkey, and the GOT response will inevitably be stronger. Berk predicted the impact of an AGR will carry over to the next U.S. administration, tying the hands of a new president to pursue strong US-TU relations. The common Turk, he said, will view AGR as a presidential problem, even if the administration is making a significant effort to prevent it. ¶3. (C) Makovsky explained the mechanics of a discharge petition in his meetings with both Apakan and Cevikoz, stressing that while 218 signatures can technically send a bill directly to the House floor for a vote, the procedure is rarely used; many co-sponsors would not challenge the leadership directly by signing such a petition. Makovsky acknowledged the perceived momentum behind the bill and the House leadership's continued support for it. Cevikoz (MFA's point-person on Turkey-Armenia relations) said the passage of AGR would be tragic. He applauded the State Department, Makovsky, Lantos's staff, and the Turkish Embassy for their efforts to avert AGR passage. Makovsky praised the Administration and Embassy efforts, noting the Embassy quickly sensitized the senior leadership to the issue's importance. ¶4. (C) Cevikoz told Makovsky that Armenia is blocking all aspects of historical analysis by opposing review of the 1915 events. Turkey's more liberal approach would analyze the whole history of TU-AM relations -- a "common histories commission." Cevikoz said Turkey is prepared to live with the outcome of any such review, in its totality. He explained that Turkey prefers to wait for an official response from Yerevan rather than interpret Armenia's position of normalizing relations with no pre-conditions as a de facto rejection of Turkey's commissions proposal. As late as the Dink funeral in February 2006, he said, Yerevan was unofficially telling GOT that an official response (i.e., accept, counter-proposal or reject/let's meet) was coming, but nothing has materialized. ¶5. (C) Cevikoz listed five unilateral steps Turkey has recently taken to improve relations: -- Akdamar Church restoration, and the participation of the Armenian Deputy Culture Minister and other Armenian delegates ANKARA 00001732 002 OF 003 at the inauguration ceremony in April. -- Invitation to FM Oskanian to attend Hrant Dink funeral. (Deputy FM Kirakosyan attended and visited a local Armenian church.) -- Turkey's Ambassador to Tbilisi attended PM Harkarian's March funeral. -- A summer charter flight from Yerevan to Antalya, in addition to the regular Istanbul service. -- The GOT Minister of Tourism and Culture announced its intent to restore the ancient Armenian city of Ani, with work expected to begin after the election. Cevikoz believes the U.S. public is not aware of some of these gestures. He regretted that Armenia does not reciprocate, noting Armenia's rejection of Turkish OSCE election observers and Armenia's cancellation of a Turkish official's participation in a NATO PfP program. Progress on Nagorno-Karabakh is important to opening the border, Cevikoz said, because the border closure arose from Armenian aggression towards Azerbaijan. He added that Turkey would view even a limited pull-back from occupied Azeri territory as a significant step. Iran: "We Don't Want to be Part of their Games" -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Apakan, who had just returned from biannual U/S-level consultations with Israel, emphasized the utility of the exchange, as events on the ground are changing rapidly. Turkey and Israel share not only a geographic proximity, but a common lifestyle, he said. Israel is important to Turkish foreign policy, as is Turkey's triangular partnership with Israel and the United States, which is aimed at generating peace and stability in the region. Apakan said that an Iranian nuclear weapon is a threat to peace in the region, and emphasized, "We are telling them this." He noted that Turkey officially informed the UN Sanctions Committee about the incident of Iranian weapons found aboard a train transiting Turkey, and has sought an explanation from Iran. "We don't want to be part of their games." ¶7. (C) Apakan told Makovsky that the Cabinet approved UNSC Resolution 1737 and is implementing it completely. Resolution 1747 is in the process of receiving cabinet signatures, but the GOT is already implementing it in full, with "one or two technical exceptions." Apakan would not elaborate on these, but sought to assure Makovsky that these exceptions were strictly based on the non-applicability of some elements of the resolution, emphasizing Turkey's long-standing commitment to UN compliance. He wasn't clear whether technical exceptions will persist following Cabinet approval of the Resolution 1747, and promised to follow up with the necessary details. Iraq: Division Equals Failure -------------- ¶8. (C) Apakan said he supports the Baker-Hamilton Commission findings, as well as the current U.S. strategy in Iraq. The U.S. should be successful in Iraq, "otherwise we all fail." He defined failure as the division of Iraq, and the chaos that would ensue as Al Qaeda dominates the center of the country, and Iran the south. While Turkey repeatedly urges Iran not to play with non-state actors, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Iraqi Shia groups, they continue to deny their involvement, even as they concede moral and political support. ¶9. (C) Makovsky pointed out that Baker-Hamilton supporters have not generally supported the current Iraq policy, even though the surge was a strategy called for in the Commission's report. Apakan said he wants U.S. forces to stay in Iraq -- "no surprises; no precipitous withdrawals." Makovsky said many on Capitol Hill are suffering from war fatigue, and feel differently. He noted that opponents of the war are developing an intellectual construct to justify a withdrawal, whereas earlier, opponents lacked such arguments. Apakan said Turkey needs to cooperate with the U.S. in Iraq, and to thoughtfully consider long-term consequences of their actions. Iraq, he said, is an Arab country. Its Arab identity should be promoted, otherwise Al Qaeda will succeed in damaging the prospects for political reconciliation. Apakan said he believes reconciliation can come about in two to three years, if only due to exhaustion. He said all parties in Iraq have moderate groups within them who are seeking reconciliation. ANKARA 00001732 003 OF 003 Empower Abbas; Pull Syria Toward the West -------------- ¶10. (C) Apakan opined that events in Gaza are affecting the course of events in the West Bank. He said that Israel can isolate Hamas but should be careful not to further isolate the Palestinian people, which will lead to more reaction. He said Turkey understands Israel's problems; it understands the region. Israel, he said, should empower Abbas. He also expressed his view that peace talks between Syria and Israel would be difficult, but easier than Israel-Palestine talks, and could help pull Syria away from Iran and toward the west. He stressed GOT's support for Lebanon's territorial integrity, its government and its army. Al Qaeda-type groups are creating problems, and he acknowledged that Israel and Lebanon believe these groups to be supported by Syria. U.S. is a Permanent Component of Turkish Foreign Policy -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Makovsky inquired about a recent Pew survey revealing an 83 percent unfavorable view of the United States in Turkey. Apakan said Turkish support for the U.S. and the EU might be falling, but this cannot be the basis for a comprehensive assessment of Turkey's relations. U.S. relations and EU membership, he said, are permanent components of Turkish foreign policy. The U.S. has an important role in three leading issues driving public opinion in Turkey: AGR, PKK, and Cyprus. On Cyprus, both Apakan and Berk asked the U.S. to do more to end Northern Cypriot isolation by establishing direct flights, dispatching trade delegations, and inviting (Northern Cyprus "President") Talat to Washington from time to time. ¶12. (C) Makovsky was not able to clear this cable. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON