TURKEY PROPOSES IRAQI RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000137 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2022 TAGS: PREL PTER TU IZ IR SUBJECT: TURKEY PROPOSES IRAQI RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE, ASKS FOR U.S. HELP ON KIRKUK Classified By: A/DCM Dan Sreebny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey supports the U.S.'s strategy for Iraq but remains deeply concerned about the lack of political consensus in Baghdad or the PKK and Kirkuk issues, GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol told visiting PDAS James Jeffrey on Jan. 19. Jeffrey explained the thinking behind the President's Iraq strategy, and urged the GOT to engage the Iraqi Kurds on issues of special concern to Turkey. Celikkol reported that FonMin Gul will meet Nechirvan Barzani later in February. He pressed hard for the U.S. to press the Iraqi Kurds to delay the Kirkuk referendum; Jeffrey responded that we are advising all GOI elements not to pursue sectarian/ethnic aims over national unity, but Kirkuk is ultimately an Iraqi issue. Celikkol proposed Turkey host an Iraqi reconciliation conference, but Turkey's proposals look problematic. End summary. ¶2. (C) Visiting PDAS Jeffrey met Jan. 19 with GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol. Celikkol opened by pledging Turkish support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. He recalled the MFA's strong statement of support for the President's new strategy for Iraq, and agreed with our assessment that Baghdad must be secured in order to create the necessary conditions for political progress. He noted that both PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul met with Tariq al-Hashimi Jan. 13-14 in Istanbul, and reported that Hashimi also supports the U.S. plan. ¶3. (C) However, Celikkol assessed that the political parties in Iraq are not united behind a national agenda. Time after time, he asserted, the parties in the government -- including SCIRI, Tawafuq, and the Kurdish parties -- seem to agree to a national policy, but then act only in their own interests and often against Iraq's national interests. "This is the missing link" in the Iraqi political system, he said, and Turkey wants to seek reconciliation. Celikkol handed Jeffrey a non-paper proposing that Turkey host an Iraqi reconciliation conference involving all the political players in Iraq, with some of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, acting as "facilitators" (the U.S. could also serve in this function--full text of nonpaper in para. 15). ¶4. (C) PDAS Jeffrey responded that the Secretary was very interested in reconciliation. We have worked hard to get the Iraqis to agree to an equitable hydrocarbons law, and it appears that may be happening. The new drft law would have a high degree of central government control and say over hydrocarbon reveues. While we must watch closely to ensure th Iraqis follow through, this is a promising development. ¶5. (C) Jeffrey stated that while the Iraq Study Group report did a great service by demonstrating the grave situation in Iraq and offering a number of good suggestions, the ISG's recommendations to immediately begin a draw down of troops and open discussions with Iran and Syria have not been accepted. Not only will additional troops help secure the capital and Anbar, we are working to change the Iraqi Security Forces' training and doctrine as well as our own toward urgent counterinsurgency priorities. ¶6. (C) As for talking with Iran and Syria, we have already offered Tehran in the context of P-5 plus one an opportunity for broad discussion of a number of issues, an offer the Iranian regime ignored. Thus we are instead prepared to deal with Iran from a position of strength, as we have demonstrated by detaining their intelligence agents and force deployments in the region. Recent elections demonstrate that Ahmadinejad's popularity is shaky; our robust policy may help this along. ¶7. (C) Internal dynamics in Iraq are more important than getting Tehran on board, Jeffrey continued. PM Maliki must live up to his promises, which in essence include removing caveats on going after Jaysh al-Madhi forces, corrupt officials and military officers, and operating in certain areas. Standing up local forces in Anbar and adding three divisions to the Iraqi Army will help give a national ANKARA 00000137 002 OF 004 orientation to the Iraqi Security Forces and employ more Sunni Arabs. 18 ISF brigades, plus nine of our own, in Baghdad will help roll back the wave of sectarian violence. ¶8. (C) Even Iran could have a useful role to play in this, Jeffrey emphasized, as stability in Iraq does not threaten Tehran. The Arab states can also do more, and Turkey deserves a good deal of credit for its support, through Incirlik Air Base, the Habur Gate, overflights, and support in the early days of the war (despite not allowing the 4th ID to use Turkey). The USG is thus all the more saddened by the loss of Turkish lives due to the PKK. While the security situation in Iraq remains crucial, we have decided that the U.S. needs to work harder on the PKK issue. When Gen. Ralston visits Turkey at the end of January, he will bring with him further information on the steps under consideration by the USG. ¶9. (C) On the Kirkuk issue, Jeffrey underscored that we continue to emphasize with the Iraqis the importance of national unity. All sides are quite emotional on the Kirkuk issue, including the Kurds. They are a serious player in Iraq, and in no small part they are strong due to their economic interdependence with Turkey. Turkey needs to discuss its concerns on both the PKK and Kirkuk with the Iraqi Kurds directly. ¶10. (C) Celikkol responded that FonMin Gul will meet with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani "on an informal basis" in Istanbul during the second half of February. He said he hopes Barzani will bring positive messages on the PKK and Kirkuk. If he were to do so, Celikkol emphasized, it could "start a new era" in Turkey-Iraqi Kurdish relations. ¶11. (C) Celikkol then pressed hard (and repeatedly) on the Kirkuk issue. He outlined the steps required in the Iraqi constitution before a referendum can take place (normalization, census, etc.) and asserted that there is no way these steps can take place in time for a referendum by the end of 2007. Thus, he went on, the time is now to press the Iraqi Kurds to agree to a postponement "for a couple of years." Celikkol claimed that only SCIRI was willing to go along with a referendum this year: Dawa, Al-Sadr, Fazilet are opposed; even Talabani's PUK has its doubts. He asked that the U.S. press the Kurds (especially the KDP) on the issue, and worried that Barzani had painted himself into a corner with his rhetoric on the matter. This is not a Turkoman issue for Turkey, he underscored: It is an issue for all Iraqis, and the Arab neighbors are also worried about it. ¶12. (C) PDAS Jeffrey demurred, saying that while we talk to all sides about doing what they can to reduce tensions and keep Iraq unified, we are not prepared to demand specific items on Kirkuk or to tell the Iraqis how to interpret their constitution. The U.S. can remind Iraqis of the costs of ethnic and sectarian conflict, but it is up to them to fit this imperative into their political calculus. He cautioned that Turkey should not get locked into a lockstep position on Kirkuk where only certain options are acceptable. Turkey should focus on the results it wants, not necessarily the process. ¶13. (C) Celikkol complained that the GOI has been slow to respond to Turkish offers of assistance. Turkey has offered the use of an entire police academy in Diyarbakir for training IP, but the Iraqis have yet to reply. Turkey is also frustrated that FonMin Zibari reportedly wants to hold the next "Iraq neighbors" foreign ministers meeting in Baghdad. Celikkol reported that the Saudis and other Gulf States are unwilling to travel to Baghdad for security reasons, and the GOT has prevailed upon the Egyptians to offer up Cairo for the meeting. Celikkol accused Zibari of holding up the neighbors meeting process, which he contended has been useful in isolating Iran. PDAS Jeffrey responded that there are many issues with which the Iraqi Kurds must contend -- PKK, Kirkuk, reconciliation, use of Kurdish troops in Baghdad, Sunni outreach -- but that Turkey is a key ANKARA 00000137 003 OF 004 neighbor with some valid concerns. ¶14. (C) Comment: Turkey continues to worry that events in Iraq are outpacing its ability to influence them, and that Ankara is being left behind in regional diplomacy efforts. The GOT's insistence on the PKK and Kirkuk issues is caught up in the swirling domestic political situation (presidential election this May, parliamentary elections by November). Celikkol's paper proposing a reconciliation meeting in Turkey appears to be heavily biased toward the major Iraqi community that reaches out the most to Turkey: the Sunni Arabs. We defer to Embassy Baghdad, but fail to see how the players in Iraq would agree to outcomes which include suspending the constitution. Celikkol expects to get feedback from us on this paper when he visits Washington in the coming days. End comment. ¶15. (C) Text of GOT paper on reconciliation conference (as received): BEGIN TEXT Confidential--Releasable U.S. SIPDIS Non-paper A reconciliation meeting initiative including all the parties and movements in Iraq Framework: --A reconciliation meeting which will include all the political groups and movements will be organized in Istanbul. --The Iraqi government will send a high level member to the meeting and pledge its support by a public declaration. --Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran will be present as "facilitators" but not take part directly in the meeting. --The neighbouring countries will declare their support to the meeting and commitment to the reconciliation process. --The US will either be present as a "facilitator" or declare its support to the process. --From Iraq, the participants will take part in the meeting in their capacity as representatives of their respective political parties and movements and not as representing particular sectarian groups. Possible Expected Results: --Reiterate the pledge to the territorial integrity and political unity of Iraq. --Declare renewed support to the National Government of Iraq. --Call on the National Government of Iraq to reorganize Defense and Interior Ministries, including the replacement of top officials at these Ministries. --Call on the National Assembly of Iraq to suspend the federal constitution for one year period. --Call on the National Government of Iraq to declare martial law if current security plan does not work. --Pledge that Iraq will no longer pose a security threat to its neighbours and to the international community. --Call on the neighbouring countries to commit to the independence and unity of Iraq safeguarding its existing borders. END TEXT ANKARA 00000137 004 OF 004 ¶16. (U) PDAS Jeffrey cleared this message. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON