U/S BURNS' MEETING WITH TURKISH FM GUL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000136 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2022 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' MEETING WITH TURKISH FM GUL Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: FM Gul expressed shock during a meeting January 19 with U/S Nicholas Burns at the murder several hours earlier of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, which he feared might weaken prospects for fending off a possible Armenian "genocide" resolution in the U.S. Congress. He expressed support for President Bush's new Iraq strategy, worried about a Kirkuk referendum in 2007 and appealed for concrete action against the PKK. Gul said Turkey continues to press Iran on the nuclear issue and commented that the targeted financial sanctions were having their intended impact on Iranian officials. Gul argued for a renewed UN Cyprus settlement process under Ban Ki-Moon and expressed hope that Greece-Turkey relations would continue to improve. Burns said the Administration will oppose any Armenia resolution, expressed U.S. determination to work more effectively with Turkey and Iraq on the PKK, reviewed U.S. thinking on Afghanistan and Kosovo ahead of the NATO foreign ministers meeting later this month and pressed Turkey to find a way to reopen the Halki seminary. End summary. DINK MURDER AND THE ARMENIA "GENOCIDE" RESOLUTION ¶2. (C) Gul said the murder of Armenian activist Hrant Dink in Istanbul on January 19 shocked him, particularly as Turkey faces a likely Armenian "genocide" resolution in the U.S. Congress. He noted that the Turkish cabinet had been interrupted by the news about Dink. PM Erdogan had made a statement, and the authorities will investigate the murder as quickly as possible. Gul hoped that the Armenia resolution can be stopped. The U.S. and Turkey will have to work effectively on the matter or all of our plans will be affected. He noted that several Turkish MPs will visit Washington in the coming weeks and that he plans to call on prominent members of Congress during his early February visit to Washington. ¶3. (S) U/S Burns affirmed that the Administration will strongly oppose any Armenia resolution in Congress, but observed that the issue will be extraordinarily difficult. Gul's meetings in Washington will be important. To improve the politics on the issue, Turkey might consider taking steps toward a more normal relationship with Armenia and making a new statement on the events of 1915. Burns hoped that a resolution could be avoided, but if efforts to divert it are not successful, our governments must protect the U.S.-Turkish relationship despite public reaction. Too much is at stake to do otherwise. He welcomed Gul's plans to see Congressional figures when he visits Washington in February. IRAQ ¶4. (S) On Iraq, Gul said that Turkey and the U.S. need to consult closely. Frankly, he said, he was more optimistic a year ago. There had been some progress in 2006, but the deteriorating security situation had overshadowed this. He expressed support for President Bush's new Iraq strategy, noting that Iraqi Sunni Islamic Party leader and now Vice President Tariq Hashimi told him that he had asked the President to send additional U.S. forces. It was remarkable that this rejectionist figure that Gul and Ambassador Khalilzad had persuaded to participate in the political process only in December 2005 in Istanbul took this position. Unity and territorial integrity of Iraq remain Turkey's key goals. Kirkuk is a smaller version of Iraq. A peaceful solution for Kirkuk will help stabilize all of Iraq. Turkey and Iraqi Kurds share interests and enjoy strong economic ties. If Turkey were not encouraging Turkish businesses to go to Iraq, there would be far less economic progress. Turkey can do much more in northern Iraq, he said, if Iraqi Kurds handle Kirkuk and the PKK in a wise way. PKK ¶5. (S) Gul reviewed familiar Turkish concerns about the PKK and the lack of visible U.S. action against PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. He said the GOT finds it difficult to explain ANKARA 00000136 002 OF 003 to the Turkish people why PKK leader Murat Karayilan has received safehaven and support from a friendly regime in northern Iraq, even appearing on KDP-controlled television. By contrast, in Asad's Syria, Abdullah Ocalan was kept hidden. He urged U.S. action and said its absence is undermining U.S., and Gul's own, credibility with the Turkish public. ¶6. (S) U/S Burns responded that the U.S. is working hard on what concrete steps can be taken against the PKK. Turkey needed to give us time to work on a solution. He hoped that General Ralston would be in a position to discuss these when he visits in 10-12 days. He also noted that the Iraq/U.S. inspection of Makhmour carried out a few days earlier had sent a signal that the PKK status quo is not acceptable. IRAN ¶7. (S) Gul noted that Turkey will enforce sanctions imposed by UNSCR 1737, but complained that Turkey is stopping delivery to Iran of dual use technology sold by European companies. He said that he had told the Iranian government that having nuclear weapons is too dangerous. It could not use such weapons, having WMD would make Iranian policy "irrational, look at Saddam," and the international response would hurt the Iranian people. Gul applauded last June's P5 1 proposal to Iran, noting that both Ahmadinejad and Larijani had told him it was a better deal than they had expected. Gul said he had emphasized to the Iranians that the U.S. had put a "real offer" on the table that Iran should accept. ¶8. (S) U/S Burns said that the President and Secretary Rice regard Iran as our biggest challenge after Iraq. He reviewed steps the U.S. is taking to send the message that Tehran should respect the U.S. and not assume it has unlimited room for maneuver -- e.g., two carrier battle groups in the Gulf, detaining Iranian intelligence and paramilitary personnel in Iraq, etc. On the nuclear front, Burns said that in any future contacts with Tehran Turkey could make the point that the P5 1 proposal is still on the table and that, as Secretary Rice said publicly a week ago, she is willing SIPDIS personally to negotiate with Iran on all issues, including the nuclear one. This was an important offer by the U.S., the first such effort in three decades. Because Iran has rejected this, sanctions have gone forward -- at the UNSC and the financial sanctions that are cutting off Iran's access to dollars and to international markets generally. The EU will declare an end to arms sales to Iran, and we are encouraging the cutoff of European export credits. We would like the EU, Turkey and others to call for an end to Russian and Chinese arms sales, as well. ¶9. (S) The U.S. financial sanctions are the most serious and effective steps taken, Gul indicated. They have the Iranians in a "panic." They are not seen as insulting Iran or aimed at the Iranian people, but they have a negative economic impact which Iranians blame on their government. EYE-TO-EYE ON KOSOVO ¶10. (C) U/S Burns explained U.S. thinking on Kosovo focused particularly on Ahtisaari's plans, which should lead to UNSC action by March. Some Europeans fear a Russian veto. The Russians will manipulate any divisions among the Western countries, so unity is important. We are trying to convince the Europeans to follow Ahtisaari's plan and that further delay on Kosovo independence is dangerous. Gul said that the U.S. and Turkey have very similar views of Kosovo and the way forward. CYPRUS ¶11. (C) Gul argued that UNSYG Annan had done a good job in efforts to reach a Cyprus settlement and hoped that new SYG Ban Ki-Moon would follow up on those efforts. It will be important, he argued, to reduce the isolation of Turkish Cypriots to get back to productive discussions. ANKARA 00000136 003 OF 003 Turkey wants to see a reunified Cyprus governed by a bi-communal government. But, if this is not achieved, the international community must move to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot economy so that it can stand on its own. Papadopoulos thinks Turkish Cypriots should be a minority in the country and assimilated with the Greeks, but this isn't acceptable. If Greek Cypriots are faced with "de facto visible status" for Turkish Cypriots, they will understand that they must negotiate. GREECE-TURKEY RELATIONS AND THE HALKI SEMINARY ¶12. (C) Noting that he had visited Athens three times, Gul hoped that Greek PM Karamanlis would visit Turkey soon. He was unsure it would happen. Gul had been disappointed by "some" Greek attitudes and actions last fall during the Turkey EU accession discussions. That said, bilateral relations have improved dramatically in recent years with increasing Greek investment in Turkey and construction of the Turkey-Greece Interconnector gas pipeline. These are good developments that will cause both countries to look out for the other's interests. ¶13. (C) Burns asked Turkey to consider ways to reopen the Halki seminary, saying that it would have a very positive impact on Turkey-Greece relations. It was also important to the USG and the Greek-American community. Gul responded that he, PM Erdogan, and the AK Party wanted to open Halki. In addition, they pushed through parliament a foundations law that provided for restitution of many Greek Orthodox properties, but President Sezer had vetoed it. Progress, however, is difficult when the mufti of western Thrace are under pressure and Turks in Greece cannot establish their own foundations. Burns said we hope Greece would do more on western Thrace. ¶14. (SBU) Gul was accompanied by Deputy U/S Akgunay, Iraq Coordinator Celikkol and personal assistant Cengezir. Joining U/S Burns were Ambassador, NEA PDAS Jeffrey and EUR/SE Director Silliman (notetaker). ¶15. (U) U/S Burns has approved this cable. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON