Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA135
2007-01-24 11:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKEY REQUESTS CONTINGENCY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
how-toVZCZCXRO6752 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHAK #0135/01 0241122 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 241122Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0675 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA// PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000135
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO MNF-I AND PRT MOSUL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ US
SUBJECT: TURKEY REQUESTS CONTINGENCY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ITS NEW MOSUL CONSULATE
REF: 06 ANKARA 6082 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: POL/C Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000135
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO MNF-I AND PRT MOSUL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ US
SUBJECT: TURKEY REQUESTS CONTINGENCY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ITS NEW MOSUL CONSULATE
REF: 06 ANKARA 6082 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: POL/C Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request -- please see para. 8.
2. (C) Summary: The Turkish Consul General to Mosul, H. Avni
Botsali, plans to deploy permanently in early February.
Botsali told us that -- despite some tense moments -- he has
a good relationship with Ninewah Governor Kashmoula, though
less so with Kashmoula's deputy. Botsali confirmed that his
first line of defense in case of a crisis (such as an attack
on the consulate or its personnel) will be the Iraqi
authorities, but asked that local commanders at FOB Marez be
authorized to offer assistance in extremis. End summary.
3. (C) On Jan. 11 and 23, we met with Turkey's Consul General
to Mosul, H. Avni Botsali. Botsali hopes to deploy
permanently to Mosul the first week of February. He reported
that construction was going smoothly, and showed us photos of
the site. He repeated his intention to engage all
communities in his consular district (which will include
Ninewah province and the KRG, but not -- for now -- Kirkuk):
"We will not just be talking to Turkomans," he asserted.
Botsali expressed appreciation for PRT Mosul and the 25th
ID's assistance with his previous visits to Mosul (most
recently Dec. 29),and looks forward to working with our
people there.
4. (C) Botsali reported that Governor Kashmoula has been
helpful during his visits and is appreciative that Turkey is
opening a consulate there. The Governor has provided
security for Botsali and his people, offered gracious
hospitality, and has been receptive to Turkey's offers of
assistance to train medical personnel and for water projects.
However, Botsali reported that during their Dec. 29 meeting,
Kashmoula confronted Botsali on the PKK issue, specifically
(according to Botsali) claiming that there were no terrorist
elements in Makhmour refugee camp and insisting that Turkey
cease pressuring the GOI and KRG on the PKK issue. Botsali
said that on a previous visit he and Kashmoula had had a
tense exchange on Turkish petroleum shipments into Iraq.
Nevertheless, Botsali emphasized, he has a positive
relationship with the Governor and his people, though less so
with the Deputy Governor, Khesro Goran, a KDP official. He
recounted that Goran invited the press to a luncheon for
Botsali, and Goran proceeded to tell the press -- in Kurdish,
which was not interpreted for Botsali -- that Turkey fully
supports the Iraqi Kurdish program, including on Kirkuk.
5. (C) Botsali emphasized that his first outreach in an
emergency (for example, an attack on the consulate or its
personnel, especially resulting in casualties or the need to
evacuate) would be to Iraqi officials. He has, for example,
installed a direct line from the consulate to Mosul's main
hospital. However, Botsali went on, there have been
occasions when he has been unable to raise the Governor or
his security director, despite having been given many
land-line and cell phone numbers.
6. (C) In such an eventuality, or if the Iraqis are unable or
unwilling to help, Botsali may need to reach out urgently to
FOB Marez. He is concerned that U.S. commanders there may be
compelled to seek authority from Baghdad or even
Washington/Tampa before rendering assistance, losing valuable
time in a crisis. Thus he requested that our personnel at
FOB Marez be authorized to take a local decision in case the
Turkish consulate requests assistance in an emergency.
7. (C) We emphasized that Botsali's first line of defense
should be the Iraqis, and that the list of scenarios may be
difficult to encompass in any agreement. Some assistance
might be comparatively easy to provide, such as allowing
access to FOB Marez to medevac wounded personnel. Other
assistance might be more difficult, like extracting Turks
ANKARA 00000135 002 OF 002
from an ongoing terrorist attack. Additionally, we
suggested, it might make more sense for Botsali to work this
out with PRT Mosul when he actually commences operations in
February. Botsali responded that he was not/not seeking an
agreement in writing, but simply USG assurance that we would
not leave him or his people waiting for a decision during a
crisis.
8. (U) Action Request: We seek Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, and
PRT Mosul's guidance on this matter.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO MNF-I AND PRT MOSUL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ US
SUBJECT: TURKEY REQUESTS CONTINGENCY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ITS NEW MOSUL CONSULATE
REF: 06 ANKARA 6082 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: POL/C Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request -- please see para. 8.
2. (C) Summary: The Turkish Consul General to Mosul, H. Avni
Botsali, plans to deploy permanently in early February.
Botsali told us that -- despite some tense moments -- he has
a good relationship with Ninewah Governor Kashmoula, though
less so with Kashmoula's deputy. Botsali confirmed that his
first line of defense in case of a crisis (such as an attack
on the consulate or its personnel) will be the Iraqi
authorities, but asked that local commanders at FOB Marez be
authorized to offer assistance in extremis. End summary.
3. (C) On Jan. 11 and 23, we met with Turkey's Consul General
to Mosul, H. Avni Botsali. Botsali hopes to deploy
permanently to Mosul the first week of February. He reported
that construction was going smoothly, and showed us photos of
the site. He repeated his intention to engage all
communities in his consular district (which will include
Ninewah province and the KRG, but not -- for now -- Kirkuk):
"We will not just be talking to Turkomans," he asserted.
Botsali expressed appreciation for PRT Mosul and the 25th
ID's assistance with his previous visits to Mosul (most
recently Dec. 29),and looks forward to working with our
people there.
4. (C) Botsali reported that Governor Kashmoula has been
helpful during his visits and is appreciative that Turkey is
opening a consulate there. The Governor has provided
security for Botsali and his people, offered gracious
hospitality, and has been receptive to Turkey's offers of
assistance to train medical personnel and for water projects.
However, Botsali reported that during their Dec. 29 meeting,
Kashmoula confronted Botsali on the PKK issue, specifically
(according to Botsali) claiming that there were no terrorist
elements in Makhmour refugee camp and insisting that Turkey
cease pressuring the GOI and KRG on the PKK issue. Botsali
said that on a previous visit he and Kashmoula had had a
tense exchange on Turkish petroleum shipments into Iraq.
Nevertheless, Botsali emphasized, he has a positive
relationship with the Governor and his people, though less so
with the Deputy Governor, Khesro Goran, a KDP official. He
recounted that Goran invited the press to a luncheon for
Botsali, and Goran proceeded to tell the press -- in Kurdish,
which was not interpreted for Botsali -- that Turkey fully
supports the Iraqi Kurdish program, including on Kirkuk.
5. (C) Botsali emphasized that his first outreach in an
emergency (for example, an attack on the consulate or its
personnel, especially resulting in casualties or the need to
evacuate) would be to Iraqi officials. He has, for example,
installed a direct line from the consulate to Mosul's main
hospital. However, Botsali went on, there have been
occasions when he has been unable to raise the Governor or
his security director, despite having been given many
land-line and cell phone numbers.
6. (C) In such an eventuality, or if the Iraqis are unable or
unwilling to help, Botsali may need to reach out urgently to
FOB Marez. He is concerned that U.S. commanders there may be
compelled to seek authority from Baghdad or even
Washington/Tampa before rendering assistance, losing valuable
time in a crisis. Thus he requested that our personnel at
FOB Marez be authorized to take a local decision in case the
Turkish consulate requests assistance in an emergency.
7. (C) We emphasized that Botsali's first line of defense
should be the Iraqis, and that the list of scenarios may be
difficult to encompass in any agreement. Some assistance
might be comparatively easy to provide, such as allowing
access to FOB Marez to medevac wounded personnel. Other
assistance might be more difficult, like extracting Turks
ANKARA 00000135 002 OF 002
from an ongoing terrorist attack. Additionally, we
suggested, it might make more sense for Botsali to work this
out with PRT Mosul when he actually commences operations in
February. Botsali responded that he was not/not seeking an
agreement in writing, but simply USG assurance that we would
not leave him or his people waiting for a decision during a
crisis.
8. (U) Action Request: We seek Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, and
PRT Mosul's guidance on this matter.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON