THE U.S. AS POLITICAL FOOTBALL IN TURKEY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001348 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU US SUBJECT: THE U.S. AS POLITICAL FOOTBALL IN TURKEY'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN REF: A. ANKARA 1326 ¶B. ANKARA 1318 ¶C. ANKARA 1300 ¶D. ANKARA 1291 Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: As Turkey's parliamentary election campaign heats up, all players will use any hook to drag the US into the campaign. The name of the game is to embarrass, trip up or sideline PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP). The context includes an overheated political situation, featuring a civilian-military high-wire act, increased terrorist PKK action, and the very real possibility of a cross-border operation (CBO) into northern Iraq. At stake is what Turkey will look like in the next decade. In many cases, we are a proxy for the very real issues and balances that Turkey must sort out - secular and pious; military and civilian; Turks and Kurds; and the nature of Turkey's future relations with Iraq. The best USG responses when accusations arise will be factual and designed to prevent throwing more fuel on the already overheated fire. End summary and comment. It's Their Campaign, But We're on Page One -------------- ¶2. (C) Before party ballot lists are even published June 4, several issues have arisen in quick succession that suggest all parties will not hesitate to use Turkey's relations with the US -- and the tense situation in neighboring Iraq -- as fodder in the run-up to the July 22 parliamentary election: --The F-16 "cross-border incursion": The US two F-16s that strayed across Turkey's southern border for four minutes, the result of pilot error overflying mountainous terrain, would normally have been handled at the staff level. Instead, TGS chose to tell selected media outlets it had posted the violation on its website, and it became front-page news, complete with dramatic photos of war planes. It subsequently morphed into "when did the TGS tell MFA and what did they know", a way of showing that the military had information that it alone could dole out to the civilian leadership when it so chose. This has also been linked -- by both columnists and political cartoonists -- to the US presence at Incirlik Air Base (up for renewal in June). --The freight train that the PKK bombed May 25 in Bingol province: While the meat of this story should be Turkey's lax customs regime at its borders with Iran and Syria that apparently allowed arms to transit Turkey from Iran to Syria, the initial headline was that weapons discovered in one of the derailed freight cars were of US-origin, a story since debunked but which people will remember. It has now shifted to "did the US give this information to the terrorist PKK in order to uncover this illicit weapons transit?" --Handover of control in three provinces of northern Iraq: This story has just started to gain traction, but is the next in the series of "if the US is plotting against us we will just have to take care of ourselves"; it is excellent fodder for ultra-nationalists, who like to believe that Turkish territorial integrity remains under threat, not just from the PKK but from the US-backed KRG as well. --Alleged contacts with the PKK: Just as the Chief of the General Staff Buyukanit, in his May 31 speech to an Istanbul security conference, accused allies of helping the PKK (septel),a story appeared in mainstream daily "Milliyet," citing Ozgur Akdag, a PKK member who had allegedly surrendered to Turkish security forces, as saying that US military officials came to Kandil mountain in northern Iraq (home to PKK camps) by helicopter, met with people there for 3-4 hours, after which they allegedly started fortifying camps against a possible CBO. There was also an allegation in the press on May 28 that U.S. Special Envoy Ralston met ANKARA 00001348 002 OF 002 with the PKK. Why We Are Fodder -------------- ¶3. (C) The US is a handy target for several reasons. First, US-Turkish relations matter here -- a lot. Any Turks who didn't already realize that found out after the March 1, 2003 vote when relations went into the deep-freeze. At the same time, many of our current policies and policy approaches are deeply unpopular, as evidenced by opinion polls showing 90% of the population with negative views of the US. This is fueled in large part by our Iraq policy, our inability to go after the terrorist PKK in its hideouts in northern Iraq, and our perceived unwillingness to talk tough with KRG President Barzani. And because US-Turkish relations are both important and controversial, they are at once something with which the military can tar the AKP (for being too close) and excoriate them (for doing a poor job). We are so deeply involved in their region that we are an easy target - and scapegoat. Finally, conspiracy-minded Turks, who see themselves consistently as the victims, generally view us as the hidden hand, responsible for everything (at least everything bad). Lessons to Draw -------------- ¶4. (C) This is only the beginning and is principally about domestic politics (though it has obvious ramifications elsewhere). Given our proximity in Iraq and the renewal of PKK violence, we should anticipate heightened tensions and hair trigger responses. Our challenge is to help lower the temperature by having TGS and politicians alike shift away from using us as a proxy and instead focus on the real issues: how they solve the Kurdish issue; how they deal with the PKK; how they should deal with the KRG; how they can cope with a volatile Iraq on their southern border; and how they deal with their pressing set of internal divides: civilian versus military, secular versus pious, Turks versus Kurds. For now, we are a convenient proxy as all sides here play with fire. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON