TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: INTO THE BEAR'S DEN?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001215 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET TU RS SUBJECT: TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: INTO THE BEAR'S DEN? REF: 06 ANKARA 2741 Classified By: POLCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Deepening economic and political ties between Russia and Turkey bear watching, but they do not signal a fundamental shift in Ankara's foreign policy orientation. Contacts believe Russia offers Turkey a sympathetic ear as both feel buffeted by a critical west. However, on key Turkish issues the Russians remain unhelpful. End summary. A Marriage of Convenience? -------------- ¶2. (C) Turkey's economic and political relationship with Russia continues to develop. Bilateral trade volume between the two jumped to $21 billion in 2006 compared to $15 billion the previous year, and it appears that the two will reach their shared goal of $25 billion for 2007. Russia is Turkey's second largest trading partner (and enjoys a considerable trade surplus, mostly due to energy sales). If contacts are a basis to judge, bilateral political ties remain robust. In June of last year, President Sezer became the first Turkish Head of State to visit Russia since the end of the Cold War, and Putin and PM Erdogan have met many times and reportedly developed a close relationship. In March 2007, Russian Speaker Mironov reciprocated Turkish Speaker Arinc's visit of last year. Our MFA contacts cite about 15 regularly scheduled bilateral consultations at many levels, the most senior of which is an annual meeting between deputy foreign ministers, but also bilats covering energy, trade, Black Sea maritime security, and a host of other topics. With some exceptions, MFA officials cite a convergence of views on the world's foreign policy challenges, albeit at a very general level. ¶3. (C) These developments were likely unimaginable 15 years ago. Turkey and Russia are historical enemies. The Ottomans fought at least 15 wars against the czars, eventually losing considerable territory in the process. During the Cold War, Turkey protected NATO's southeast flank and maintained chilly relations with Moscow. But as the new great game has unfolded in the Caucasus and Central Asia -- and as Russia became for Turkey a source for much needed oil and natural gas -- the two countries have been drawn together into a spirit of increasing cooperation. Just one example: MFA officials recently told us that their highest priority in the ;OECD enlargement process -- after keeping Cyprus out -- is to bring Russia in. Some academics believe that inherent similarities have helped to pull the two countries together: Both are outside of Europe looking in, and feel that Europe does not respect them. Both have strong central state systems and somewhat similar political cultures. And Russians and Turkish secular elites share one additional trait: fear of political Islam. Working Over the Turks -------------- ¶4. (C) One expert here, Turkey's German Marshall Fund Director Suat Kiniklioglu, asserts that the Russians have been exceptionally skillful in exploiting Turkey's recently troubled relations with the U.S. and the EU, offering a sympathetic ear for Turks to vent their frustrations about both. In return, Russia has emphasized its willingness to be non-judgmental on issues such as human rights and civil-military relations. Several Turks have emphasized to us that Russia "treats us with respect." In a more sinister vein, Kiniklioglu pointed out that the Moscow principality's budget in the 17th and 18th centuries carried line items for "bribery of the Ottomans." Such practices -- including, Kiniklioglu asserted, the occasional well-placed prostitute -- help the Russians make inroads here. Energy: A Tie That Binds -------------- ¶5. (C) Turkey and Russia have regularly engaged at high levels over the last few years, and energy has been a key area of discussion in the economic realm. Turkey is 65% dependent on Russia for its growing consumption of natural gas. President Putin came to Turkey in November of 2005 to (belatedly) commemorate opening of the Blue Stream natural ANKARA 00001215 002 OF 003 gas pipeline under the Black Sea. Turkey has sought support for its favored Samsun-Ceyhan Bosphorus bypass oil pipeline and for refineries and natural gas infrastructure which could contribute to development at Ceyhan. Turkey has criticized apparent Russian support for the competing Bulgaria-Greece Bosphorus bypass (Burgos-Alexandropolos). Russia has called for sending more natural gas to and through Turkey via an expanded Blue Stream or a Blue Stream II, as well as access to natural gas distribution and storage. ¶6. (C) Although there is a long laundry list of potential projects, they have failed to reach concrete agreement. We have feared the potential for a grand bargain of allowing natural gas transit to Europe (foreclosing transit of Caspian and Central Asian gas) in exchange for support for Samsun-Ceyhan, but this has apparently not materialized to date. While Russia has used energy as a geopolitical weapon against some countries, it has been a reliable gas supplier to Turkey (albeit at a high price). Russia has stepped up to replace volumes when Iran has arbitrarily cut supplies in the winter. Russia will likely seek to persuade Turkey not to facilitate competing transit of gas to Europe, which would hurt Gazprom's monopoly. Common Ground in the Black Sea -------------- ¶7. (C) Turkey and Russia enjoy a new defense relationship centered on Black Sea maritime security cooperation. Russian DefMin Sergei Ivanov hosted Defense Minister Gonul in Moscow in September 2006 for negotiations on military cooperation. In May 2006, NSC Secretary General Yigit Alpogan and his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov held talks on regional security issues and military cooperation in Moscow. ¶8. (C) Russia participates in BLACKSEAFOR, the on-call naval force created by Turkey in 2001 that is currently called up twice annually. Its most recent deployment was April 6-24, with port calls on the Bulgarian port of Burgaz, the Romanian port of Constanta and on Istanbul. ¶9. (C) In January 2007, Russia joined Turkey's other major Black Sea security initiative, Operation Black Sea Harmony. Unlike BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Harmony (OBSH) is a continuously operating patrol force that shows a naval presence along the main merchant traffic routes and conducts surveillance. OBSH shares data on suspicious vessels with its Mediterranean counterpart, Operation Active Endeavor, although Turkish officials acknowledge Turkey is bound to respect Russian caveats on sharing information with NATO obtained from Russian vessels. But What Have You Done for Me Lately? -------------- ¶10. (C) Even as the Turkey-Russia romance blossoms, some of its lead players are cautious. Ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) MP Nevzat Yalcintas, head of parliament's Russia friendship group, told us candidly that Russians are "sociable but cunning, and we cannot trust them." Looking beyond the veneer of current positive ties, Yalcintas believes it will take 100 years to overcome the half a millennium of bad blood between the two countries. He asserted that -- despite recent ups and downs -- Turkey is far more invested in its relationship with the U.S. ¶11. (C) Indeed, Russia has thus far refused to assist on two issues key to Turkish interests: Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K). In 2004, Russia vetoed UNSC approval of the SYG's report on the Cyprus settlement initiative (a report favorable to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (TCs)). Subsequent Erdogan-to-Putin approaches have failed to turn the GOR around on supporting the TCs (though Russia and the "TRNC" have exchanged commercial delegations). Turkish officials forthrightly tell us that Ankara expects more from Moscow on Cyprus given expanding bilateral ties, and Russia's lack of help still rankles. GMF's Kiniklioglu told us that the ROC has noted improving Turkey-Russia ties, and worked hard to maintain good relations with Russia. He attributed warm Moscow-Nicosia ties to "Orthodox affinity" as well as laws and practices that still make Cypriot banks a favored destination for dirty Russian money. ANKARA 00001215 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Turks are also frustrated that Russia has not been more helpful on N-K. In their view, Moscow should be able to force Yerevan to make a deal. Turkey also looks to Russia to get the Armenians to improve ties with Turkey and cease lobbying for recognition of the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. According to MFA, Russia has responded to Turkish entreaties on N-K by referring to the Minsk Group and making only the most general statements of support for solving the conflict. Russian officials have expressed support for the GOT's proposal to the GOAM for a Joint Commission of Historians to discuss the genocide issue, but apparently Russia has not pressed the Armenians on it. Yalcintas, the MP who leads the friendship group, suspects that Russia will never provide substantive help on these issues, because Russia "always wants Turkey to have some problems." ¶13. (C) One issue on which the two sides have apparently worked out a modus vivendi is terrorism, an issue about which there had been significant friction in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In that period, Moscow accused Ankara of harboring Chechen terrorists, while Turkey slammed Russian support for/tolerance of the PKK. MFA officials now tell us that this problem has been "solved," which they clarified to mean neither side raises the issue anymore. Yalcintas asserted to us that he personally explained to the Russians that Chechens in Turkey were all harmless refugees. The GOT has repeatedly requested that Russia officially declare the PKK to be a terrorist organization, but does not protest too loudly when the Russians explain that this would require a finding by a Russian court. Comment: More of the Same -------------- ¶14. (C) While we may be dealing with a different Turkish government following July 22 elections here, that is doubtful to occasion a significant shift in Turkey-Russia relations. Economic ties are sufficiently deep (and mutually beneficial),and much of the political dialogue is now institutionalized. Though Turkish outreach to Russia is sometimes cited as part and parcel of AKP foreign policy guru Ahmet Davutoglu's "strategic depth" concept -- which in its briefest form means that Turkey should reach out to neighbors and not rely too much on the west -- it is rational and by no means restricted to the AKP. For example, it is the military (which despises the AKP government) that is driving the very Black Sea maritime security instruments which have characterized Turkey-Russia cooperation. ¶15. (C) The potential area for concern is whether Moscow can successfully prevail upon Ankara to oppose American interests in the region and in the world. It is possible that Russian influence is in part responsible for Turkey's rather cool stance toward Georgia's NATO ambitions and toward Tbilisi overall. Turkey often cites its engagement with Russia as the reason for its opposition to an expanded U.S. or NATO role in Black Sea maritime security ("we don't want to spook the Russians"),but in fact a limited U.S. role is really Turkey's preference anyway. And on some issues Turkey will go ahead without much caring what Russia thinks, for example its support for UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's Kosovo plan. (However, MFA officials sheepishly told us they do not plan to work the Russians on Kosovo, implying that even with better relations between the two Turkey could not hope to turn Russia around on this issue.) While we do not discount the deepening political dialogue and economic dynamism of the Turkey-Russia relationship -- and the attraction for Ankara of having a powerful yet non-judgmental "friend" -- we do not see a fundamental shift in Turkey's foreign policy orientation toward Moscow. End comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON