SCENESETTER FOR TRANSCOM/CC GENERAL SCHWARTZ MAY

S E C R E T ANKARA 001174 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TRANSCOM/CC GENERAL SCHWARTZ MAY 24 VISIT TO TURKEY Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Your arrival comes at a crucial political moment as the derailed presidential bid of FM Gul has forced an early parliamentary election scramble. The Turkish General Staff,s (TGS) April 27 harsh statement against the nomination of FM Gul as president, and Gul,s subsequent withdrawal, demonstrated the military's continued influence on the political process here. You will want to express appreciation for Turkey's permission to use Incirlik Air Base, Habur Gate, and Turkish sea ports in support of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have requested authorization to continue these operations for one year after the June 22 expiration. Officials here will be eager for an update on U.S. plans in Iraq and may press you for U.S. action against PKK terrorist safe havens in Northern Iraq. The military has stated its support for a cross-border operation if granted parliamentary approval; however, absent a major terrorist attack or significant military losses to the PKK in Turkey, such an operation does not appear imminent. On Iran, you will want to urge continued active opposition to Tehran's nuclear weapons program. MDA briefed the GOT on U.S. long-range missile defense, and Turkey recently released RFIs for short, medium and long range missile defense systems. Defense procurement relations, stalled for the last three years, may be moving again. Turkey signed an LOA for 30 new F-16s, is considering a strategic partnership with Sikorsky, and remains a partner in the Joint Strike Fighter project. You will want to express thanks for significant Turkish contributions to ISAF, including its recent donation of 155mm howitzers to the Afghan National Army. End summary. Political Scene -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Your visit comes during a time of political uncertainty in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (AKP),whose roots are Islamist, has ruled as a one-party government for four-and-a-half years, enacting numerous economic and pro-democracy reforms. On April 24, the AKP announced Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as its candidate for President, a largely ceremonial office but one with significant veto and appointment powers currently held by the staunchly secular Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The first round of parliamentary voting on April 27 was marred by a procedural dispute and opposition parties petitioned the Constitutional Court to rule that the AKP did not have the necessary quorum to validate the results. Late on April 27, TGS published a harshly-worded statement warning of the dangers of fundamentalism and declaring its determination to defend the secular state. The statement was read as a warning against a Gul presidency. Successive marches in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir over recent weeks each drew upwards of a million participants in a show of pro-secular solidarity. The Constitutional Court annulled the first round of voting on the president and interpreted quorum rules that effectively launched Turkey on the path to early parliamentary elections, currently scheduled for July ¶22. ¶3. (C) Both the AKP and opposition parties believe early elections are in their favor and offer the only legal and political way out of the constitutional deadlock. Meanwhile, Turks debate the effect of the General Staff,s April 27 midnight statement -- a clear intervention into the political process. There is considerable speculation on how the military will react if the AKP retains its parliamentary majority following early elections and nominates another presidential candidate perceived as too Islamist. ¶4. (C) We have made clear -- publicly and privately -- that it is up to Turkey's democratic institutions and constitutional procedures to resolve the current dispute and that there should be no extra-constitutional intervention, military or otherwise, in the democratic process. In any public comments you make, you should avoid being drawn into a discussion of Turkish political developments. Despite its critical role in this drama, we do not expect Turkish military leaders to raise the issue with you. Incirlik Authorization Up for Renewal -------------- ¶5. (C) Despite the Turkish parliament's March 1, 2003 decision not to allow the 4th ID access to Iraq, Turkey has provided critical logistics support for Iraq operations from Turkey through the Incirlik Air Hub and by use of the land crossing at Habur Gate. Almost 60% of air cargo destined for U.S. troops in Iraq transits Incirlik and over 25% of fuel for coalition forces passes through the land bridge at Habur Gate. More recently, on October 19, 2006, the USG was given permission to retrograde equipment out of Iraq overland through Turkey. The expected start date for equipment retrograde is July 2007. The first items to be retrograded will likely be the over 23,000 shipping containers currently held in Iraq. You will want to express appreciation for Turkish permission to use Incirlik Air Base, Habur Gate GLOC, and Turkish seaports, which are vital links in the logistical TRANSCOM hub supporting US operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. authorization for the logistics hub, air-refueling, retrograde, and FAA Navigation Aid Check operations will expire on June 22. We have requested their extension for an additional year and do not see foresee any barriers to their renewal following the Council of Ministers meeting in mid June. You will want to emphasize the importance of these capabilities to support U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. PKK - Military Prepared to Take Action -------------- ¶6. (S) Military operations in Turkey against the PKK terrorist organization have intensified as snowmelt and agreeable weather have permitted. The early April deaths of ten soldiers in PKK clashes led to press speculation that the TGS would launch a cross-border operation (CBO). In an April 12 press conference, CHOD GEN Buyukanit accused the U.S. of backing of Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani. He stated that the Turkish military considers a CBO to be necessary and useful, but deferred to a parliamentary vote to green-light such an operation and acknowledged that the TGS had not yet requested such approval. Given civil-military tensions over the presidential election process and absent significant casualties at the hands of the PKK, we believe that a CBO is not imminent. However, government and military officials alike have expressed frustration that the U.S./Turkey/Iraq trilateral process has not produced the concrete results they expect. Officials will press you for U.S. action against PKK safe havens in northern Iraq and will warn that the option of unilateral Turkish action is on the table. Kirkuk is the Pivotal Point -------------- ¶7. (C) Turkey's frustration with the PKK is exacerbated by its fear of a strong Iraqi Kurdistan and the specter of Kurdish independence. Turkey's deepest concern regarding Iraq is that the Kurds will move -- either via a referendum or other means -- to annex Kirkurk and other significant territory south of the Green Line, Ninewah Province in particular. Turkey fears that Kurdish control of this territory, including oil-rich Kirkuk, will almost inevitably lead to an independent Kurdish state whose leaders will then agitate for a greater Kurdistan to include southeast Turkey. Recent provocative rhetoric from Barzani has only added fuel to this fire. While Turkish officials currently seem more confident that Kirkuk's final status may not be decided by the end of this year, they will likely still express their concerns to you, as well as an overarching fear that sectarian violence will contribute to Iraq's eventual disintegration. Iran's Nuclear Program -------------- ¶8. (C) Turkey strongly opposes Iran's development of a nuclear weapons system, and has actively engaged Tehran, urging Iran to accept the P5 offer or some other diplomatic solution. Turkey also strongly opposes any kind of military intervention by the U.S. or others against Iranian nuclear sites and is unenthusiastic about economic sanctions, having lost much business during the wars in Iraq. On April 25-26, Turkey served as host for the most recent meeting on Iran's nuclear program between Larijani and the EU's Javier Solana. Turkey has important commercial links with Iran, including the import of about 15 percent of its natural gas. Despite the failure of Turkish firms' bids for the new Tehran airport and cellular telephone system, Turkey says it hopes to expand trade with its eastern neighbor. Over one million Iranians visit Turkey each year and Iran is Turkey's door to Central Asia. Ninety percent of eastbound Turkish Air flights and over 35,000 trucks a year cross Iranian territory on their way to Central Asia. While Turkey has been supportive of U.S. requests to check suspect Iranian charter flights crossing its territory en route to Lebanon, it has resisted requests to do the same for regularly-scheduled commercial flights for fear of retaliation. Turkey is working to implement UN Security Council sanctions against Iranian regime. You will want to urge continued active opposition to Tehran's nuclear weapons program. Missile Defense -------------- 9 (C) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Deputy Director BG Patrick O'Reilly briefed Turkish officials on April 2 about the Iranian ballistic missile threat and the U.S. Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System. Turkey supports the establishment of a NATO defense grid and BG O'Reilly emphasized our intention that the proposed system be NATO-compatible. MFA officials questioned why some NATO members appear to enjoy a "free ride" under the U.S. national system and asked how the system would be integrated with a NATO grid. The government has been reluctant to discuss Turkey's long-term strategy but the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries has issued a Request for Information for short, medium and long range missile defense systems and has requested Price and Availability data for the Patriot and Arrow II systems, which can only be sold via the Foreign Military Sales system. Procurement Issues -------------- ¶10. (C) The bilateral defense industry relationship may be coming out of a multi-year deep freeze. Following lengthy negotiations, Turkey signed on April 30 a Letter of Agreement for the purchase of 30 new F-16 Block 50 aircraft to fill out its inventory while its fleet is being modernized. Turkey is also discussing a "strategic business partnership" agreement with Sikorsky under which Turkey would produce significant portions of its International Black Hawk and possibly an armed Black Hawk helicopter. The armed Black Hawk would replace the attack helicopter Turkey has been trying to buy since the mid-1990s. Italy's Augusta Westmoreland was just selected to produce 30 to 50 attack helicopters, but the military's displeasure over that choice (the only other contender was South Africa's Denel) may cause the tender to be canceled. Turkey is a Tier III partner in the JSF program, with a contribution of $175 million and a proposed purchase of 100 aircraft (making it the fourth largest purchaser after the U.S., U.K., and Italy). NATO and Afghanistan -------------- ¶11. (C) Turkey has been a solid contributor to the NATO Allies' effort in Afghanistan. It has nearly 1,000 troops on the ground, took over command of the ISAF Kabul region in April, and recently donated 24 155mm howitzers to the Afghan National Army, along with a training package. In addition to military support, Turkey operates a PRT in Wardak Province and has committed 100 million dollars in long-term development support to Afghanistan, which has been used primarily for the construction of hospitals and schools. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON