Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA1108
2007-05-10 13:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY'S GOVERNING BIG TENT PARTY -- SPLITS IN THE

Tags:  PGOV TU 
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DE RUEHAK #1108/01 1301329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101329Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2041
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001108 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2022
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S GOVERNING BIG TENT PARTY -- SPLITS IN THE
SEAMS

REF: ANKARA 1096 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001108 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2022 TAGS: PGOV TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S GOVERNING BIG TENT PARTY -- SPLITS IN THE SEAMS REF: ANKARA 1096 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The political crisis sparked by Foreign Minister Gul's failed bid for the presidency has exacerbated pre-existing divisions within the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). While AKP has always been a "big tent" coalition of the devout, the moderate, the nationalists and the opportunistic, disputes over Prime Minister Erdogan,s handling of the presidential campaign have polarized divergent camps. At least two trends are currently evident: Some are questioning the future of the party and Erdogan's leadership capabilities, while others are pulling the strings to put the tent back in order; still others, for whom AKP is the only possible vehicle to return to parliament, will stay on board at least through the July general election. End summary. ¶2. (C) Mehmet Dulger, Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and one of AKP's moderate faction, was scathing in his criticism of Erdogan. In a recent private conversation, Dulger shared his judgment that Erdogan had made a profound miscalculation in putting forward Gul over other compromise candidates and then exacerbated the problem by failing to consult with key stakeholders within the party and elsewhere in the government. Openly acknowledging that he is not a part of AKP's innermost circle, Dulger asserted that the party's strength lay in its potential to bridge social divisions. Erdogan's refusal to make necessary concessions had plunged the country into the most serious political crisis since 1997 and had badly damaged AKP's internal cohesion. ¶3. (C) Projecting ahead over the weeks leading up the July 22 parliamentary elections, Dulger predicted that none of the proposed constitutional reforms (including the one calling for direct election of the president) would be adopted and that the next parliament would be even more fractious and less effective. As a result, the political crisis over the presidency and the underlying issues of social fragmentation and institutional imbalance, would inevitably re-emerge. ¶4. (C) In a separate conversation, AKP parliamentary whip and party insider Salih Kapusuz projected calm and confidence. He believes that the electorate will ultimately reward AKP at the ballot box as the "victim" of the Turkish General Staff's April 27 e-memorandum. Reflecting on FM Gul's forced withdrawal from the presidential sweepstakes, he defended AKP's internal process that he claims chose Gul through extensive consultations with the party base. As for party unity and AKP's continued draw, he pointed to the conservative voters of Anatolia, whose body politic he said has changed substantially in recent years. He focused, too, on AKP's well-honed organization, a contrast, he noted, with other parties. Two months, he added, is a very short time to build and fine-tune a political machine. AKP was preparing to showcase their popular support not through mass demonstrations, but by carefully choosing events for PM Erdogan and others to attend, such as an opening May 12 in the eastern city of Erzurum. ¶5. (C) In contrast to Dulger, Kapusuz seemed convinced that parliament will pass the second constitutional package, which calls for direct election of a president. His expectation is that President Sezer will veto it, send it back to parliament. Parliament will then re-pass it, at which point, according to Kapusuz's interpretation of the relevant constitutional articles, the President must either approve the package or submit it to popular referendum. ¶6. (C) Bulent Gedikli, AKP's financial and administrative vice chair, echoed Kapusuz's optimism but took pains to emphasize the party's centrist, non-religious nature. AKP has brought improvements in its four-plus years in office; voters will remember that, including in the southeast, he predicted. Gedikli said AKP must take note of recent mass rallies around the country, which he viewed as positive for Turkey's development. ANKARA 00001108 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Comment: There clearly is foment within AKP, sparked by perceptions that Erdogan played too fast and loose with his last-minute presidential candidate announcement. It is a natural juncture for those who feel on the outs to air their frustrations. Erdogan et al are just as clearly attempting to re-assert control over the party. With parliamentary elections looming, they have a powerful tool: election lists. If AKP indeed starts to fray, despite the inner circle's best efforts, early signs will include MP resignations and jumps to other parties in the run-up to the parliamentary election. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON

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