Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA1071
2007-05-07 15:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: TURKS OF TWO MINDS ON THE MILITARY'S

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 071526Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1987
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001071 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2027
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: TURKS OF TWO MINDS ON THE MILITARY'S
INTERVENTION

REF: A. ANKARA 1070

B. ANKARA 1056 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, for Reasons 1.4 (b
,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001071

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2027
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: TURKS OF TWO MINDS ON THE MILITARY'S
INTERVENTION

REF: A. ANKARA 1070

B. ANKARA 1056 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, for Reasons 1.4 (b
,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY and COMMENT. Two main streams of thought
assess the current political crisis in Turkey: one, that the
ruling party's behavior compelled the military to take
action; and two, that (even if the party's behavior or
perceived agenda caused profound concerns) military
intervention was not the appropriate course (septel). These
views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A certain
amount of overlap exists among those who feel that the
military's action was harmful to Turkey's democracy, but that
the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) both paved
the way with a series of problematic behaviors and pulled the
cord by nominating FM Abdullah Gul -- a man whose pious
approach to Islam (and early roots in more radical pro-Islam
movements),many say, render him unable to truly represent
all 72 million Turks. This debate underscores that democracy
in Turkey continues to be hobbled, not just by the military's
(and its allies') willingness to intervene, but by a public
and political class still unable to assume responsibility for
setting the terms of Turkish politics. END SUMMARY and
COMMENT.

"The military had to act"
--------------


2. (C) Secularism trumps democracy: this national priority
feeds the idea that the military -- by virtue of AKP's
incautious and subversive activities -- was compelled to
intervene in politics. Many Turks reflect this view and
argue that AKP rule was in itself anti-democratic. A
department head at the Treasury, while appreciative of
Turkey's economic gains under AKP, asked rhetorically whether
an Islamist-controlled state that abused women's rights would
really be democratic. Holders of this view point to:

--the perceived democratic deficit of the ruling party's
two-thirds majority in parliament, when "75 percent" (in
reality, about 67 percent) did not vote in favor of AKP;

--their perception of its bullying of the media;

--AKP's failure to call early elections last fall and thus
avoid the problem of an outgoing parliament attempting to
elect a president;

--AKP's failure to heed the General Yasar Buyukanit's April
12 warning and other signals;

--AKP's refusal to seek a consensus presidential candidate;

--the perceived creeping oppression of women through the
increasingly pervasive headscarf ("turban"); and

--the final insult of attempting to install the offending
cover in the presidential palace (on the head of Abdullah
Gul's wife, Hayrunnisa).


3. (C) While some contacts assured us earlier in the year
that the headscarf in the presidential palace was a red
herring, it has become the emotionally-charged symbol that
some believe would take Turkey down the slippery slope to
theocracy. This line of thought is apparent in the
demonstrations in Ankara, Istanbul, Manisa, and elsewhere,
where anti-AKP activists present the view that Turkey stands
at the threshold of an Islamic revolution. The specter of
Tehran-in-Ankara has become much more immediate in recent
weeks, and makes clear the existential determination of AKP's
opponents.


4. (C) Even politicians who consider themselves democrats
argue that AKP brought this crisis on themselves; current
ANAVATAN party leader and former minister in the AKP
government Erkan Mumcu today stood in parliament and said
just that. AKP may have been within its legal bounds, the
argument goes, but it behaved provocatively in a system where

ANKARA 00001071 002 OF 002


the military has always played a role: when you live with a
tiger, don't pull its tail. Part of this implicit support
for military intervention has to do with a combined fear and
hope that the military can yet act more forcefully than
conveying messages. For example, parliamentary advisor Kemal
Kaya, who is considering a run with ANAVATAN, told us the
military had acted very professionally and appropriately in
the April 12 and April 27 verbal warnings. In a particularly
extreme view, Nationalist Action Party (MHP) vice chairman
Oktay Vural explained that AKP actually sought to create a
crisis with the Constitutional Court, but did not foresee the
e-memorandum. If AKP had acted more tactfully and not scared
people, Vural said, we would not be where we are today.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON