JORDAN'S ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION NOT YET READY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 005061 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017 TAGS: KDEM PGOV JO SUBJECT: JORDAN'S ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION NOT YET READY FOR PRIME TIME REF: A. 06 AMMAN 7737 ¶B. ARAB ARCHIVES INSTITUTE - "WASTA - THE DECLARED SECRET" (2001) AMMAN 00005061 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Passed as part of a raft of reforms in October 2006, Jordan's Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is still trying to get on its feet. A seven-member body protected by limited immunities, the ACC has the power to investigate claims and assemble cases for transfer to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution. The ACC has no current cases, however, and will not have any in the foreseeable future - a problem that has already started to chip away at its credibility. Some observers complain that the ACC is sluggish and that the law which created it is flawed. The ACC will have difficulty dealing with the problem of "wasta" ("connections" or "influence peddling"),which is illegal but remains widespread. Ultimately, high-level corruption prosecutions in Jordan will likely come from the top, not the ACC. Unless the ACC pursues its mandate with more vigor and a broader vision, it will continue to flail. End Summary. Structure and Powers -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The seven-member Anti-Corruption Commission was created in October 2006 as part of a royally backed anti-corruption law (Ref A). Former Minister of Justice Abed Shakhanbeh is the current head of the ACC. Commissioners are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Commissioners serve four year terms, and can only be fired, arrested, or charged with a crime with the approval of the Judiciary Council, the Ministry of Justice body that administers the judicial branch of government. The commission sets its own budget, which is sent directly to the Prime Minister for approval. While the Prime Minister could in theory pressure the ACC by reducing its budget, Shakhanbeh told poloff that the political pressure against such a move would deter any PM from taking it. The ACC is charged with issuing an annual report on its activities and the progress of Jordan's fight against corruption. ¶3. (SBU) The ACC has the power to investigate alleged cases of corruption and hand down indictments. While it has no prosecutorial staff of its own, the ACC has the ability to pull in functionaries from the Ministry of Justice and the National Police to work on its caseload as it sees fit. The ACC has no proactive investigatory unit. Instead, it relies on public complaints and whistleblowers for its initial information. In addition, there are no internal regulations or guidelines as of yet on how to judge the merit of a potential corruption case. Shakhanbeh emphasizes that the ACC's powers are based on evidence rather than rumor, but there is no legal basis so far for how much evidence constitutes critical mass in a case. Once a case is assembled, the file in theory goes to a special prosecutor charged with pursuing corruption cases. The prosecutor will then present the case before a court designated for hearing corruption cases. Once the file is transferred, it will essentially be out of the ACC's hands. The methods of prosecuting these cases are still theoretical - neither the corruption prosecutor nor judges for the corruption court have been assigned. Public Enemy Number One: Wasta -------------- ¶4. (C) The ACC's official objective is to fight "institutional corruption" through both punitive cases targeting offenders and through public awareness campaigns. Shakhanbeh and his NGO interlocutors both acknowledged that the most significant task facing the ACC is the system of "wasta" or "connections/influence peddling" that often greases the wheels of Jordan's bureaucracy. Shakhanbeh acknowledged wasta as a crime, but one that is so entrenched in Jordanian society that most people do not view it as such. A survey by the Arab Archives Institute in Amman showed that while eighty-seven percent of Jordanians see wasta as a problem, more than ninety percent use it (Ref B). ¶5. (C) Anti-wasta legislation was in fact passed in 2005, after much pressure from civil society and two years of internal debate. After the legislation's long trip through parliament, the King ratified the measure in late 2006. With the legal foundation in place, the ACC is working on a public campaign against wasta that will complement several civil society efforts already underway. Bassem Sakijha, the head of Transparency International's Jordan branch, stressed to poloff that such educational efforts are critical because, AMMAN 00005061 002.2 OF 003 while the law to criminalize wasta was a step in the right direction, it did not go far enough. He said that vague provisions in the law still act as loopholes for Jordanian officials to essentially justify the practice. Along with other civil society institutions, Sakijha has been working with the ACC on its anti-corruption campaign materials, with a particular focus on wasta. However, according to Shakhanbeh, there are no internal controls within the commission to guard against the use of wasta and other subtle forms of influence by family or tribal members of commission members who may be under investigation. ("Our people are OK", he says.) Strong Support From King, Government -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The King has repeatedly stressed the need for a stronger commitment to fighting corruption in Jordan. In 2001, the King reportedly disguised himself as an old man and stood in line at a tax office so as to experience the wasta-based system at work. The King later told reporters: "Let me say this clearly. We are all one group in serving Jordan, in fighting corruption and in enhancing transparency and accountability. I stand against cronyism. Everyone who works on consolidating it or ignoring its existence is my personal enemy." In his November 23 letter of designation to PM Dahabi, the King specifically said that "the ACC must be supported in its efforts to...combat all forms of corruption through the entrenchment of the principles of transparency and accountability." Prime Minister Dahabi has expressed strong public support for the ACC, and called Shakhanbeh early in his tenure to reiterate his backing. More Cases, More Problems -------------- ¶7. (C) The ACC currently has no cases, and indications are that this situation will continue for the near future. Shakhanbeh said that there is information coming in, but was unwilling or unable to predict how many cases might result. "We aren't in a hurry," he said. "We want to do it right, to gradually gain the confidence of the people." Thus, in the absence of a pipeline of case work, the mechanisms of the ACC remain theoretical. There is currently no assigned ACC prosecutor, no assigned corruption court, and no training for judges who may be assigned to that court in the future. The creation of these mechanisms is on hold until the pipeline of cases is robust enough to justify their existence. Shakhanbeh attributed this to the fact that the ACC's headquarters building is still under construction, but early indicators are not promising: two members of the ACC have already resigned - one due to the lack of progress in pursuing cases, and one because he faced corruption charges himself. ¶8. (SBU) This slow start was commented on in a September 2007 USAID-funded report on corruption in Jordan which said that "the Commission has not yet established any specific priorities. The (evaluation) team was not able to establish a clear picture of current or planned levels of staffing, budget requirements, relationships with other relevant government institutions, or policy focus." Further causes for concern identified by the report are the Prime Minister's role in appointing members of the ACC, and a loophole in the ACC legislation that allows "vexatious" whistleblowers to be charged with crimes themselves. Most important, however, was the opinion that "current members of the ACC are not strong reform leaders, nor do their backgrounds (as central members of the political elite) inspire confidence that they will take any steps that will challenge current interests of institutional prerogatives." ¶9. (C) Ammar Al-Husseini, the international affairs director at the Ministry of Justice and a frequent interlocutor of the Commission, noted to poloff that a further complication in the ACC's mission is that a parallel structure exists within the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). The GID's commission was set up several years ago, and, according to Husseini, has successfully prosecuted cases to completion. Unfortunately, Husseini said, there is almost no contact between the ACC and its GID counterpart, and their ability to work together on broader governmental efforts against corruption is questionable. "One of these institutions will eventually need to be cancelled," he said. ¶10. (C) While public statements by the government are still supportive of the ACC, outside observers are less generous. TI's Bassem Sakijha said that the ACC "hasn't done anything." He asserted that "the ACC has to get some cases, otherwise people will cease to believe them." Sakijha himself has not given up on the ACC as an institution, but relayed that there AMMAN 00005061 003 OF 003 are probably six months remaining on its honeymoon period. Meanwhile Ammar Al-Husseini estimated that it will be "one or two years" before the ACC brings its first case to trial. Pursuing the Big Fish: Top Down, or Bottom Up? -------------- -- ¶11. (C) When asked about his willingness to investigate higher level officials, Shakhanbeh said that he has no problem with doing so, even if a corruption case involved a member of the royal court. Note: Certain members of the royal family itself are constitutionally immune from prosecution. End Note. In practice, however, it appears that the pursuit of such a case from evidence and complaints compiled from citizens by the ACC would be extremely unlikely. The USAID-funded report opined that "weaknesses in the legal foundation do provide some indication that the government is not yet willing to allow real independence to institutions that could ultimately touch upon the interests of political and economic elites." ¶12. (SBU) To the extent that there have been past prosecutions of high-level corruption cases, the impetus and approval for them have generally come from the top, as in the 2003 case of former General Intelligence Director Samih Batikhi, convicted and held in house arrest for four years on corruption charges. Another example is that of Former Minister of Municipal Affairs Abdulrazzaq Tbaishat, who was charged with corruption in the purchase of garbage compacting equipment from Germany. That case never went to court, but it demonstrated the ability of high level government officials to be charged with corruption-related crimes. All of this represents progress, although there are also counter-examples in which vagueness of the law on immunities for officials essentially halted corruption investigations. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Jordan's efforts against corruption suffer from a disconnect between the broad-ranging reformist goals of the King and his inner circle, and the realities dictated by the way in which personal relationships affect business and professional opportunities in this small, tightly knit country. In many ways "wasta" is simply a synonym for many Jordanians that means both "tribal politics" and "how things get done." Wasta is accepted by many Jordanians as the cost of doing business - a cultural factor that will be difficult for civil society and governmental institutions to combat effectively. Changing that culture will take a long-term effort focused on both enforcement and lowering the expectations of Jordan's elites regarding their own impunity. Unfortunately the ACC, a year on, has done little to gain the public and bureaucratic confidence necessary to fight corruption in Jordan on a mass level. While other steps - enactment of a financial disclosure law for officials and more transparent methods at several ministries - help the overall situation, until there are visible convictions of corrupt officials, Jordanians will assume it is "business as usual". Perhaps the reformist credentials and energy of the Dahabi cabinet will allow the ACC to demonstrate its ability to act and thus begin to establish some degree of credibility. Hale