IRAQIS IN JORDAN UPDATE - DECEMBER 10

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 004884 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA AND PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREF SOCI IZ JO SUBJECT: IRAQIS IN JORDAN UPDATE - DECEMBER 10 REF: A. AMMAN 4790 ¶B. AMMAN 4773 ¶C. AMMAN 4738 ¶D. AMMAN 4560 ¶E. AMMAN 3545 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNHCR signed a USD 11 million agreement with the Jordanian Ministry of Health to assist the GOJ in providing primary care services to Iraqis at equivalent costs to non-insured Jordanians. UNHCR hopes that increased Iraqi usage of Jordanian primary care facilities will allow the organization to focus on the largely unmet secondary and tertiary needs associated with chronic conditions. Despite media reports of Iraqis returning to Iraq, a variety of sources - the GOJ, UNHCR, the Embassy's Civil Affairs Liaison Team (CALT),and Iraqis themselves - say that for the time being, Iraqis in Jordan are largely staying put. Representatives from donor countries met with the GOJ Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee during the UNHCR donor mission in Jordan last week. The GOJ discussed the reported $2.26 billion financial impact of Iraqis (refs A & B),the new visa system the GOJ plans to establish by January, and its insistence not/not to accept assistance funds directly from the GOI. For their part, NGOs have expanded their outreach activities and promoted UNHCR registration, but by and large refuse to directly refer cases to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for resettlement. End Summary. PROGRESS ON HEALTH ISSUES -------------- ¶2. (U) UNHCR Program Officer Giorgi Sanikidze told Acting Refcoord that UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Jordanian Ministry of Health (MOH) on November 19 that will allow Iraqis to access all primary care services, except obstetric care, at the same cost as non-insured Jordanians. Cost for a typical visit would be approximately 1 - 1.5 Jordanian Dinars (USD 1.41 - USD 2.11). In return, UNHCR transferred USD 11 million to the MOH to provide additional equipment, develop additional facilities and cover costs of services. ¶3. (SBU) Sanikidze also announced that UNHCR will begin a public outreach campaign amongst Iraqis to encourage them to use Jordanian public health facilities, though in the near term, UNHCR has no plans to reduce the primary health care services provided by its partners - Jordanian Red Crescent 
and Caritas. UNHCR will evaluate progress and usage over the next six months to determine how many Iraqis are accessing the various facilities. If Iraqis increase their use of Jordanian public healthcare facilities, then UNHCR will reduce its expenditures on primary health care and focus on secondary and tertiary care, as well as psychosocial assistance. ¶4. (U) During the December 5-6 UNHCR Donor Mission to Jordan, UNHCR and NGOs emphasized the huge unmet needs of Iraqis with chronic conditions - particularly cancer and kidney conditions. UNHCR is currently finalizing guidelines for handling these cases given the exceptional per capita costs of chronic care cases. UNHCR has established a committee to review each case, determine options for treatment, and consider what can be spent on each case. ¶5. (SBU) UNHCR also reported that it is in negotiations with King Hussein Cancer Center to provide care to Iraqi children with good prognoses. Total costs of this agreement will not exceed 400,000 JD (USD 560,000) and UNHCR expects the written agreement to be signed by next week. RETURNEES FROM JORDAN: A TRICKLE, NOT A FLOW -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Embassy Amman's Civil Affairs Liaison Team (CALT) visited the Karameh-Trebil border on December 4 and reported that although commercial traffic to Iraq (mostly laden with plywood, re-bar and other construction materials) remained heavy, they observed minimal -- two cars during a six-hour visit -- civilian traffic departing Jordan for Iraq. ¶7. (C) Bisher Khasawneh, Director for Europe and the Americas at the Jordanian MFA told NEA/ELA Deputy Director and poloff on December 5 that the media hype on refugee flows back to Iraq is just that: hype. "It doesn't even border on a pattern," he said, and pointed out that refugees are "either ambivalent or pessimistic about stabilization" in Iraq. There is no data collected by the Jordanian government that suggests flows of refugees either back to Iraq or on to Syria. He said that the Iraqis in Jordan are generally AMMAN 00004884 002 OF 003 better off than the ones in Syria, and asserted (correctly, according to ref b) that in terms of the supposed negative impact of Iraqis on Jordan's economic situation, "there is a psychological dimension that doesn't necessarily correspond to reality." ¶8. (SBU) An Iraqi refugee interviewed by poloff saw absolutely no basis for media reports of mass returns to Iraq. "These stories are a bunch of lies," he said. "The media and the international community need these kinds of stories to make the Iraqi situation look better than it really is." Gaby Daw of ICMC and the case workers who deal with refugees on a daily basis agreed. Daw said that "in Jordan, things are still the same" - he had no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, to suggest a mass return by refugees to Iraq, and believed that surveys consistently indicate that around eighty percent of Iraqis are not expecting to return. UNHCR DONOR MISSION MEETING WITH GOJ INTER-MINISTERIAL STEERING COMMITTEE -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) UNHCR Donor Mission representatives met on December 6 with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) Secretary General Nasir Shraideh and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Interior, including Nawaf Tal, Head of the Department of Negotiations. GOJ representatives reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to treating Iraqis well, while emphasizing the financial burden Iraqis have placed on the Jordanian economy. ¶10. (SBU) The GOJ is currently finalizing an assessment of Iraqis' financial impact on the Jordanian economy and expects to release this assessment shortly. The report estimates that Iraqis have directly imposed a 1.6 billion JD (USD 2.26 billion) burden on the Jordanian economy in the water, education, energy, health, transportation, and security sectors. Dr. Shraideh emphasized the difficulties facing Jordan should it not receive additional financial assistance. ¶11. (C) Tal reported that a new visa system for Iraqis - established at the behest of Iraqi PM Maliki, FM Zebari, and NSA Ruba'i during their August visit (ref E) - will be in place by the end of January. Tal explained the delay by affirming the GOJ's intent to establish an entry system that allows entry for a range of Iraqis, as opposed to merely wealthy Iraqis and business people. The GOJ plans to set up multiple "consulates" throughout Iraq to facilitate access. Note: Jordan's setting up consulates throughout Iraq by the end of January seems both unlikely and unnecessary. Earlier descriptions by the GOJ of its planned visa program focused on the use of couriers or bank branches to receive and transmit application. End note. ¶12. (SBU) Donor representatives inquired about the USD 8 million the Government of Iraq previously stated it provided to the GOJ to assist with displaced Iraqis. Shraideh said that the GOI expressed interest in giving this money directly to Jordan, but the GOJ made clear that it will not accept assistance directly from the GOI; instead, this money should be channeled through UNHCR (refs C & D ). Shraideh noted that this preference applies to contributions from any Arab country. (SBU) NGOS WON'T REFER TO THE USRAP BUT WILL PROMOTE UNHCR REGISTRATION -------------- -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Two NGOs (ICMC and Relief International) told Refcoord in early December that they do not intend to directly refer cases to the USRAP for a number of reasons, including: - Lack of capacity: they are worried that resettlement referrals will jeopardize their ability to provide services, which they view as their primary mission, once word spreads about their role; - Lack of qualifications: they expressed concern that they lack the expertise to assess the persecution claims referrals; - Desire to avoid sending mixed signals about their role: they said they want to be known within the refugee community for the educational, medical or other social service they provide without confusing their mandate; - Operational and financial burden of training staff: they lack the financial resources and manpower to translate training materials to Arabic, build agency capacity to refer cases, and support the increased stress of staff members as a result of psychologically taxing interviews; - Desire to maintain credibility: they feared that their reputation will be diminished if their referrals are not successful or compromised if it appears a bias toward certain AMMAN 00004884 003 OF 003 sects, religions or other criteria develop; - Fear of raising expectations: they are concerned that by telling beneficiaries that they are being interviewed for resettlement, they will raise expectations that cannot fully be met, because not all will not be accepted for resettlement; and - ICMC in particular expressed specific concerns that many of the refugees with whom they work closely might not meet individual persecution standards or might see their families split up if some adult members are not deemed eligible. ¶14. (SBU) NGOs also offered a number of suggestions regarding why UNHCR registrations are relatively low (51,000 of an estimated 480,000 Iraqis (per the recently released report by Norwegian research institute FAFO)). Amongst the reasons given: - Misinformation or a lack of information: many Iraqis believe that registration is only for those interested in resettlement, that UNHCR will treat them poorly, or that registering will make them a target for GOJ deportation or attack by other Iraqis; - Until recently, UNHCR was not actively promoting registration; - Iraqis may lack the economic means to physically access UNHCR offices or cannot or will not leave children alone at home in order to schedule a registration appointment; - Credibility gap for UNHCR: previous UNHCR registration documents were viewed as worthless by both refugees and some government employees; Iraqis were discouraged by long wait times for interviews; and until recently, UNHCR offered very few services. ¶15. (SBU) However, these NGOs also reported that over the past two months UNHCR has exhibited a more concerted effort to increase awareness about the need to register, and this has begun to produce some results. NGOs report that UNHCR's presence has been more visible through its mobile outreach team, a variety of handouts, and pamphlets that promote the services funded by UNHCR and offered by their implementing partners. ¶16. (SBU) In addition, in October ICMC signed a three-month contract with UNHCR to conduct a pilot outreach program to reach unregistered vulnerable Iraqis and expand the pool of potential resettlement candidates in Amman, Zarqa, and Madaba. ICMC dedicated four staff members to conduct house visits and vulnerability assessments, verify and encourage registration, and ask for additional referrals. ICMC's cases are transferred to UNHCR to schedule appointments and UNHCR and ICMC provide transportation. ICMC hopes to expand its program country-wide and, if funded, plans to deploy 18 staff members (including Iraqi volunteers) in January towards this effort. Preliminary results indicate that two-thirds of those Iraqis targeted are not currently registered with UNHCR, and ICMC hopes to have referred an additional 100 to 150 families by the end of December. Relief International and International Relief and Development (IRD) plan to coordinate additional outreach activities (distributing pamphlets and encouraging UNHCR registration) as part of their education programs. Hale