ON ANNAPOLIS, FLEETING HOPE LEAVENS LOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 004663

SIPDIS

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y --
INCLUDING PARAS 7-15 PREVIOUSLY LOST IN TRANSMISSION
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SIPDIS

FOR NEA/IPA, NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL KPAL JO IS
SUBJECT: ON ANNAPOLIS, FLEETING HOPE LEAVENS LOW
EXPECTATIONS IN JORDAN

REF: A. AMMAN 4559


B. AMMAN 4584

AMMAN 00004663 001.7 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: As the Annapolis conference approaches, we
have been pulsing our Jordanian contacts on their
expectations for the event, speaking to a broad range of
Palestinians and East Bankers. While few of our contacts
evinced optimism about the meeting, neither complaints about
its expected failure nor the occasional hope for limited
success were offered with much ardor. Most identified the
U.S. as the actor most able to push for an
Israeli-Palestinian settlement. And while short on hope,
none was at a loss when it came to offering the U.S.
"helpful" suggestions.


2. (C) The run-up to the meeting coincided with a
parliamentary election season that largely pushed "Palestine"
into the background compared to past campaigns, instead
lasering in on unemployment and rising prices (Ref A).
Still, the campaign has brought into relief Palestinian
feelings of alienation in Jordan (Ref B) that influence the
way some of our Palestinian-Jordanian contacts related to
questions of "Palestine." End Summary.

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Low Expectations Are Hard to Dash
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3. (C) Both King Abdullah and Palestinian President Mahmud
Abbas have in recent weeks warned publicly of the disaster
that could attend failure, but our contacts' expectations
probably are low enough to preclude shock at an
unsatisfactory outcome. Emblematic was Samir Owaiss, a
Palestinian-origin parliamentary candidate in downtown Irbid
(which encompasses a refugee camp): "We are used to (U.S.)
administrations failing us." Hani Hourani, an East Banker
who heads the political NGO Al-Urdun Al-Jadid (New Jordan),
encouraged the U.S. to address the "trust gap" by building a
concrete base of deeds at Annapolis. He was not optimistic
that gap would be closed, however, judging that the U.S is
more oriented toward managing the Arab-Israeli crisis than
solving it. "People already don't trust the process," he
said, adding that "85 percent say nothing will happen, and
I'm giving you a low number to encourage you."


4. (C) In a free-ranging conversation with a group of
university students at Freedom House in Amman, no one
expressed hope that Annapolis would lead to an agreement, and
several peppered Poloffs with pointed questions about why the
U.S. was not doing more to pressure Israel. One, who
identified himself as "pure" Jordanian (a
self-characterization that immediately followed pious
declarations around the room that there was no difference
between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Banker Jordanians)
proffered that "the war will be forever." Another student,
who identified herself as half Palestinian, said she wished
for the "highest solution" (getting rid of Israel) but had
resigned herself to "the second solution" (two states).


5. (C) Audeh Qawas, a Palestinian-origin candidate running
for re-election to Amman's Christian seat, urged that
Annapolis not happen. In his opinion, neither Israelis nor
Palestinians are ready to make the necessary sacrifices for
peace. He also aired a common suspicion that the
Administration is making a push for peace late in its term in
a bid to influence American domestic politics rather than in
a sincere effort toward a solution. Qawas described leaders
on both Israeli and Palestinian sides as weak -- Olmert
lacking enough power within his coalition to mount a serious
push, and Abbas presiding over a divided Palestinian
Authority. Still, Qawas judged Abbas could survive a failed
meeting, and would likely remain in office.


6. (C) Pressed to imagine a positive outcome from Annapolis
short of a clear-cut signal that Palestine's establishment
was in the offing, Al-Quds Center for Political Studies
Director Oraib Rantawi said Palestinians here are eager for
increased freedom of movement to, from, and within the West
Bank to facilitate family visits. Adel Irsheid, a lawyer who
in the early 1990s was director of the Foreign Ministry's
Occupied Territories Affairs Department, also cited freedom
of movement, focusing on its importance for West Bankers and
consequent ripple effect for Jordanians concerned about their
West Bank brethren.

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A Few Optimists...
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AMMAN 00004663 002.4 OF 003




7. (C) Nawaf al-Tell, Director of the Foreign Ministry's
Negotiations Coordination Bureau who surely spoke at least
partially in his official capacity, summed up his feelings
about Annapolis with the cryptic comment that "I lean toward
optimism, but would not say I'm an optimist." Appreciating
the U.S. stance in favor of a two-state solution, Tell noted
that "all the right signs are there, all the words are
there." However, Tell observed that there has been "a gap
between what has been said and what has been done."
Annapolis, he hoped, would bridge that gap. "We don't want
another Clinton Initiative," Tell said, clarifying that he
referred to the (too late-in-term, in his view) timing, not
the substance of President Clinton's proposals. Even those
who oppose the U.S. realize only the U.S. can broker an end
to the Israel-Arab conflict," he concluded.


8. (C) Hamadeh Faraneh -- a former Jordanian MP, a member of
the Palestinian National Council, and a longtime peace
advocate -- was not worried that Annapolis would fail. In
his view, there would be no meeting if the ongoing
pre-negotiations do not bear fruit. He would consider the
meeting successful if it put an end to Israeli settlement
building. "Even a small achievement would be good." Faraneh
was the most positive when evaluating American engagement in
the peace process. He traced developments from President
George H.W. Bush's announcement mere days after the end of
Operation Desert Storm of plans to convene an international
peace conference, to the signing of the Declaration of
Principles in the Rose Garden in 1993, to the holding of the
Camp David talks and follow-on Taba talks in 2000-2001, to
George W. Bush's becoming the first President to publicly
declare achieving a Palestinian statehood as U.S. policy.
(Faraneh later made similar points in a commentary published
on November 13 in al-Rai newspaper, adding to the list the
latest U.S. pressure on Israel and Palestinians to make real
progress toward a settlement in Annapolis.)

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. . . But Most Dwell on Price of Failure
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9. (C) Renewed final status negotiations were key to all
that we talked to, but some argued that talks would mean
little if not accompanied by rapid, concrete steps to improve
Palestinian lives; failure to move forward would translate
into a step backward in terms of public support for
moderates. Rantawi predicted no dramatic change in local
Palestinian behavior should Annapolis meet his low
expectations, at least in the short-term, but argued that
extremist elements would gain ground at the expense of the
peace camp. A regular contributor to the left-of-center,
pro-Palestinian daily al-Dustour, Rantawi echoed his
published commentary of that same day, arguing that
extremists, far from being threatened by the November
meeting, are eagerly awaiting its collapse so they can say,
"I told you so."


10. (C) Faraneh, who maintains close ties to PA officials
(during our meeting he took a call from Abbas adviser Yasir
Abed Rabbo) said Abbas was seriously considering resigning if
Annapolis failed, noting that his family was well ensconced
at their house in Qatar. Former Irbid MP Saleh Shu'watah, a
Palestinian-Jordanian, said Abbas "wants to prove that he's
not just a chess piece," warning that if there is no tangible
outcome from the meeting, he would be in trouble politically.
Shu'watah also suggested Abbas might have to leave office if
the Annapolis meeting fails to produce something of value, as
extremists would pounce on that opportunity. He thought that
post-Annapolis extremism could spread to Jordan as well,
albeit on a lower level.


11. (C) Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Director Hourani suggested that
the key to success at Annapolis would be to empower moderate
Arab governments by showing that they can achieve progress
before Hamas and Hezbollah create faits accompli. Countries
like Saudi Arabia and Jordan pay a political price for even
attending such conferences, while Israel pays nothing. "Our
governments don't want to be there, but they're stuck with
you," said Hourani. Extremists have stepped into the void
left by the perceived absence of American statements on its
policies, he argued, which effectively defined the meaning of
American silence to populations throughout the Arab world.


12. (C) Palestinian-Jordanian Fuad Muammar, editor of
al-Siyasa al-Arabiyya weekly, also offered "advice." In his
view, Annapolis must establish a timetable for establishing a
Palestinian state. The "biggest mistake" the U.S. could
make, he argued, would be to shepherd a conference that fails
to offer a clear vision of such a state. Absent that, he

AMMAN 00004663 003.3 OF 003


predicted, forces opposed to peace will unite. Based on his
interactions with refugees, Muammar -- who speaks frequently
with residents of the Marka Refugee Camp (known locally as
Hittin) near his home -- noted that most see Abbas as
"worthless" and not a decision-maker. In Muammar's view,
Abbas gives the impression that he is a tool of the U.S. and
Israel. Interestingly, despite his harsh estimation of U.S.
policy, Muammar drew hope from the timing of the conference
-- 60 years to the month after the 1947 UN Partition Plan to
create an Arab state beside a Jewish state in British
Mandatory Palestine. That, as well as the Naval Academy
venue, gave the impression that the U.S. was serious. "In
the Middle East," he said, "people believe in symbolism."

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Success Could Be Tailored to Boost Abbas
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13. (C) Some of our contacts cited the potential that
success could have a direct impact on the ongoing competition
between Hamas and Fatah in the territories. Negotiations
Coordination Bureau chief Tell judged that renewed talks on
core issues would impress political analysts more than they
would the average Palestinian. "What takes place on the
ground in three or four weeks after the conference will
determine the fate of Gaza," he said. Tell listed specific
steps that could bolster Abbas at Hamas' expense: a
significant release of prisoners (not, as he put it, the
typical "drop in the ocean"),lifting "real checkpoints --
not ones that no one has ever passed through," and
transferring PA tax revenues collected by Israel. Hamas
might lose ground if the Gaza situation worsens, but to
"al-Qaida," not to moderates like Abbas, Tell predicted.


14. (C) We spoke to East Banker and former Ambassador to
Iraq Bassam Kakish the day several Jordanian newspapers
published an open letter he signed with 111 other East Banker
and Palestinian-origin notables urging Abbas to place
conditions on his attendance at Annapolis. On greeting us he
immediately directed our attention to a stack of books on his
coffee table. Among them were Jimmy Carter's "Peace Not
Apartheid," Frank Ricks' "Fiasco," and former CIA Director
George Tenet's "At the Center of the Storm." Kakish mined
this reading list for data-points to support an impassioned
critique of what he saw as a U.S. failure to put necessary
pressure on Israel. But like others, his stance came less
out of anti-Americanism than from frustration (he spoke with
great pride of two of his sons who have built successful
lives in the U.S.) "I look to America as my savior, for
peace in the future," he said, warning that by losing Arab
hearts and minds, the U.S. could not hope to retain their
support.


15. (C) To reverse that trend, said Kakish, Annapolis had
not only to set a timetable for creating a Palestinian state,
but lead to immediate Israeli withdrawals. Improving the
situation in the West Bank could provide an object lesson to
Hamas and its supporters in Gaza about what moderation could
achieve for the Palestinians. "Let the people of Gaza see
the fruits of improved life in the West Bank," he urged.


Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
Hale