ON ANNAPOLIS, FLEETING HOPE LEAVENS LOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 004663 SIPDIS -------------- -------------- C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- INCLUDING PARAS 7-15 PREVIOUSLY LOST IN TRANSMISSION -------------- -------------- SIPDIS FOR NEA/IPA, NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017 TAGS: PREL KPAL JO IS SUBJECT: ON ANNAPOLIS, FLEETING HOPE LEAVENS LOW EXPECTATIONS IN JORDAN REF: A. AMMAN 4559 ¶B. AMMAN 4584 AMMAN 00004663 001.7 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: As the Annapolis conference approaches, we have been pulsing our Jordanian contacts on their expectations for the event, speaking to a broad range of Palestinians and East Bankers. While few of our contacts evinced optimism about the meeting, neither complaints about its expected failure nor the occasional hope for limited success were offered with much ardor. Most identified the U.S. as the actor most able to push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. And while short on hope, none was at a loss when it came to offering the U.S. "helpful" suggestions. ¶2. (C) The run-up to the meeting coincided with a parliamentary election season that largely pushed "Palestine" into the background compared to past campaigns, instead lasering in on unemployment and rising prices (Ref A). Still, the campaign has brought into relief Palestinian feelings of alienation in Jordan (Ref B) that influence the way some of our Palestinian-Jordanian contacts related to questions of "Palestine." End Summary. -------------- Low Expectations Are Hard to Dash -------------- ¶3. (C) Both King Abdullah and Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas have in recent weeks warned publicly of the disaster that could attend failure, but our contacts' expectations probably are low enough to preclude shock at an unsatisfactory outcome. Emblematic was Samir Owaiss, a Palestinian-origin parliamentary candidate in downtown Irbid (which encompasses a refugee camp): "We are used to (U.S.) administrations failing us." Hani Hourani, an East Banker who heads the political NGO Al-Urdun Al-Jadid (New Jordan), encouraged the U.S. to address the "trust gap" by building a concrete base of deeds at Annapolis. He was not optimistic that gap would be closed, however, judging that the U.S is more oriented toward managing the Arab-Israeli crisis than solving it. "People already don't trust the process," he said, adding that "85 percent say nothing will happen, and I'm giving you a low number to encourage you." ¶4. (C) In a free-ranging conversation with a group of university students at Freedom House in Amman, no one expressed hope that Annapolis would lead to an agreement, and several peppered Poloffs with pointed questions about why the U.S. was not doing more to pressure Israel. One, who identified himself as "pure" Jordanian (a self-characterization that immediately followed pious declarations around the room that there was no difference between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Banker Jordanians) proffered that "the war will be forever." Another student, who identified herself as half Palestinian, said she wished for the "highest solution" (getting rid of Israel) but had resigned herself to "the second solution" (two states). ¶5. (C) Audeh Qawas, a Palestinian-origin candidate running for re-election to Amman's Christian seat, urged that Annapolis not happen. In his opinion, neither Israelis nor Palestinians are ready to make the necessary sacrifices for peace. He also aired a common suspicion that the Administration is making a push for peace late in its term in a bid to influence American domestic politics rather than in a sincere effort toward a solution. Qawas described leaders on both Israeli and Palestinian sides as weak -- Olmert lacking enough power within his coalition to mount a serious push, and Abbas presiding over a divided Palestinian Authority. Still, Qawas judged Abbas could survive a failed meeting, and would likely remain in office. ¶6. (C) Pressed to imagine a positive outcome from Annapolis short of a clear-cut signal that Palestine's establishment was in the offing, Al-Quds Center for Political Studies Director Oraib Rantawi said Palestinians here are eager for increased freedom of movement to, from, and within the West Bank to facilitate family visits. Adel Irsheid, a lawyer who in the early 1990s was director of the Foreign Ministry's Occupied Territories Affairs Department, also cited freedom of movement, focusing on its importance for West Bankers and consequent ripple effect for Jordanians concerned about their West Bank brethren. -------------- A Few Optimists... -------------- AMMAN 00004663 002.4 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Nawaf al-Tell, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Negotiations Coordination Bureau who surely spoke at least partially in his official capacity, summed up his feelings about Annapolis with the cryptic comment that "I lean toward optimism, but would not say I'm an optimist." Appreciating the U.S. stance in favor of a two-state solution, Tell noted that "all the right signs are there, all the words are there." However, Tell observed that there has been "a gap between what has been said and what has been done." Annapolis, he hoped, would bridge that gap. "We don't want another Clinton Initiative," Tell said, clarifying that he referred to the (too late-in-term, in his view) timing, not the substance of President Clinton's proposals. Even those who oppose the U.S. realize only the U.S. can broker an end to the Israel-Arab conflict," he concluded. ¶8. (C) Hamadeh Faraneh -- a former Jordanian MP, a member of the Palestinian National Council, and a longtime peace advocate -- was not worried that Annapolis would fail. In his view, there would be no meeting if the ongoing pre-negotiations do not bear fruit. He would consider the meeting successful if it put an end to Israeli settlement building. "Even a small achievement would be good." Faraneh was the most positive when evaluating American engagement in the peace process. He traced developments from President George H.W. Bush's announcement mere days after the end of Operation Desert Storm of plans to convene an international peace conference, to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in the Rose Garden in 1993, to the holding of the Camp David talks and follow-on Taba talks in 2000-2001, to George W. Bush's becoming the first President to publicly declare achieving a Palestinian statehood as U.S. policy. (Faraneh later made similar points in a commentary published on November 13 in al-Rai newspaper, adding to the list the latest U.S. pressure on Israel and Palestinians to make real progress toward a settlement in Annapolis.) -------------- . . . But Most Dwell on Price of Failure -------------- ¶9. (C) Renewed final status negotiations were key to all that we talked to, but some argued that talks would mean little if not accompanied by rapid, concrete steps to improve Palestinian lives; failure to move forward would translate into a step backward in terms of public support for moderates. Rantawi predicted no dramatic change in local Palestinian behavior should Annapolis meet his low expectations, at least in the short-term, but argued that extremist elements would gain ground at the expense of the peace camp. A regular contributor to the left-of-center, pro-Palestinian daily al-Dustour, Rantawi echoed his published commentary of that same day, arguing that extremists, far from being threatened by the November meeting, are eagerly awaiting its collapse so they can say, "I told you so." ¶10. (C) Faraneh, who maintains close ties to PA officials (during our meeting he took a call from Abbas adviser Yasir Abed Rabbo) said Abbas was seriously considering resigning if Annapolis failed, noting that his family was well ensconced at their house in Qatar. Former Irbid MP Saleh Shu'watah, a Palestinian-Jordanian, said Abbas "wants to prove that he's not just a chess piece," warning that if there is no tangible outcome from the meeting, he would be in trouble politically. Shu'watah also suggested Abbas might have to leave office if the Annapolis meeting fails to produce something of value, as extremists would pounce on that opportunity. He thought that post-Annapolis extremism could spread to Jordan as well, albeit on a lower level. ¶11. (C) Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Director Hourani suggested that the key to success at Annapolis would be to empower moderate Arab governments by showing that they can achieve progress before Hamas and Hezbollah create faits accompli. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan pay a political price for even attending such conferences, while Israel pays nothing. "Our governments don't want to be there, but they're stuck with you," said Hourani. Extremists have stepped into the void left by the perceived absence of American statements on its policies, he argued, which effectively defined the meaning of American silence to populations throughout the Arab world. ¶12. (C) Palestinian-Jordanian Fuad Muammar, editor of al-Siyasa al-Arabiyya weekly, also offered "advice." In his view, Annapolis must establish a timetable for establishing a Palestinian state. The "biggest mistake" the U.S. could make, he argued, would be to shepherd a conference that fails to offer a clear vision of such a state. Absent that, he AMMAN 00004663 003.3 OF 003 predicted, forces opposed to peace will unite. Based on his interactions with refugees, Muammar -- who speaks frequently with residents of the Marka Refugee Camp (known locally as Hittin) near his home -- noted that most see Abbas as "worthless" and not a decision-maker. In Muammar's view, Abbas gives the impression that he is a tool of the U.S. and Israel. Interestingly, despite his harsh estimation of U.S. policy, Muammar drew hope from the timing of the conference -- 60 years to the month after the 1947 UN Partition Plan to create an Arab state beside a Jewish state in British Mandatory Palestine. That, as well as the Naval Academy venue, gave the impression that the U.S. was serious. "In the Middle East," he said, "people believe in symbolism." -------------- Success Could Be Tailored to Boost Abbas -------------- ¶13. (C) Some of our contacts cited the potential that success could have a direct impact on the ongoing competition between Hamas and Fatah in the territories. Negotiations Coordination Bureau chief Tell judged that renewed talks on core issues would impress political analysts more than they would the average Palestinian. "What takes place on the ground in three or four weeks after the conference will determine the fate of Gaza," he said. Tell listed specific steps that could bolster Abbas at Hamas' expense: a significant release of prisoners (not, as he put it, the typical "drop in the ocean"),lifting "real checkpoints -- not ones that no one has ever passed through," and transferring PA tax revenues collected by Israel. Hamas might lose ground if the Gaza situation worsens, but to "al-Qaida," not to moderates like Abbas, Tell predicted. ¶14. (C) We spoke to East Banker and former Ambassador to Iraq Bassam Kakish the day several Jordanian newspapers published an open letter he signed with 111 other East Banker and Palestinian-origin notables urging Abbas to place conditions on his attendance at Annapolis. On greeting us he immediately directed our attention to a stack of books on his coffee table. Among them were Jimmy Carter's "Peace Not Apartheid," Frank Ricks' "Fiasco," and former CIA Director George Tenet's "At the Center of the Storm." Kakish mined this reading list for data-points to support an impassioned critique of what he saw as a U.S. failure to put necessary pressure on Israel. But like others, his stance came less out of anti-Americanism than from frustration (he spoke with great pride of two of his sons who have built successful lives in the U.S.) "I look to America as my savior, for peace in the future," he said, warning that by losing Arab hearts and minds, the U.S. could not hope to retain their support. ¶15. (C) To reverse that trend, said Kakish, Annapolis had not only to set a timetable for creating a Palestinian state, but lead to immediate Israeli withdrawals. Improving the situation in the West Bank could provide an object lesson to Hamas and its supporters in Gaza about what moderation could achieve for the Palestinians. "Let the people of Gaza see the fruits of improved life in the West Bank," he urged. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ Hale