MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ELECTION STRATEGY PUT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 004623 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM JO SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ELECTION STRATEGY PUT TO THE TEST REF: A. AMMAN 4584 ¶B. AMMAN 4111 ¶C. AMMAN 3989 ¶D. AMMAN 3311 ¶E. AMMAN 3240 ¶F. AMMAN 2668 ¶G. OSC REPORT OF 10-28-2007 ¶H. OSC JORDAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS GUIDE Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is fielding 22 candidates in the November 20 election for the 110-seat lower house of parliament under the banner of its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF),with the slogan, "Islam is the Solution." IAF successes or failures in the polls will be one of the main story lines the day after the vote, and is the primary focus of the regime. The MB's early October announcement of an IAF candidate list dominated by the dovish wing of the MB and excluding the IAF's dogmatic hawks - including IAF Secretary General Zaki Bani Irsheid - showed a rift in IAF ranks that became evident between a staged July 31 municipal election day boycott by the IAF - amid claims of voting improprieties, and the run up to the parliamentary election (ref E). These elections are therefore a huge test for the MB's electoral strategy. Success or failure in the polls will have significant repercussions on post-election recalibration within the Islamic movement that will impact its place in Jordan's political system. The King and his circle are keen to see the IAF bloc in parliament reduced by one to three seats, to show that political momentum is not in the Islamic movement's favor. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: While the internal machinations of the MB and IAF are opaque for outsiders, the MB leadership clearly opted to push for a IAF list considered moderate instead of a mixed or hawkish list. The motivation for this move almost certainly was to move past the association in the minds of many Jordanians of Hamas and distasteful events in Gaza with the Jordanian MB, to minimize conflict with the government, and to prevent a repeat of the poor electoral performance by more hawkish IAF candidates during the municipal elections in Irbid, Madaba, and Zarqa - each of which were considered IAF strongholds for the local polls. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. The Electoral Map -------------- ¶3. (U) In the 2003 parliamentary election, the IAF fielded 29 candidates, won 16 seats outright and one women's quota seat as well, for a total of 17 seats in the recently-terminated parliament. Currently, the IAF is fielding 22 candidates in 18 of Jordan's 45 electoral districts. Of the 17 IAF members in the previous parliament, only seven are running for reelection. In the previous parliament, the IAF held seven seats from six of the Amman districts, two from Irbid, and three from Zarqa, all cities with large Palestinian-origin populations. The IAF is again fielding candidates for the November 20 election in each of these three cities, with eight candidates in Amman, two in Irbid, and three in Zarqa. ¶4. (C) The IAF fares well in urban population centers where Palestinian-origin Jordanians live. Such districts are overrun with IAF campaign materials, which feature slogans such as "Islam is the Solution" and "All of Palestine's Lands are Holy" (ref A). However, poor results in the IAF strongholds of Irbid, Zarqa and elsewhere during the July 31 municipal elections suggest that IAF support is slipping. An IRI-supported election eve poll suggests that the IAF's male candidate in Zarqa's first district, Mamduh al-Muhaysin, is faring poorly, in comparison to the IAF's female candidate in the same district, incumbent Hayat al-Musaymi, who has a chance of winning her seat outright. ¶5. (C) The Hamas takeover of Gaza, and the rhetorical support initially extended by the IAF to Hamas, has fractured the IAF base. Many Jordanians, even those of Palestinian origin, view Hamas's disrespect for symbols of Palestinian statehood - such as stomping on photos of Yasser ARAFAT and raising Hamas flags in place of Palestinian flags (ref F) - as repugnant. They also blame Hamas for a brother on brother war with Fatah that only harms the Palestinian cause. ¶6. (C) In a noteworthy move, the IAF is trying to expand its base of support, and is seeking to pickup tribal support and the traditionally tribal seats in the tribal strongholds of Karak and Tafileh, where two IAF candidates are running. AMMAN 00004623 002 OF 003 Polling shows that the IAF candidate in Karak, Abdalhamid Al-Dhunaybat, has a good shot at winning the seat in Karak's first district, likely with significant tribal support. The Platform -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In seeking to maintain its significant presence in Parliament - as the only significant party bloc - the IAF released its campaign platform in late October (ref G). While a small part of the platform offers thoughtful policy suggestions, much of the document serves as platform for IAF rhetoric. The platform includes calls for: constitutional and political reforms that would include a new election law and financial laws that comply with Islamic law; education reform that would deepen Islamic education and resist normalization with the "Zionist enemy"; and policies that would affirm women's legal rights. The platform also discusses media policy, human rights, housing, health, agricultural, economic, and security policies. ¶8. (U) The platform also covers the IAF's position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and states that, "no one has the right to cede part of the land of Palestine, or give legitimacy to the occupiers on any part of its blessed land...our conflict with the occupier is an ideological and civilizational conflict that is not ended by peace agreements. It is a conflict of survival and not a conflict over borders." The IAF's platform also has a hearty dose of anti-Americanism, citing the Iraq war as an American effort to "control the sources of oil and Iraq's wealth so as to employ them in tightening U.S.-Zionist domination of the region and the world." MB-Government Sniping During the Campaign -------------- ¶9. (C) In the lead-up to the national polls, the IAF used the press to snipe at the government, in hopes of increasing its presence in the minds of the voters by demonstrating that it is looking out for them. The IAF has used the issue of election transparency to criticize the government, calling for more access for domestic monitors on election day in an open letter to Prime Minister Bakhit on November 6 that was widely circulated in the press. In the letter, IAF Secretary General Zaki Bani Irsheid called on PM Bakhit to allow civil society organizations to "supervise all stages of the election, provide candidates with electoral rolls, adopt the indelible ink device and permit neutral experts to control the electronic (computer) link process." As part of this give and take with the government in the press, the IAF has again intimated that they might play the election day pullout card if their candidates fair poorly and/or if they perceive electoral improprieties. Comment: Much of the pre-election IAF rhetoric in support of monitoring seems to have set the table for potential IAF claims of electoral fraud on election day. End comment. Discord in the Islamic Movement -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In a break with traditional MB unity, MB and IAF activists continued to trade indirect accusations and scorn through the media. The method of choosing the IAF candidate list has reportedly triggered discord within the Islamic movement (ref B). Movement sources have told media outlets that IAF Secretary General Bani Irsheid was excluded from meetings in which nomination decisions were made, and that conflict arose with the imposition of certain candidates in certain districts against the wishes of party supporters in those districts. This nomination process has led to speculation in the media and among Post contacts that a large number of traditional IAF supporters will not vote. An unscientific internet poll on the MB website revealed that 59 per cent of IAF and MB members/supporters would not vote as a protest against the movement's own internal nomination process. ¶11. (SBU) As a result, five Islamic movement members registered themselves as independent candidates. They are running in Ajloun, Al-Kourah, Jerash, Karak and Ruseifa. and were subsequently kicked out of the IAF because they, according to Bani Irsheid, "violated the regulations of the party and refused to withdraw their candidacy from the elections." One of the candidates, Mohammad Al-Hajj, explained the process, saying that he was elected by the General Assembly of the IAF branch in Ruseifa, but that the executive bureau of the IAF rejected his nomination, causing him to run as an independent. AMMAN 00004623 003 OF 003 The MB's Big Gamble -------------- ¶12. (C) As a war of words between the government and IAF escalated in August and September, the MB decided to gamble by pushing through a moderate-laden IAF candidate list (refs B, C and D). Non-MB contacts have told poloffs that the MB based its decision on the fear that further confrontation with the government might have led the government to ban the MB and its IAF party, a proposition that would threaten the MB's place in Jordanian society. Contacts saw the possibility of a ban as a threat to the tacit compact between the MB and the monarchy that has allowed the MB to operate legally and openly in Jordan as long as it did not cross certain red lines regarding the legitimacy of Hashemite rule in Jordan. According to many contacts, the compact also secures the personal financial position of the MB leadership, as well as MB-affiliated business interests and institutions. Note: While the government does view the MB as a serious challenge, senior officials close to the King have told the Ambassador their goal is to use legal means to reduce, at least by a few seats, the MB's parliamentary bloc that stood at 17 in the recently-terminated 14th lower house of parliament. End note. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: A big risk for the MB and IAF would come with a very poor showing at the polls for the IAF candidates, meaning significantly fewer seats that the 17 they held in the previous parliament. A significant drop of seats could signal that the so-called moderate forces in the MB and IAF, and their pragmatic approach to GOJ-IAF relations failed, opening the door to an MB and IAF more dominated by ideological hawks. Contacts argue that this dynamic could even lead to a formal split within the MB between the hawks and the doves. ¶14. (C) In the event of significant IAF losses, Post would expect to see a power struggle within the Islamic movement, pitting what is typically described as the moderates of the older generation, East Bank Jordanian nationalist pragmatists against the hawkish, West Bank-origin ideologues. The hawkish ideologues would likely try to reclaim the upper hand within the movement. While government-IAF tension after the election is a likely outcome in any case, a more intense showdown will come if the hard-liners under Zaki Bani Irsheid push out the nationalist Islamists led by Salim Falahat, the MB controller general, and regain the initiative within the movement. ¶15. (C) IAF successes in the elections, meaning essentially a continuation of the status quo, would likely keep the moderate branch of the MB in a strong position within Jordan's Islamic movement going into the inevitable internal recalibration within the MB and IAF following the November 20 vote. It is sometimes quite hard to distinguish between the policy stances of the so-called moderates and hawks within the Islamic movement, and key figures like GID Director Dahabi say the distinction is a false one, a matter of mere tactics. A key question is how the next government and MB will interact with one another, and whether the movement and government will choose confrontation, cooperation or tolerance - or most probably, a mix. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ Hale