CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) MEETING WITH

1. (SBU) From 2005 through 2007, the Organization for
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has held a series of
meetings with Iraqi officials to assist them in preparing for
accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (Ref A).
The Technical Secretariat (TS) hosted the fourth and final
meeting in Amman, Jordan on October 29-31, 2007 with the
objective of developing a complete and correct declaration
appropriate for submission to the OPCW within 60 days after
Iraq's submission of its articles of accession to the United
Nations, which could take place at any time. This final
meeting focused on review of the revisions made by Iraq to
its December 2006 draft in response to the additional
information needs identified in December, and the follow-up
U.S.-UK comments on the December 2006 draft declaration. The
meeting also afforded an opportunity to review and make
suggested edits to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
implementing legislation that includes CWC issues. This
final meeting, therefore, was organized into three sub-groups
that addressed the chemical weapons-related declaration, the
industrial declaration, and implementing legislation.



--------------------------


Chemical Weapons-Related Declaration


--------------------------





2. (C) The basis of the Iraqi declaration for CW activity
remains unchanged from the December 2006 draft:
- declaration of the possession of CW;
- declaration of five past CW-production facilities:
Al-Rashad, Al-Muthanna, and Al-Falluja I, II, and III,
- declaration of two "other facilities" for CW development at
Al-Rashad and Al-Muthanna,
- inclusion of a separate annex to provide available
information on the remnants of CW assessed to still remain at
the Al-Muthanna storage site;
- declaration of four "other chemical production facilities"
(OCPFs); and the
- declaration of CW-related transfers on a
country-by-country, non-company specific basis.

The format of the December 2006 draft declaration has been
expanded to include new annexes for additional information,
including site diagrams, process flow diagrams, photos, and
tabulated information, e.g., equipment lists.



3. (SBU) The CW sub-group conducted a line-by-line review of
the revised sections of the declaration, and provided
clarification and appropriate revisions as needed. The
Iraqis had addressed the U.S-UK additional comments (Ref B)
in preparation for this meeting, as well as the open issues
from the December 2006 session. However, complete sets of
process flow diagrams did not provide for all manufacturing
steps, and the detail of annotation provided was not
adequate. A comprehensive list of acronyms for the entire
declaration was also needed. The UK will assist Iraq with
preparing final site diagrams and process flow diagrams with
appropriate annotation. The TS representatives suggested
that all drawings should be recreated by computer to a
uniform standard. However, the U.S. delegation agreed with
the UK that original (including hand-drawn) figures are
acceptable for submission as part of the declaration as long
as they are completely legible and fully annotated.



4. (SBU) The TS encouraged the Iraqi delegation to obtain
additional photographs that could demonstrate the
completeness of destruction of declared facilities and
equipment. The Iraqi delegation reported that they had been
unsuccessful in accessing the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) archives in
order to obtain useful photos. The U.S. delegation provided
the Iraqi side with 11 aerial photographs and 5 preliminary
site diagrams for three of the five declared CWPFs. The U.S.
delegation agreed to continue to look for useful,
unclassified photographs (e.g., bunkers), and asked the TS to

SIPDIS
consider using the OPCW's specifically designated status -
paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's Report on paragraph 5
of Resolution 1762 (2007), S/2007/568 - to access useful
photos from the UNMOVIC archives.



5. (SBU) The Iraqis had not understood that the Convention
requirements for destruction of CW facilities differ from the
criteria used by the UN for CW destruction, i.e., that
equipment was permanently disabled, that equipment was
dismantled and reused for other legitimate commercial use, OR
that the facilities were destroyed from coalition strikes and
deemed unusable for CW development. TS participants reviewed
several of the photographs provided by the Iraqis, pointing
out examples of facilities that did not meet the CWC
definition for destruction.



6. (SBU) The TS defined four specific tasks to be completed
by the Iraqis, in addition to minor corrections and required
clarifications identified in the text of the draft
declaration, in order for the draft declaration to be
considered complete:
- To address remaining issues (highlighted in the current
draft of Initial Declarations), including comprehensive site
diagrams, process flow diagrams (CW-related), inventory of
buildings and equipment (original) for each CWPF, to the
extent possible;
- To check for additional photographic evidence regarding the
current condition of Iraqi CWPFs, to the extent possible;
- To review the draft for editorial completeness, to check
the availability and correctness of CAS numbers and other
data; and
- To provide an introductory narrative for the declaration
that covers the history of the Iraqi CW-program, and the
circumstances and problems in retrieving information evolving
from the events since the 1991 Gulf war.

A comprehensive list of acronyms is also needed, which the
Iraqis agreed to provide.



7. (C) The Iraq delegation made no commitment as to its
schedule for completing the final revisions to the draft
initial declaration. The U.S. and UK delegations plan to
conduct a final review of the October 2007 version of the
initial declaration draft to ensure that all of the changes
were properly entered, and to add technical details not
captured by the TS during the meeting, e.g., correct chemical
names and structures, etc. The U.S. and UK plan to submit a
final coordinated set of comments to the Iraqi side within
the next few weeks, which will include restatement of our
shared view that at least the annex defining the assessed
content of the two Al-Muthanna bunkers be classified Highly
Protected. The issue of classification of the Iraqi
declaration, currently marked as Highly Protected as a place
holder, was not discussed in detail, and was left to the
Iraqis for decision and incorporation into their final
version.



8. (C) The U.S. and UK delegations raised concern that the
generic entry for 122 mm rockets did not reflect the known
four types that were imported, i.e., Sakr, Sakr-18, Sakr-30,
and Firos-25. An acceptable clarification for this entry was
to add the word "different types" to represent the four types
as referenced in UNSCOM official documents. However, when the
two delegations asked about a fifth type of "aluminum"
rocket, also known as the "Al-Borak" that was produced
indigenously, Iraqi officials denied their existence. U.S.
and UK delegations made reference to this type of rocket
which is referenced in Chapter III of the June 2007 UNMOVIC
Compendium, and in press reporting describing such rockets as
being recovered. Although this matter was not resolved at
the meeting, TS Director of Verification Horst Reeps opined
in discussions on the margins of the meeting that since the
Al-Borak rockets were not imported, the Treaty does not
require their declaration as received CW. This issue still
remains unresolved, and U.S. and UK will raise it again in
our joint comments on the final draft declaration review.



--------------------------


Industry Declaration


--------------------------





9. (SBU) As in the case for the draft Iraqi CW related
initial declaration, the basis of the Iraqi industry
declaration remains unchanged from the December 2006 draft:
- declaration of declarable industry facilities; and
- declaration aggregate national data (AND), in particular
imports and exports of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals.



10. (SBU) Since the last workshop in December 2006, six other
chemical production facilities (OCPFs) had been identified by

the Iraqis as possibly meeting the requirements for
declaration under Article VI (note that the codes assigned
were adjusted at this workshop):
-IRQ001, State Company for Petrochemical Industries, Basra,
vinyl chloride monomer;
-IRQ002, State Company for Vegetable Oil Industries, Baghdad,
LABS;
-IRQ003, State Company for Fertilizer Industries-Northern
Area, Baghdad, urea;
-IRQ004, State Company for Fertilizer Industries-Southern
Area, Basra,
-IRQ005, State Company for Vegetable Oil Industries, Baghdad,
LABS; and
-no code, Alswari Chemical Industries, Taji, vinyl acetate.



11. (SBU) Four of the OCPFs met the criteria in 2006 for
declaration in 2007, IRQ002-IRQ005, and only three --
IRQ002, IRQ004, and IRQ005 -- met the criteria in 2007 for
declaration in 2008. IRQ001, while intact and capable of
production, did not operate in 2006 and 2007, but may do so
later. The Alswari Chemical Industries plant site did not
produce vinyl acetate monomer and only polymerized imported
monomer, so it did not meet the criteria for a declarable
OCPF. It was determined that Iraq will have no AND
declarations for either 2006 or 2007. The necessary
declaration forms 4.1 were completed. The industry portion
of the Iraqi initial declaration is ready for submission.



--------------------------


Implementing Legislation


--------------------------





12. (SBU) Representatives from the TS and all delegations
except the UK discussed in detail the "Final Draft" Law on
Non-Proliferation in the Republic of Iraq. According to the
Iraqis, the Shura Council will have one more (the third)
reading of the text before it is forwarded to the Parliament.
After the second reading, the Shura Council requested
changes to the text; however, the Iraqi delegation only
brought a revised Arabic draft to the meeting since it is
still undergoing revisions. The Shura Council had requested
that the law be revised to add in three objectives to the
preamble, and provide elaboration on the handling of
classified information. The three new/revised objectives to
the law are: 1) prevent the exploitation of any activities
related to weapons of mass destruction; 2) implement
sanctions for violations to treaty provisions and protocols;
and 3) more closely incorporate Convention definitions (which
were not fully articulated during discussions). The Iraqi
delegation agreed to incorporate, with some modifications,
the informal U.S. CWC-related comments previously provided.
The group also discussed the informal comments on the
BWC-related provisions, and reached agreement on the changes
the Iraqi government needs to make to the text. The Japanese
delegate also provided substantive comments on the text, some
of which were accepted. Additions by the Shura Council and
those discussed during the Amman working group are to be
incorporated prior to the third reading, but are subject to
change.



13. (SBU) The group discussed at length the differences
between the term "means of warfare" and "method of warfare"
with regard to the use of riot control agents. The Arabic
version of the CWC uses the term "means of warfare" which
explains the difference in the English translation. For
consistency, the Iraqi delegation will continue to use the
same term used in the Arabic version of the CWC.



--------------------------


Other Issues Discussed


--------------------------





14. (C) U.S. delegation met with Horst Reeps on the margins
of the Tuesday session to discuss the status of the U.S.
submission on recovered munitions, and stated that the
updated summary was still being developed. The delegation
indicated that we expect to have the summary available prior
to Iraq's submission of its initial CWC declaration. Reeps
opined that the United States had met its immediate reporting
obligation via the joint U.S. and UK letter to the United
Nations (Annex I of Security Council Resolution 1762(2007)).
The UK delegation suggested that we consider providing a
joint status report on recovered munitions, and was told that
this approach appeared to have merit. Comment: Agreement to
this approach could be made part of the coordination of final

declaration comments. End Comment.



15. (C) The U. S. Delegation also discussed informally with
Horst Reeps how the TS planned to assist the Iraqis in their
verification obligations after they become a State Party.
Mr. Reeps said the Director-General has decided that in light
of the current security situation in Iraq, no on-site
inspection activities will take place. Further, the
Director-General does not want Iraq to be perceived as having
been party to this decision. On the other hand, the
Director-General is looking for ways to provide interim
verification that can be reported to the Executive Council.
Methods being considered include imagery provided by
interested States Parties or commercial imagery purchased
from commercial satellite operators. No decisions have yet
been made.



16. (U) Participants:

IRAQ
-- Muhaned T. Kareem, Director of Chemical Department,
National
Monitoring Directorate (NMD), Ministry of Science and
Technology
-- Abbas Ghadab, Head of Declaration Activities, NMD
-- Adnan Abbas, Head of Verification and Inspection, NMD
-- Reyadh Abd, Inspection Activities, NMD
-- Farouq Jassim, Import-Export Officer, NMD
-- Ahmed Mohammed, Head of Operations, NMD
-- Mahmood Ahmed, Legal Advisor, NMD
-- Mushin Y. Abdul Majid, Second Secretary, MFA
-- Kurdistan A. Kittani, Second Secretary, MFA
-- Basim Mohammad Saleh, Ministry of Industry and
Minerals
-- Hessien N. Hamad, Kurdish Region Government

OPCW TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
-- Horst Reeps, Director of Verification
-- Santiago Onate, Legal Advisor
-- Kenneth Penman, Officer, Declarations Branch
-- Oleg Ukharov, Officer, Chemical Demilitarization Branch
-- Jose Renato Carvalho, Head, Inspectorate Management Branch
-- Mahmoud El-Ghabbach, Interpreter

UNITED STATES
-- Tom Ferguson, ISN/CB, State
-- Don Clagett, VCI/CCW, State
-- Bill Parker, ISN/CB, State
-- Sarah Nett, OSD, DOD

UK
-- Jim McGilly, DSTL, Porton Down
-- Chris McCormick, Ministry of Defense
-- Sheilesh Patel, DSTL, Porton Down

JAPAN
-- Tatsuya Abe, Advisor to Delegation of Japan to OPCW,
University of Kyoto



17. (U) This message was drafted by ISN/CB.
Hale