IRAQ/IRAN: IRAQI SHI'A CLERIC KHOE,I SAYS IRANIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004567 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR, AND NEA/I BAGHDAD FOR POL E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ IR JO SUBJECT: IRAQ/IRAN: IRAQI SHI'A CLERIC KHOE,I SAYS IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN IRAQ CONTINUES; AHMADINEJAD WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH U.S. REF: AMMAN 3057 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Anti-Iranian Iraqi Shi'a cleric Jawad al-Khoe'i (strictly protect) described to Emboff his views on Iranian perceptions of Iraq and the U.S., the current situation in Iraq and Iran (where he has been studying for ten of the last twelve years),political developments, ongoing Iranian interference in Iraq, and outlined a variety of his opinions regarding USG interests in Iraq and Iran. End Summary. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (S) Emboff met for a follow-on discussion (reftel) with Jawad al-Khoe'i (strictly protect),the thirty-something nephew of Al-Khoe'i Foundation chief Abdel Majid al-Khoe'i (murdered in Najaf in 2003),after his visits to the Najaf region of Iraq, and to Iran. Khoe'i requested the meeting. Khoe'i earlier reported that he has spent more than ten years as a student in Qom, Iran, beginning in 1994 (except for a two-year break in the 1990's, when he lived in London),has extensive contacts with prominent Iranians and Iraqis living in Iran, and has done considerable traveling around the country. He currently resides in London, but just visited Iraq and Iran, and now Jordan, to discuss Iraq and other regional issues with prominent Iraqis and others. ¶3. (S/NF) He noted that his meetings in Jordan included a just-concluded talk with Prince Hassan bin Talal (uncle of King Abdullah) about establishing an Islamic entity to promote a more positive image of Islam. He expected a meeting with Royal Coordinator for Tribal Affairs Sharif Fawaz before returning to London later in the week. Iran -------------- ¶4. (S) Khoe'i said he had just been in Iran, and while there appears to be general support for the current regime among the rural population (which accounts for much of the population),he believes there is a great deal of nervousness among the elites regarding the potential for war with the U.S. He also reported rumors that internal conflict between Iranian President Ahmadinejad and Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene,i has surfaced. He described Khamene,i as being in favor of Iran doing everything - short of encouraging an actual invasion - to provoke the United States, while Ahmadinejad feels no such compulsion to back off, apparently believing that war with the U.S. would be perfectly acceptable, as it is supposed to bring about the arrival of the Shiite Mahdi. Khoe'i said the recent resignation of senior security advisor Ali Larijani was a result of this conflict. ¶5. (S) Khoe'i reported that Ahmadinejad depends heavily on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the National Guard for his power (the National Guard members being mostly from the rural areas and possessing limited education). He said the Revolutionary Guard recently opened an office for JAM leader Muqtada al-Sadr and affiliates under his protection. ¶6. (C) He opined there remains great hatred for Americans among the Iranian people; almost two full generations of school indoctrination perpetuates the strong feelings against the U.S. Khoe'i further claimed that the Iranian public, while not thrilled with Ahmadinejad, would still choose his dictatorship over a situation similar to that of Iraq. Iraq -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Khoe'i told Emboff that one of the purposes of his trip was to lobby other Iraqi Shiite clerics to encourage Iraqi Shiites to identify with their Arab (vice Iranian) heritage, and to discredit Iranian propaganda seeking their AMMAN 00004567 002 OF 002 allegiance. He said that while Shiite Iraqis share religious practices with Iran, they stand against its ideology and practice. ¶8. (S/NF) Khoe'i repeated his earlier recommendations that the U.S. provide money to Iraqi Shiite leaders to buy loyalties in Iraq -- being careful of course to do so without it becoming common knowledge -- just as Iran has been doing for some time. Khoe'i said the Iranian public is generally pleased with the situation in Iraq vis-a-vis the United States, and the Iranian Government is preparing to take advantage of apparent U.S. weakness, at some point in the future. He said that that the U.S. was often seen as "too loud and swaggering," and that an American obsession with "quick fixes" costs the U.S. greatly. He called for a well thought-out, long-term strategy, and asserted that if the USG could be more discreet in offering financial assistance, it would find many clerics and others in Iraq who would be more amenable to their common interests. He added that there were many anti-Iranian Iraqi clerics with no great love for Iran, but who were reluctant to take the risk of being publicly associated with the United States. ¶9. (S/NF) Khoe'i lamented the current instability in Iraq, commenting that many in the region wonder out loud how the U.S., "with all it's power," could have allowed such a chaotic situation to develop. He commented that "If this was your plan (to make Iraq unstable so as to better control it), that would be a tragedy; and if it was not planned, that would be an even greater tragedy." He added that he also hears Iraqi Sunnis wondering how the USG allowed "a pro-Iranian fundamentalist" to come to power in Baghdad. ¶10. (S/NF) COMMENT: This was the second meeting between Khoe'i and EmbOffs. While a strong personal agenda cannot be discounted, he appears sincere in his opposition to the Iranian regime and its objectives in Iraq, and indicates a willingness to work with and "advise" the USG. Post is not in a position to assess the breadth or quality of Khoe,i,s contacts in Iraq, however. In an e-mail shortly after this meeting, Khoe'i indicated a strong desire to travel to the U.S. (January 2008 time-frame) for more extensive discussions with USG officials on these issues. ¶11. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Baghdad. Hale