Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07AMMAN438
2007-02-01 10:53:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR APHSCT FRANCES TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO

Tags:  PTER PREL JO 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #0438/01 0321053
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011053Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6724
S E C R E T AMMAN 000438 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL JO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APHSCT FRANCES TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO
JORDAN

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T AMMAN 000438 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 TAGS: PTER PREL JO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APHSCT FRANCES TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO JORDAN Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. ( C ) The Jordanian government and Embassy Amman are looking forward to your visit February 3-5. Jordan is a key partner on counterterrorism and other top U.S. priorities. King Abdullah views U.S. success in Iraq as essential to his own success; he also shares our concerns on Iran and is looking to blunt Iranian influence in the region. ¶2. ( C ) The government of Jordan views combating takfiri ideology as a key element of its long-term counterterrorism strategy. The GOJ backs Islamic voices that promote tolerance, both directly with efforts like the Amman Message and its follow-on conferences, and indirectly through a range of Islamic institutions. However, much work remains to be done; one Jordanian think tank's poll indicated that only half of Jordanians consider Al-Qaeda a terrorist organization. ¶3. ( C ) In the aftermath of the November 2005 Amman hotel bombings, King Abdullah requested a large assistance package to combat terrorism. The USG responded by sending an ATA-led interagency assessment team that identified needs across the GoJ. The team's findings are serving as a basis for U.S. assistance and GOJ improvements including border security, C4ISR, and the establishment of a crisis management center. During your visit, it is likely that senior GoJ interlocutors will pitch their case for supplemental assistance, especially FMF, to meet potential terrorist and conventional threats from Syria. ¶4. ( C ) Led by S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Crumpton, Embassy Amman and other posts in the region have been encouraging host governments to work together more closely on counterterrorism issues. In response, Jordan hosted a conference on biometrics in November, attended by security authorities from moderate Arab countries, and USG interagency security experts. Plans for follow-up conferences and biometric exchange programs are underway. ¶5. ( C ) Embassy Amman is also working to support tolerance and moderation through its exchange programs -- the recent visit of a U.S. Army Imam generated considerable positive media coverage -- through MEPI, and through its other public diplomacy efforts. ¶6. ( C ) Jordan's political class is gearing up for the elections scheduled for 2007. In order to minimize the electoral prospects of the Muslim Brotherhood's party, the King is pressing his government to do a better job in creating a positive socioeconomic climate for the polling, chiefly through the launch of public works and job creation projects in deprived areas. Politically, the regime exploited vulnerabilities and fissures within the Muslim Brotherhood adroitly last summer, and the movement is currently on the defensive. Nevertheless, the Brothers remain the best-organized political movement in the country and are likely to do well in the large cities. ¶7. ( S ) The GOJ is working with other moderate Arab governments to head off an increase in violence in the West Bank and Gaza that would further inflame regional public opinion. King Abdullah believes we can and must achieve progress now. He has publicly voiced concern that a lack of substantial progress toward a two-state solution in 2007 will result in an irreversible deterioration in the situation. As always, not far in the background is the Jordanian fear that such a deterioration could generate refugee flows into Jordan, or even revive international discussion of "Jordan as Palestine." ¶8. ( C ) The King views Iran as a strategic threat to Jordan, and seeks ways to minimize Iranian ability to exploit problems in the region, whether in the West Bank/Gaza, Lebanon/Syria, or Iraq. ¶9. ( C ) During last summer's fighting between Israel and Hizballah, the image of the King and the GOJ suffered. Moderates were not seen as serving the interests of Arabs; instead, Nasrallah, Ahmedinejad and al-Jazeera were defining the issues relevant to the Arab world. The footage of Saddam's execution has dampened popular admiration of Iran, and to a lesser extent of Hizballah. But moderate leaders like King Abdullah still have to demonstrate that their course of positive engagement with Israel and support for U.S. policies meets the needs of their people. Robust U.S. economic assistance has been critical in this regard, and Embassy Amman is continually creating opportunities to showcase how U.S. assistance helps average Jordanians. But in terms of blunting the extremist message, the Jordanians will stress, there is no substitute to our sustained diplomatic engagement to try to resolve regional conflicts. HALE

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