KING ABDULLAH DISCUSSES IRAQ AND REGIONAL ISSUES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004369 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ELA DEPT FOR NEA-I BAGHDAD FOR A. KHEDERY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV JO IZ SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH DISCUSSES IRAQ AND REGIONAL ISSUES WITH AMBASSADOR CROCKER Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: King Abdullah said October 28 that Jordan sought strategic consultations and close coordination with the USG in the effort to help to restore stability to Iraq. He told visiting Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker that Jordan would continue to work with PM Maliki and planned to send an ambassador to Iraq soon. Crocker welcomed those decisions and said this was the time for greater Arab engagement -- to help Iraqis build their institutions of government, to counter Iranian influence, and to reinforce Iraq's affiliation with the Arab world. Abdullah said Saudi Arabia was key; he thought the Saudis had been more forward-leaning lately, and he would be in contact with them to encourage that. Jordan would continue its traditional contacts with Iraqi tribal and political figures, and could expand them beyond the Sunni community, to include Iraqi Shia tribal figures in the south. Jordan might do more in other areas as well, such as training the Iraqi military, but it lacked financial resources. End summary. JORDAN WANTS STRATEGIC CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ -------------- ¶2. (C) King Abdullah, accompanied by his brother Prince Ali, General Intelligence Directorate (GID) director al-Dahabi, and Royal Office director Awadallah, received visiting Ambassador to Iraq Crocker October 28. With Crocker were Ambassador Hale and Embassy Baghdad Senior Adviser Pearce. ¶3. (C) The King said he had been looking forward to the visit, because there was a real need for authoritative, high-level strategic consultation. Jordan supported U.S. policy in Iraq and was already working in close coordination with the USG in many areas, whether tribal engagement in Anbar, or anti-terror collaboration against al-Qaida. The future of Iraq was of major consequence to Jordan, and it was essential that Jordan understand clearly U.S. intent. ¶4. (C) Crocker thanked the King for Jordan's continuing support. He explained that he was on a regional swing in advance of the Istanbul Neighbors Conference. The Ambassador briefly reviewed recent events in Iraq, noting that violence was down in many areas, and this was having some political effect, including greater cross-sectarian contact and outreach. While there was much more to be done, this was clearly a key period for shaping Iraq's institution-building and future. It was a time for more Arab engagement. The Iranians had a large embassy and an active ambassador in Baghdad but there were no Arab ambassadors. CROCKER: NEED MORE ARAB ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶5. (S) Alluding to the palpable distrust of Iraqi PM Maliki by some of Iraq's Arab neighbors, Crocker said it was not a time to focus on individuals, but rather on institution-building. Prime ministers would come and go, but Iraq will always be there. A strong, positive Arab presence now could provide critical reassurance not only to Iraq's Sunnis, but also to Shia who resent Iranian overreach but feel shunned by their Arab neighbors. ¶6. (C) The King replied that Jordan had a good relationship with PM Maliki and would continue to work with him. Saudi Arabia, however, was key. He thought the Saudis were more forward-leaning vis-a-vis the Iraqi government, but he would follow up with them "to check." Prince Ali offered that Jordan could extend its Iraq outreach to Shia sheikhs in the south, but it faced resource constraints. This might be something the U.S. could mention in its own discussions with the Saudis, he suggested. The King added that Jordan could talk to the tribes in the south in ways the Saudis might not be able to, because the Shia tribes were "more comfortable" talking with the Jordanians than the Saudis. There were other areas where Jordan could help, he said, including military training for the Iraqi army, but Jordan's financial resources were limited. KING ABDULLAH: JORDAN WILL SEND AMBASSADOR -------------- ¶7. (S) On engagement with Iraq, the King agreed on the need to counter Iranian influence, and said Jordan was prepared to send its ambassador back, although it would need to study the AMMAN 00004369 002 OF 002 security issues first. Crocker said that was good, because it was important to be there, and we were prepared to help any way we could. The issue of reinforcing Iraq's Arab identity as an antidote to Iranian influence was something the United States could help with, but the Arab states needed to be in the forefront. The Iraq of the future is being shaped now and it is vital for the Arabs to be there to help shape it. The Iraqis will long remember the countries that stepped up when they were most in need. ¶8. (C) The King recalled that he had longstanding good relations with Masoud Barzani, and Jordan could usefully engage the Kurds on Sunni-Kurd issues like Kirkuk as well. Crocker said it would be helpful for the Kurds to have that connectivity with the larger Arab region. The King said the relationship with President Talabani, although newer, was also good. Prince Ali, commenting on Sunni Arab-Kurdish relations, said he hoped that the Kurds would "not ask for much more than they already have". ¶9. (C) At the end of the meeting, in a discussion of reconciliation efforts, the King noted that the execution of former Iraqi MinDef Sultan Hashim would have a negative impact. The former minister had surrendered to the U.S. and, the King said (seconded by GID chief al-Dahabi),the perception in the Iraqi Sunni community was that he had received certain assurances at the time on his treatment. His execution would be perceived in Arab opinion as the U.S. going back on its assurances. Crocker said the assurances Hashim had received were that he would be treated with dignity, no more. The Jordanians said that was not the perception, and his execution could have a damaging effect on many in the Sunni Arab community (COMMENT: in contrast to Hashim, the Jordanians made no mention of the expected execution of detainee Ali Hassan al-Majid, aka "Chemical Ali." END COMMENT.) ¶10. (S) COMMENT: The King was plainly keen to engage, and like his advisers in separate meetings (septel),focused on the existential importance of the Iraq issue to Jordan, Jordanian support for U.S. policy in Iraq, and the desire for high-level coordination. The King keyed less on Saudi Arabia, but his advisers all stressed that the Saudis - and other Arab states - were very distrustful of the Maliki government, considering it a pro-Iranian sectarian actor. Crocker urged that they look beyond any misgivings about individuals and focus on the need to consolidate institutions of government in Iraq, for the sake of long-term stability. This argument appeared to have some resonance, but the King's office director warned us not to underestimate the work to be done with Saudi Arabia. The Jordanians seemed keen to help, but felt Saudi Arabia's positive involvement was essential to counter burgeoning Iranian influence, not only in Iraq but in the wider region. Crocker reminded them that the concerns cut both ways. Maliki was afraid of the possibility of Sunni anti-government plotting, and the reticence to engage of Arab states fed this. While Egypt and Saudi Arabia were undoubtedly important, Jordan was also well positioned to play a constructive role. End comment. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Hale