IRAQIS IN JORDAN TELL CODEL LEVIN - DUMP MALIKI,

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003582

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I, H FOR MSMITH AND AMACDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER JO IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQIS IN JORDAN TELL CODEL LEVIN - DUMP MALIKI,
SUPPORT PARLIAMENT


Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In multiple meetings with prominent Iraqis living or
transiting Jordan, CODEL Levin was told that the U.S. should
stop supporting the Maliki government and should support a
parliamentary move by moderate, non-sectarian forces in the
Iraqi parliament to bring about a new government, likely to
be led by former Prime Ministers Ibrahim al-Ja'afari or Iyad
Allawi. End Summary.


2. (U) CODEL Levin visited Jordan on August 19. The Senate
Armed Services Committee delegation consisted of Senators
Carl Levin and John Warner, Majority Staff Director Richard
DeBobes, Minority Staff Member William Caniano, Majority
Staff Member Daniel Cox and military escorts COL Michael
Barbero, COL Frederick Hodges and LT Matthew Shaffer.

Iraqis in Amman Lobby for Change in Baghdad
--------------


3. (C) The CODEL's activities in Amman focused primarily on
speaking with prominent Iraqis either living in or transiting
Amman. The CODEL met separately with: Saleh al-Mutlaq, Head
of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front; Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Salam al-Zawba'i; Iraqi MP from the Iraqi National
Forces bloc Muhammad al-Daini; Iraqi MP Adnan Pachachi; and
former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (Pachachi and Allawi met
with CODEL jointly).


4. (C) All of the interlocutors argued that the U.S. should
stop supporting Maliki, that he was unable to bring about
reconciliation, and that the U.S. should support a
parliamentary move to replace the Maliki government with a
non-sectarian government that could garner a parliamentary
majority from the Dialogue Front, Tawafuq, Fadhila, Iraqi
List, parts of Da'wa and the Sadrists, and Kurdish parties.
As candidates for prime minister, all of the interlocutors
brought up the names of Ibrahim al-Ja'afari, Iyad Allawi,
Adel Abdel-Mehdi and Nadim al-Jabiri.

The New Prime Minister Should Be...
--------------


5. (C) The CODEL's Iraqi interlocutors indicated support for
Allawi as a post-Maliki PM, but Mutlaq, Zawba'i and Daini all
said that Allawi would not be able to garner support in the
parliament because of his conflict with the Sadrists. As an
alternative, Mutlaq and Daini suggested former Prime Minister
Ja'afari who, according to Daini, could get the support of
Allawi, the Sadrists and Muqtada al-Sadr. Allawi and
Pachachi disagreed, saying that Ja'afari's period as PM was
the most disastrous period in Iraq -- the time when militias
and sectarianism began to flourish.


6. (C) In addition to Allawi and Ja'afari, Adel Abdel-Mehdi
and Nadim Jabiri were mentioned as potential PM candidates.
Daini was dismissive of Abdel-Mehdi, describing him as much
worse than Maliki in terms of sectarianism and ties to Iran;
other interlocutors viewed Abdel-Mehdi as capable but
sectarian, and thus undesirable. Mutlaq and Zawba'i said
that Jabiri, while espousing a moderate ideology, did not
have a sufficient constituency in the parliament. Zawba'i
raised the utility of finding a moderate within the Sadrist
camp for PM, but did not suggest any names.

Hope for a Democratic Coup Via Parliament
--------------


7. (C) The Iraqis all shared with the CODEL their support for
a democratic maneuver in the parliament in which nationalist
parliamentarians would unite as, in Daini's words, "the only
salvation army in Iraq." To accomplish such a parliamentary
move, each of the Iraqi interlocutors called on the U.S. to
stop supporting Maliki, and to support the parliament, which
would vote no confidence in the Maliki government.


8. (C) Mutlaq, Zawba'i, Daini, Allawi and Pachachi all were
convinced that they could muster the votes needed to topple
the Maliki government via a parliamentary no-confidence
motion, especially if parliamentarians who were living
outside of Iraq were given American protection on their
return. To secure an anti-Maliki, moderate and non-sectarian
majority in the parliament, Allawi, Pachachi and Mutlaq
emphatically urged the U.S. to talk with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Kurdish parties in Iraq to support
non-sectarian Iraqis and to bolster that support within the

parliament. (Note: Allawi and Mutlaq told the CODEL that the
U.S. instructed Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to
keep out of Iraqi political affairs, and that this hampered
efforts to bolster support for moderate, non-sectarian
forces.)


9. (C) Allawi also told the CODEL that Maliki could even
remain PM, but with a new government that is truly one of
national unity and that includes competent and honest
ministers. Zawba'i added that the government should be
composed of technocrats and not political leaders. Mutlaq
and Zawba'i also argued for a UN conference that would
support a post-Maliki Iraqi government (following Maliki's
parliamentary ouster).

On Sadr
--------------


10. (C) The CODEL asked their interlocutors where Muqtada
al-Sadr's allegiances lie, and were told that Sadr was
non-sectarian and that he and part of his movement could be
brought into an anti-Maliki, non-sectarian coalition. Mutlaq
told the CODEL that Sadr often traveled to Iran because the
Arabs were "not clever enough to contain him," which they
could, according to Mutlaq, by offering him a limited measure
of symbolic support (such as welcoming him in their countries
by offering him a place to stay and showing him a modest
level of respect). Instead, intimated Mutlaq, Sadr is being
driven further into the hands of Iran. Mutlaq argued that
Iran was not in Sadr's heart, but that he feared pro-Iranian
members in the JAM. Allawi also argued that Sadr is against
sectarianism, and that Sadr's people can be brought into a
non-sectarian national unity government.

Sectarianism, Democracy, and Iran in Iraq
--------------


11. (C) There was unanimity among the Iraqi interlocutors
regarding the failures of the Maliki government. They each
described the government as unwilling and unable to foster
unity among all Iraqis; Mutlaq told the CODEL that under
Maliki there was no chance for passing a de-ba'athification
reform law. All independently argued that the Iraqi army and
police are infiltrated by the militias, and that the Maliki
government and President Jalal Talabani (whom Mutlaq
described as a cartoon character) do not care. Daini told
the CODEL that the government was no more than sectarian
death squads and militias. Mutlaq argued that alliances (and
successes) with the Sunni tribes would be short-lived if
sectarian militias replace Al-Qa'ida in Sunni tribal areas, a
scenario Mutlaq described as possible under Maliki. All said
that the Iraqi people have lost confidence in the Maliki
government.


12. (C) Mutlaq and Zawba'i added that the people have also
lost confidence in Islamist parties and have lost confidence
that Islamists (Shia or Sunni) can run Iraq successfully.
The Iraqi people, they argued, want a non-sectarian, moderate
government. Mutlaq said that Iraq can never be stable with
an Islamist government, and that democracy cannot be injected
into Iraq, especially when the marja'iya is issuing political
orders. He also claimed that Tariq al-Hashimi has lost Sunni
support. Zawba'i emphasized that the "Shia brothers" want a
religious state but that Iraq cannot be run by those wearing
turbans. He told the CODEL that Iraqi statesmen "must secure
the rights of Iraqi Jews just as fully as the rights of
Sayyid Al-Sisatani's son - if they cannot do that, they
cannot be statesmen."


13. (C) All five Iraqi leaders warned of Iran's rising
influence, including 1 billion dollars worth of investments
in Iraq as well as 12 television stations. They claimed that
Persian was being spoken on the streets of Basra. They also
made the point that the only forces supporting Maliki were
the U.S. and Iran. Daini said that Iranian Revolutionary
Guards and the Jaish Al-Quds were in Iraq killing Americans.
Allawi and Pachachi told the CODEL that the "most dangerous
thing facing Iraq and the region is Iran." Zawba'i
emphasized that economic and security vacuums in Iraq are
being filled by Iran and that this would increase as
sectarianism becomes more entrenched.


14. (C) All of the Iraqis whom the CODEL met in Amman urged
the U.S. to stop supporting Maliki and to support
non-sectarian moderates. The CODEL responded by arguing that
the U.S. cannot choose the Iraqi Prime Minister and that
Iraqis are responsible for their political future. Mutlaq
summed up the consensus of the Iraqi leaders, rhetorically
asking, "who are we, who is Maliki?" He told the CODEL to

"be practical, and accept the fact that the U.S. is
everything in Iraq."

Should We Stay or Should We Go?
--------------


15. (C) Opinions varied on the question of U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq. The CODEL told interlocutors that some sort of
withdrawal was likely in the near future, but that it was
impossible to say when or how many troops will be withdrawn.
Zawba'i said that a withdrawal before fixing the problems
would be a disaster and would give Iraqis more reasons to
hate America; such a move, according to Zawba'i, would ruin
any future chances of friendship between Iraq and the U.S.
He stressed that security vacuums in Iraq are, and in the
future would be, filled by Iran. Daini argued for a
timetable for withdrawal, and said that more than half of the
parliament would support such a timetable - which would not
mean a precipitous withdrawal. Mutlaq's position was that if
U.S. policy were to remain the same, then the U.S. should
leave as soon as possible, even though that would make things
more complicated. He added that if there were a change in
policy (meaning withdrawing support for Maliki),the U.S.
should stay. He told the CODEL that he would rather have the
U.S. leave than to have the U.S. continue to support Maliki
and stay.

An Inopportune Dinner Encounter
--------------


16. (C) During the CODEL's dinner meeting with Allawi and
Pachachi and as the two leaders were criticizing sectarianism
in Iraq and the current government's enabling role in
sectarianism, Iraqi Finance Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh (also
a former Interior Minister) entered the restaurant.
Following pleasant greetings, Allawi and Pachachi continued
to rail against the government and Jabr personally under
whose Interior Ministry mandate, they said, militias and
sectarian violence grew. Simultaneously, Emboffs overheard
Jabr criticizing and mocking Allawi at the next table. Jabr
told his dinner guests that the opposition wanted to bring in
Allawi or Ja'afari to replace Maliki, and that Jabr had
enough evidence to indict Allawi for corruption and would
present that evidence "at the right time."


17. (C) Allawi and Pachachi told the CODEL that they were
considering an early September visit to Washington, to
influence the results and fallout of the September Iraq
progress report.

Comment
--------------


18. (C) The CODEL's Iraqi interlocutors in Amman aggressively
sought to make the case that the Maliki government is not
part of the solution, but instead is the entire problem.
Their view, of course, belies the fact that the narrow forces
they represent - the (mostly) Sunni expatriate opposition -
are busily and unhelpfully grinding their own axes in an
effort to make predictions of a weak Maliki government
self-fulfilling.


19. (SBU) CODEL Levin did not clear this message prior to
departure from Amman.


Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/

Hale