Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07AMMAN3005
2007-07-15 10:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

ISLAMISTS AND OPPOSITION PARTIES, WAR OF WORDS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KISL KPAL KWBG JO 
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VZCZCXRO2942
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #3005 1961017
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151017Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9521
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003005 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL KPAL KWBG JO
SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS AND OPPOSITION PARTIES, WAR OF WORDS
OVER HAMAS

REF: A. AMMAN 2668

B. AMMAN 2955

Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003005

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL KPAL KWBG JO
SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS AND OPPOSITION PARTIES, WAR OF WORDS
OVER HAMAS

REF: A. AMMAN 2668

B. AMMAN 2955

Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary. In the run-up to municipal elections,
pro-government editorialists and smaller opposition parties
continue to take swings at the Islamic Action Front (IAF) for
its perceived backing of Hamas, mid-June takeover in Gaza.
The degree of IAF backpedaling is in the eye of the beholder,
however, while the Front seeks to regain traction by bringing
the popular debate back to Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
action in Gaza and the West Bank and other perceived GoJ
disappointments on the Israel front. End Summary.


2. (C) As reported ref A, the IAF,s failure to come out
against Hamas, takeover in Gaza played poorly for many
Jordanians, and briefly put the organization on the
defensive. Opposition parties took particular umbrage at an
IAF-led meeting to discuss developments and the Front,s
subsequent establishment of a "follow-up committee" widely
seen as supportive of Hamas, actions.


3. (U) The war of words continues as we get closer to
municipal elections scheduled for July 31. The press
reported in early July that IAF Secretary General Zaki Bani
Irsheid had, after some delay, agreed to sign off on minutes
of a previous meeting of the opposition parties, Higher
Coordination Committee (HCC) which contained an implied
condemnation of Hamas, action. Some reporting spun this as
an IAF political failure. At least one press report,
however, suggested that the other parties in the HCC (a
long-standing institution which brings the IAF together with
13 other, much smaller, opposition parties) had agreed to
adjustments in the minutes to accommodate the IAF,s
position. Subsequently, Arabic daily Al-Dustur reported that
"widespread disagreement" continues within the HCC, with the
IAF pressing the other parties for participation in meetings
of its follow-up committee. In response, per Al-Dustur, the
HCC reaffirmed the importance of Palestinian national unity
and its previous stance in favor of the legitimate PA
government (i.e., that of President Mahmoud Abbas). Both
Al-Dustur and pro-government daily Al-Rai reported that the
dispute nearly led to fisticuffs between IAF and other
opposition party figures.


4. (C) In an attempt to regain traction, the IAF has returned
to its time-tested formula of highlighting Israeli military
action and embarrassing the government through other means.
In a conversation with Ambassador July 3, Minister of
Interior Eid al-Fayez said that public opinion on the
Fatah-Hamas split was working against the IAF and in favor of
moderates, but that Israeli actions (in a reference to recent
IDF raids in Nablus and Jenin) could jeopardize this dynamic.
As reported ref B, the IAF is also making use of the recent
GOJ-Israel deal which allowed for the return, but continued
incarceration, of four Jordanian prisoners; on July 11 the
IAF asked the government for permission to visit the
prisoners and again called for their immediate release.


5. (C) Dr. Musa Keilani, a long-time political observer with
family ties to both the security establishment and the IAF,s
old guard, suggested to PolCouns on July 9 that the spate of
press stories and attacks on the Front were in large part a
Government-led campaign to undermine the IAF in the run-up to
the municipal elections (widely seen as a bellwether for
later parliamentary elections). Keilani was dismissive of
the impact, however, characterizing the back-and-forth as
traditional political gamesmanship without much influence on
support for the parties or voters, inclinations.
Rubinstein