Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07AMMAN2980
2007-07-11 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

STAFFDEL SOCHA TOLD THAT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI

Tags:  PREL JO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9481
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #2980/01 1921420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111420Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9494
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002980 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PREL JO
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SOCHA TOLD THAT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT POSES GREATEST THREAT TO JORDAN


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002980

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PREL JO
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SOCHA TOLD THAT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT POSES GREATEST THREAT TO JORDAN


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a series of meetings with Christopher
Socha, Senior Policy Advisor to Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC),
Jordanian interlocutors stressed the urgency for movement
toward a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, and that Jordan was not able to further accommodate
Iraqis in Jordan. End summary.


2. (U) Socha held discussions on July 5 with Jordanian
governmental and non-governmental figures on Iraq, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Iran, and the Jordan-U.S.
bilateral relationship.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Threatens Jordan
--------------


3. (C) Jafar Hassan, Director of the International Policy
Department at the Royal Court, told Socha that Jordan's
greatest threat stemmed from the continuing absence of a
two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Hassan argued for political negotiations toward the
establishment of a Palestinian state with a clear action plan
and a reasonable time line.


4. (C) Hassan asserted that with a technocrat government NOW
in place in the Palestinian Authority, concrete steps are
needed to shore up Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas,
including the lifting of West Bank roadblocks and the release
of prisoners. Such steps, along with Fatah efforts at
internal reform, would help Abbas demonstrate that his way,
and not Hamas', is in the Palestinian interest. But without
tangible results, Hamas would gain support in the West Bank.
"If we drag our feet" on visible movement toward a two-state
solution, in one or two years, radicalization would be an
even more serious problem in the region. The status quo, he
argued, served the interests of Syria and Iran (now on
Israel's border in Gaza),and not those of the U.S., Israel
or Jordan.


5. (C) Hassan put the onus on Israel to decide what it wants.
If Israel wants peace, he asserted, it must end settlement
expansion, stop excavations in Jerusalem, freeze construction
of the separation barrier, and engage in a real political
process with the Palestinians and in relation to the Arab
Peace Initiative. Hassan also rejected suggestions of any
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation discussions prior to the
establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Israel and
the Palestinians should, Hassan said, reach agreement on
broad principles such as on final status issues and on the
shape of the state, and then turn such planning documents
into a detailed framework agreement next year.

Iraq and Iraqis in Jordan
--------------


6. (C) On Iraq, Hassan told Socha that there are no quick
fixes. He pointed out that Jordan was asked to support the
Maliki government, which it did, but that it was skeptical of
the ability of the Maliki government to deliver on
reconciliation and thus needed to see proof on the ground.
Hassan said that the GoJ supports the surge plan, and that
any precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would be disastrous. He
also stressed that the Jordanians have worked with Sunni
tribes in Iraq to convince them to take part in Iraqi
politics and to turn against Al-Qa'ida in Iraq.


7. (C) On Iraqis in Jordan, Hassan said that they pose an
existential threat to Jordan, and that there was "zero"
political capacity to take steps that could lead to the
long-term presence of many Iraqis in Jordan. He said that
refugees who come to Jordan tend to stay in Jordan (note:
referring to Palestinians who have stayed in Jordan since the
1948 and 1967 influxes). He also said that Jordan is not
interested in undertaking policies that "ethnically cleanse"
Iraq, nor would it implement policies that would serve as
pull-factors and encourage more Iraqis to come to Jordan.
From a security vantage point, Hassan argued that Jordan was
playing Russian roulette with Iraqis within Jordan's borders
because with them came potential Al-Qa'ida and Iranian
infiltrators.


8. (C) Hassan noted that Jordan's laws on persons who
overstay their residency permits were not being stringently
enforced, and that Iraqis in the country - while posing a
significant burden on government services and the economy -
are given access to health care and subsidized fuel, food,
education and electricity. As for providing access to
education for Iraqi children, Hassan said that there was a
capacity issue, but that Jordanian concerns were not
primarily a matter of resources, but instead focused on the

AMMAN 00002980 002 OF 002


existential impact on Jordan's demographic balance of the
Iraqi presence.

Deter Iran and Isolate Syria
--------------


9. (C) Hassan said that Iran is aggressively pursuing its
interests throughout the region, but is not invincible. The
U.S. needs to build a deterrent capability toward Iran, short
of military action, and "pinch" Iran when necessary. Iran
had its own internal issues which could be exploited via
stronger sanctions. Hassan said that Saudi efforts to split
the Syrians from Iran over Lebanon have not gone far, and
that isolating the Syrian regime was the best course of
action. He added that diplomatic visits and overtures to
Bashar Al-Asad were not helpful. He argued that Syria needed
to be isolated and put under pressure, but that if overtures
where made, they should focus on what conditions Syria should
meet and what consequences would arise from not meeting those
conditions. Hassan concluded the meeting by stressing that
if the peace process were not advanced this year, U.S.
influence and legacy in the region would be seriously
undercut.


10. (SBU) Additionally, Socha met with Thamer Al-Adwan,
Director of the Foreign Minister's Private Office who made
many of the same points as Hassan. Both expressed
appreciation for America's "more than generous support" to
Jordan through foreign assistance programs.

Hamas Rise in West Bank if No Progress
--------------


11. (C) Socha also met with the head of the non-governmental
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of
Jordan. The new CSS director, Ibrahim Saif, told Socha that
the academic community and general public were skeptical
about American policies in the region. He claimed that
discussions about a "Jordan option" for the West Bank (such
as confederation) were real and increasing in intensity, and
that delay in progress towards a two-state solution between
Palestinians and Israelis will further leads to
radicalization in the region and in the West Bank. Saif
argued that moderates are on the retreat, and that recruiting
for extremist groups including Al-Qa'ida would be easy,
particularly given the mounting frustration and lack of
opportunities for young males. Saif predicted that if there
were no progress toward a two-state solution, Hamas would be
in a position to take over the West Bank in 6 to 12 months.
Saif also said that the Palestinians need a charismatic
leader who has legitimacy inside and outside of the
territories who supports the peace process, pointing to
Marwan Bargouti as such a leader.


Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/

Rubinstein

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -