THE JORDAN EXBS PROGRAM: DON'T FIX WHAT ISN'T BROKEN

UNCLAS AMMAN 002704 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/ECC, DS, PM, NEA DOC FOR L. HOWE, D. CREED US COAST GUARD FOR USCG ACTIVITIES/MIO EUROPE US CUSTOMS FOR J. GOUGE, R. Watt, W. LAWRENCE USDOE/NNSA FOR T. PERRY, P. ROBINSON, D. TYNAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL MASS KNNP PGOV JO SUBJECT: THE JORDAN EXBS PROGRAM: DON'T FIX WHAT ISN'T BROKEN ¶1. (U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Over the past two years, the EXBS program in Jordan has helped to facilitate the safe passage of goods and people through commercial portals in Jordan, and to deliver key training and equipment to a close U.S. ally in a dangerous region. These successes were due in large part to the diligent work of EXBS Advisor coordinating through the U.S. interagency process with several agencies represented at Post, and with 13 different Jordanian government agencies and organizations in a border security environment in which Jordanian Customs plays a supporting, instead of a leading, role. ¶3. (SBU) Despite efforts to enhance the role Customs plays, the appointment of a former military officer as the new Director General of Jordan Customs indicates that the GoJ's intelligence and security services, as well as military forces will continue to dominate activities related to border security as they always have. As State/ISN prepares to transition to a new advisor for EXBS Jordan, representatives of relevant sections and agencies on Post's Country Team (including those on Post's Counterterrorism Working Group and Law Enforcement Working Group) firmly believe that EXBS program management should stay the course with an EXBS Advisor in Jordan whose primary skill sets include expertise in intelligence and military operations and concepts. The Advisor should also have deep experience in the interagency environment. Expertise in traditional law enforcement activities would be an additional asset, but the former abilities are essential. Post management shares this assessment. End Summary. ¶4. (SBU) Background: The Export Control and Border Security Program (EXBS) was established in Jordan in 2005, and over the past two years has made significant strides in assisting the GOJ in facilitating the movement of goods and people through commercial portals, a process that involves 13 different agencies and organizations. This success was achieved through an interagency effort - State, Commerce, Energy, and DHS - that promoted Jordanian adoption of a National Control List, preliminary work on a national export control law based on "the Malta model," acceptance of the Megaports Initiative, and a wide variety of training at the basic and intermediate levels. The Major Players in Border Security -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While these accomplishments were achieved, Jordan's essential operating environment at its ports of entry remains constant. Four stakeholder organizations manage all activities in the commercial portals. These same four also administer security along national borders. They are the General Intelligence Department (GID),the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF),the Public Security Directorate (PSD),and Jordan Customs, which, despite being a natural counterpart for EXBS programs, has the least influence. In terms of operational oversight, GID has preeminence within the portals, and is the major player along the borders, although the role of immediate execution and border security is the purview of the JAF and in limited locations, the PSD. Jordan intends to militarize the border security mission in the near future. ¶6. (SBU) Significant military assistance funds have been programmed toward border security improvements for the JAF, which will make Jordan a regional leader in border security initiatives and concept implementation. Nevertheless, specialized support and law enforcement roles will still be executed by the GID and PSD. Customs will have almost no role along the borders except in a limited fashion and related to traditional counter-smuggling operations. The small operational footprint of Customs along the borders will be significantly subordinated to the authority, missions, and operational execution of the JAF, GID, and PSD. For example, state-of-the-art technology that can leverage border security will be almost exclusively the responsibility of the JAF and GID. Some operational tasks will likely be given to PSD, but these will relate to law enforcement, defense in depth, and protection of interior lines of movement and resupply. Customs at the Bottom of the Bunch -------------- ¶7. (SBU) As part of this border security evolution, PSD is expected to revert to concentration on security in/at the portals. The first face any person or shipment will meet crossing into Jordan will be that of the PSD. Civilian functions in the portals will come under Customs; military or law enforcement functions will be the responsibility of PSD. In this pairing, PSD is the clear lead agency. GID will be strongly but discreetly present, and the JAF will effectively be in charge six inches on either side of a portal. While many GOJ officials have expressed the desire to create "one face at the border," it is probable that this face will be on a body wearing a PSD uniform but representing the GID and/or working in very close coordination with it. The JAF will continue, in close support of PSD and GID, its traditional role as the primary steward of Jordan's cohesive defense. Additionally, historical concerns about corruption in the ranks of the Customs service will continue to flavor the private opinions and perceptions of the three lead organizations, relegating Customs to the sidelines. ¶8. (SBU) The progressive, reform-minded former Director General (DG) of Customs experienced some success in leading Jordan Customs toward becoming an excellent professional service in which personal advancement was based on merit. During his tenure, Jordan Customs appeared poised to become an exemplary WCO-compliant service and a regional leader among neighboring Customs services. It remains to be seen if this momentum will continue under the new DG who is a retired general officer with understandable links and loyalty to JAF. The Future of EXBS in Jordan -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Post appreciates the strong support provided to the EXBS program from Washington-based agencies and offices. Jordan's political stability and steady economic growth make its position in a turbulent region unique. As a result, Post believes that Jordan's particular needs and organizational characteristics should be taken into consideration to the degree possible by USG program managers in the fields of security assistance, law enforcement cooperation, and counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. In the specific field of EXBS, what has worked well in other countries may not be the best fit for Jordan where agencies other than Customs take the lead in defense in depth of national borders, counter-proliferation, control of strategic commodities, and border security. In this context, relevant interagency representatives on Post's Country Team agree the time is not right to reshape the focus of the EXBS program. ¶10. (SBU) To maintain programmatic impact, EXBS should ensure that its advisor has the ability to engage effectively the Jordanian stakeholders who do take the lead in strategic policy execution in counter-proliferation and border security -- namely, the GID, JAF, and PSD. Likewise, the advisor must be able to work with more traditional Embassy contacts such as Ministry of Industry and Trade officials, who administer licensing of controlled commodities. To do both requires not only technical expertise on the part of the EXBS advisor, but also diplomatic and liaison skills. ¶11. (SBU) The EXBS assistance program to Jordan has been a huge success, and been well planned and coordinated with the appropriate members of the Country Team. It has been executed in a manner that facilitates sustained improvement in Jordan while ensuring that USG resources are wisely spent on those organizations wielding the greatest influence in the war on terror and illicit proliferation of WMD and related technology. To continue this success, EXBS's advisor in Jordan must be conversant with and have expertise in intelligence and military organizations, operations, and concepts in order to best advise the GoJ. With this essential expertise, the advisor can establish credibility and interact effectively with both U.S. and Jordanian practitioners, and in turn effectively position the program to make its best possible contribution to the overall effort. Expertise in traditional law enforcement would be an additional asset, but the former skill set is essential. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ HALE