FORMER IRAQI DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF REQUESTS

S E C R E T AMMAN 001629 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/ELA, PRM/A - TERRY RUSCH E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREF PINR IZ SY JO SUBJECT: FORMER IRAQI DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF REQUESTS RESETTLEMENT, COMMENTS ON BA'TH PARTY AND AQI Classified By: Ambassador David Hale, Reason 1.5 (B) and (D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Emboff met on April 3 with retired Iraqi Lt. General Khalid al-Jibouri, chief of Iraqi military intelligence from 1991-1995, at the latter's request. Jibouri explained that he came to Jordan from Syria in November, 2006, after leaving Baghdad due to repeated death threats. Noting that he worked with the U.S. Army during the CPA period, Jibouri claimed to have kept aloof from most of his senior Ba,th and ex-army contacts since leaving Baghdad. He noted that the Iraq's Ba,th party is undergoing a process of gradual renewal after a period of near collapse at the time of the war. He characterized the recent Ba,thist party split between Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and Mohammed Yunus al-Ahmed as a personality and regional-based division being manipulated by the SARQ. Jibouri opined that the al-Duri faction is actually headed by a shadowy group using al-Duri as a symbol, and is still on top. Jibouri claimed that both Ba,thist and non-Ba,thist-oriented insurgents increasingly recognize AQI as a major threat to their interests, and predicted that AQI will ultimately lose any intra-Sunni struggle. Jibouri recommended that the USG continue to improve its understanding of Iraq's traditional regional political diversity, and adjust its diplomatic strategies accordingly. ¶2. (S) Citing his previous work with U.S. forces as the cause for the death threats, Jibouri requested assistance in obtaining resettlement for himself and his family in the United States or the UK. End Summary. Meeting with Former Iraqi Military Intelligence Chief -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) Emboff met on April 3 in Amman with former (1991-1995) head of Iraqi military intelligence, Lt. General Khalid Mohammed Abbas al-Jibouri, at the latter's request. Jibouri was referred to Emboff by a mutual friend, the London-based Lt. General Mohammad Bara'a al-Rubaie, who was a "finalist" for selection as Minister of Defense in the Maliki government. Like Rubaie, Jibouri is a Sandhurst graduate and has substantial experience working with western military organizations. According to Jibouri, he was Iraq's military attach in West Germany in the 1970,s, and served as the senior official liaison between the USG and Iraqi military intelligence during the Iran-Iraq war. He speaks fluent English. Retired Three Times -------------- ¶4. (S) The Baghdad-born Jibouri claimed that he has always been a professional military officer and "not a politician." After serving as senior staff officer at military intelligence headquarters, Jibouri says he was abruptly retired in 1989, but brought back into active service six months later. He became acting Director of Intelligence in 1991, but was removed from this position in June 1993, retired, and degraded to the rank of Brigadier General. Notwithstanding this disgrace, Jibouri said that he was returned to active duty as Director of Military Intelligence and given the rank of Lt. General in December, 1993. Jibouri was retired for the third and final time (this time with full honors) in 1995. Jibouri attributed this erratic career path to a conflict between Saddam,s "suspicion of military professionals," and his pragmatic recognition of a need for them. In 2005, Jibouri was granted a Ph.D. in Arab history by the Arab League Union of Arab Historians. Alleged Post-war Work with U.S. Army -------------- ¶5. (S) Jibouri claimed that he actively cooperated with U.S. military organizations from late 2003 until June 2004, after which he said he lost touch with his USG contacts. He provided a copy of a letter from a DOD official working in the Information Collection Program dated 22 November 2003 attesting that his "assistance and friendship" to the U.S. government "is directly responsible for preventing attacks against coalition forces and saving lives." Jibouri said that from February to June 2004 he worked with Dr. Mohammed al-Mashadani as an advisor on contract to the U.S. Army, and prepared many written analyses for the USG while in this position. He provided a copy of a U.S. army certificate from that time that authorized him to possess an AK-47 and a 9mm pistol. Amman DAO Comment: Jibouri was entry #142 on the DIA Blacklist. The Blacklist, which is no longer maintained, was a list of individuals targeted for detention/questioning following the war because of their position in the former regime. Jibouri submitted a letter in 2003 asking to be removed from the list given his cooperation with Coalition forces. End DAO Amman Comment. Flight from Baghdad -------------- ¶6. (S) Because of this service and other perceived cooperation with coalition forces, Jibouri claimed that he received "three credible death threats" from Iraqi insurgent elements during 2005 and 2006, leading him to move his family from Baghdad to Syria in June 2006, and from Syria to Jordan in November 2006. Jibouri does not have a Jordanian residency permit, and said that he is ready to work for the U.S. government as an analyst, teacher, or in another capacity, and requested assistance in resettlement in the United States or the U.K. for himself and his family (one wife and two children). Emboff promised to relay this message. Unpleasant Sojourn in Syria -------------- ¶7. (S) Jibouri claimed that he was under steady surveillance while in Syria, and required to check in frequently with Syrian police authorities who expressed suspicion that he was an "American infiltrator." He described Iraqi migr life in Syria as dominated by Iraqi Ba,thists whom he said exercise a heavy hand over much of the Iraqi community there. "If you don't cooperate with them your life (in the Iraqi migr community) is very difficult," he said. ¶8. (S) He contrasted this situation with the Iraqi community in Jordan, which he described as much freer and apolitical in its interactions. Jibouri conceded that he had some "chance encounters" with senior ex-Iraqi military and Ba,thist individuals in Syria and Jordan, but stressed that he has avoided regular contact with them, both out of personal preference and because he did not want to encourage suspicion of his activities by the host governments. Nonetheless, he offered his "personal opinion" on some issues related to current Ba,thist infighting, attitudes towards al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),and other issues. Comments on Ba,thists -------------- ¶9. (S) Jibouri said that Iraq's Ba,th party was in a "state of shock" at the end of the war. He recalled that in the 1960,s the Ba,th was a tightly organized vanguard group that was able to outmaneuver both the similarly organized Communists and the Nasserites. However, he claimed, Saddam moved against the old cadres and favored "quantity over quality" in terms of party membership, with the result that the party lost most of its institutional dynamic and integrity. Ironically, he asserted, the aftermath of the war has given the Iraqi Ba,th party a new lease on life. He opined that it is both "modernizing" (in the sense of recognizing that it will no longer be able to rule Iraq as a sole, dictatorial party) and "returning to its roots" by becoming better organized and nationalistic in its approach. Jibouri speculated that a renewed Ba,th party would likely do well if and when it participates in free democratic elections in Iraq. Al-Duri Faction Still on Top -------------- ¶10. (S) With regard to the recent party split between Izzat al-Duri and Mohammad Yunus al-Ahmed, Jibouri claimed that the recent Aleppo conference which "deposed" Duri was largely a manipulation by the SARG, and thought that the Duri faction still has the loyalty of most Iraqi Ba,thists. He portrayed the real split as probably more personality and regional (Mosul versus Salah-ad-Din) than ideologically-based. He said that he knows Yunus al-Ahmed well, and called him "very honest and very inflexible." His impression is that Duri is essentially a symbolic figure, and opined that there is a powerful shadow group of personnel behind him who really constitute the operational leadership of his faction. Despite their military ranks, both Duri and Yunus al-Ahmed have always been political figures with little military training, according to Jibouri, who added that they are not seen by army professionals as "real military men." Ba,thists and AQI -------------- ¶11. (S) Jibouri speculated that Iraq's Ba,thist establishment may be currently more concerned about AQI as an immediate threat than it is about the Shi,ite parties and the GOI. Jibouri said that, if it ever was, AQI has "ceased to be useful" to the Ba,th and is increasingly viewed as potentially threatening to Ba,thist and ex-army nationalist interests and to the integrity of Iraq. He repeated comments from others that AQI generally pays its fighters much better than anyone else. That being said, he predicted that AQI will ultimately lose out in any intra-Iraqi power struggle in Sunni areas because of its anti-nationalism, its lack of a tribal base, and its rejection of tribal politics. Iraq's Regional Political Structures -------------- ¶12. (S) Jibouri remarked that Iraq's regional political structure is very diverse, and claimed that political leadership is exercised quite differently in different areas of Iraq. For example, he said, Sunni areas in general have historically been dominated by tribal politics (with tribal sheikhs as the leadership class),while politics in the Shi,ite south has been traditionally dominated by clerical figures. In the South, he claimed, no tribal Sheikh could ever be successful politically without backing from some prominent clerics, while in the West clerics generally had little true political influence. He said that the Baghdad area has yet another political tradition, which it retains to this day "apart from Sadr city," which he said is more similar to the South. Jibouri argued that the USG should continue efforts to improve its understanding of Iraq's differing regional political traditions, and tailor its diplomatic strategies accordingly. ¶13. (S) Jibouri agreed to remain in close touch with Emboff, and provided a hand-written resume of his career which has been provided to State offices as well as DAO and Regional Affairs, along with copies of the other documents he presented. ¶14. (S) Action request for Washington agencies: Please provide guidance on further questions for Jibouri, if desired, and on his request for assistance in resettlement in the United States and possible USG employment. Embassy Amman will ensure that he can be considered for access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). ¶15. (U) This cable was cleared by Embassy Baghdad. HALE