NEA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUTLER,S MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001005 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2012 TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF JO IZ SUBJECT: NEA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUTLER,S MEETINGS IN AMMAN REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 585 ¶B. B) AMMAN 571 ¶C. C) AMMAN 703 ¶D. D) AMMAN 726 ¶E. E) AMMAN 786 Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings in Amman with the Jordanian Foreign Minister and the Amman-based Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, DAS Butler discussed perceptions of the Iraqi government, the Baghdad Security Plan, the International Compact for Iraq, and displaced Iraqis. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Deputy Assistant Secretary Lawrence Butler met separately with Foreign Minister Abdelilah al-Khatib and United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Deputy Representative Jean-Marie Fakhouri during his February 18-20 visit to Jordan. FM: "We can't afford to fail on any points" -------------- ¶3. (C) Khatib told Butler and the Ambassador that Iraqis want to lead normal lives, and that it is essential that the GOI restore normalcy. "We can't afford to fail on any points," as the regional implications are too high. He expressed the need for patience in getting results from the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). Khatib compared the BSP with the GoJ's operations against Palestinian militants in 1970, noting that the latter centered on clear-and-hold tactics, "but took nine months" to succeed. He also cautioned against listening to people who have "already made mistakes," mentioning specifically the reported role of Ahmad Chalabi in establishing popular committees (Ref A). Khatib said that "no serious government" in the region has any problems with the GoI's legitimacy, but the GoI needs to act in a "national rather than a sectarian" manner in order to improve its image in the region. Khatib added that some in the Arab world wonder if the current plan for a sub-ministerial -- and then a ministerial -- conference for the neighbors of Iraq in March makes sense, but noted that there seemed to be some movement toward Cairo to serve as the venue. "Iran does not yet see the danger of its behavior" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Khatib said Saudi Arabia labors under no illusions about Iran's recent conciliatory gestures. While there are some positive messages from Iran, he said one can not isolate Iranian activities in Palestine and Lebanon from Iraq. "I believe this is a tactical move, rather than a strategic shift." Khatib argued that Iran wants a "grand bargain" that includes its nuclear program. ¶5. (C) Khatib credited King Abdullah for that fact that "more countries are now willing to confront Iran." Khatib expressed concern over Iranian manipulation of Shia communities in the region. "We must highlight (the Shia communities') Arab identity and not lump them with Iran." While using this sectarian tactic to further Iran's regional interests, Khatib opined "Iran does not yet see the danger of its behavior." It must be careful it does not upset its own diverse ethnic and religious communities. Considering visas for Iraqis, assessing the displaced -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Khatib reported that the GOJ is considering issuing visas to Iraqi travelers to address concerns in transparency and reduce ill will when some Iraqis are refused admission at Jordanian ports of entry. Note: Jordan and Iraq continue, at least on paper, their pre-war bilateral visa-free travel regime. End note. Due to security conditions in Baghdad, the GoJ is evaluating a courier system with a notional 72-hour turn around time. Khatib discussed this with Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zabari during his recent visit to Amman. ¶7. (C) While wanting to maintain an open door policy for Iraq, Khatib said that "we cannot declare Jordan as a refugee camp." Khatib criticized the UNHCR for having pressed Jordan to accept refugees in the past, and then allegedly failing to keep up its side of the bargain by re-settling them in third countries (Refs B and C). "There is only so much absorptive capacity" in Jordan, and the GoJ must be careful, he said. ¶8. (C) Khatib expressed doubt that recent UNHCR decisions were consistent with international consensus on the definition of a refugee (Refs D and E). He was hopeful that the assessment being conducted by the Norwegian NGO FAFO will AMMAN 00001005 002 OF 002 provide the GOJ with a better understanding of the numbers and condition of displaced Iraqis in Jordan. He opined that many of them may be economic migrants. He hoped the assessment will provide initial results before the April UNHCR conference in Geneva; Khatib committed to sharing the results with the U.S. UNAMI: Refocusing strategy and tactics -------------- ¶9. (C) Jean-Marie Fakhouri, UNAMI's Amman-based Deputy Special Representative, told Butler that the February 2006 bombing in Samarra "changed everything," and triggered events that displaced 2 million outside Iraq and 500,000-600,000 internally. Comment: Fakhouri did not say where he obtained these statistics. Most observers agree that large numbers of Iraqis were already present in Jordan and Syria before February 2006. End comment. Fakhouri stated that UNAMI's ability to work on development is severely restricted due to the security environment in Iraq, and that UNAMI was now shifting to humanitarian work. He said he had been in discussions with the governments of Syria and Jordan to secure access through their borders to displaced persons, whom he expected to congregate along Iraq's western frontiers. The UNAMI office is taking stock of its current implementing strategies and will consult with the Human Rights Working Group in Geneva on March 2 on how best to conduct humanitarian support. He predicts that UNAMI's recommendations will focus on supporting regional governments to provide education and health services rather than recommending refugee camps. ¶10. (C) For its remaining development work, Fakhoury said UNAMI needs to refocus away from capacity building of ineffective central government authorities, to assisting provincial authorities, tribes, and religious groups who implement programs. This may include "working with militias." Fakhouri stated that since the government cannot provide services, the people are turning to militias, as they do for security. Reflecting on his own Lebanese heritage, Fakhouri drew a comparison between the tactics of Hizballah and the tactics of the militias -- winning supporters by taking care of people's needs. As UNAMI moves to provide local service, Fakhouri is concerned that the militias will see UNAMI as a competitor, increasing its security risk. Still on board with Compact, recommends next steps -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Fakhouri confirmed that the UN fully supported the International Compact for Iraq (ICI),and was waiting the final unveiling of the document. He believes that the proposed two-stage process, a meeting of permanent representatives followed by a regional event, is a step down from the prior meeting of Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the UNGA. He recommended waiting for the timing to improve for a higher-level event. In the meantime, he suggested a video teleconference from Baghdad between donors and capitals. While praising the document, Fakhouri assessed that the key is implementation -- "I can't solicit funds when the Government of Iraq is sitting on billions." Sees GoI pursuing ethnic resettlement as policy -------------- -- ¶12. (C) Fakhouri also gave a short overview of his recent visit to Baghdad, including a meeting with Vice President Tareq Al-Hashemi. According to Fakhouri, Hashemi said that there were ways that the GoI could convince expatriate Iraqis to return, though Hashemi did not say how. Fakhouri claimed Hashemi told him that the cabinet had determined it would resettle returnees by sect "for their safety" -- Shia would go to Al-Najaf, Sunnis to Al-Anbar, and Kurds to the north. When Fakhouri pointed out that this was resettlement on sectarian lines, he reported that Hashemi backed off his statement that this was a cabinet decision and re-characterized it as a cabinet discussion. Fakhouri reported other ministers confirmed this resettlement policy was in fact a cabinet decision. ¶13. Deputy Assistant Secretary Butler has reviewed this message. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ RUBINSTEIN