AL-QAEDA IN THE MAGHREB IS NOT MUCH UNITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000896 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY -- PARAGRAPH 9 MARKING ADDED STATE FOR NEA; DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017 TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER AG SUBJECT: AL-QAEDA IN THE MAGHREB IS NOT MUCH UNITED REF: ALGIERS 498 Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Algerian contacts who closely follow Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) sense the organization is grappling with ideological splits and command problems in the wake of the spectacular April 11 bombings in Algiers. On June 10, well-connected Echourouk el-Youmi editor Mohammed al-Muqadam (pen name Anis Rahmani) received an email death threat that appeared to come from the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The threat said it was in response to Echourouk's continued reporting on splintering within AQIM, splintering that Rahmani believes is ideology-based. Several other observers, including Hmida Ayachi - thought by many to be the best expert on Algerian Salafists - told us that the splits within AQIM are not new but perhaps worse now. Although our contacts disagree on whether AQIM is breaking apart, they do agree that the killing of Algerian Muslim civilians in the April 11, 2007 attacks (reftel) has generally offended the Algerian people and accentuated divisions among some AQIM leaders. With press reports proliferating of prominent AQIM members seeking amnesty under the government's National Reconciliation Charter, Rahmani and other contacts think AQIM's leader Abdelmalek Droukdal needs a spectacular attack to consolidate control of his own organization. END SUMMARY. Rahmani Threat -------------- ¶2. (C) On June 10, an e-mail threat purporting to be from AQIM arrived at the office of Anis Rahmani, one of the best-informed journalists here tracking Islamist extremists. The email stated that "Any helper of the government is an enemy of AQIM. The sword must win." The threat indicated AQIM's plans to kidnap, blindfold, force a confession and then kill Rahmani on video. Echourouk el-Youmi reporter Naila Berahal was also named in the threat. Rahmani told us June 21 that he has received numerous threats in the past, but he took this one seriously when the same verbiage was used by irate blogger Saifo Allah ("Sword of God") on the closed-membership website www.alhesbah.org (membership on that website opened and closed in 2004). (On June 25 Algerian papers reported that Algerian police had arrested a man allegedly responsible for sending the threatening e-mails.) Ideology: Any Imam Can Be an Expert -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Rahmani on June 21, the ideological debate over whether AQIM is justified in killing civilians and Muslims when trying to kill apostates still festers among Algerian Islamists. On June 20, (government-approved) Muslim Scholars Association head Abdelrahmane Chibane told PolOffs June 20 that plenty of Islamist groups claim to be believers, but they do bad things and it is obvious they have no understanding of the Islamic faith. Chibane placed AQIM in that category. On June 23, Ambassador and Poloffs met writer and newspaper editor Hmida Ayachi, whose 1992 book about Algerian Islamists is widely considered here to be the best of its kind. Ayachi told us that one of the obstacles hindering efforts to counter Islamist extremist ideology is that there is no recognized senior Islamic jurist in Algeria. Government-appointed figures, like Chibane, lack much credibility on the street, he said. Individual imams in Algeria and the Maghreb take it upon themselves to interpret the Koran. Those imams who justify killing civilians often re-interpret centuries-old fatwas to suit their current goals. Ayachi asserted that AQIM skirts the issue of killing Muslims and innocent bystanders by insisting that innocents killed in attacks against an apostate government or infidels die as martyrs and will go to heaven. AQIM's After April 11: Justification -------------- ¶4. (C) Rahmani explained that both the Algerian public and several AQIM leaders did not approve of the April 11 attacks since civilians were killed. Rahmani reported that he and his paper's reporters participate in blogger websites that discuss Muslim ideology and AQIM activities. On June 1, AQIM posted a 23-page justification on its new and improved website www.qmaghreb.org. In the statement AQIM answered several questions that were raised on the Jihadist Hassaba internet chat group asking about the propriety of suicide operations and the killing of civilians. AQIM claimed that its activities were nothing new and emphasized that its target was not civilians but apostates. AQIM claimed that it is consistent with Islamic jurisprudence to kill civilians if that will protect the core of the faithful Muslim community. God, the statement, can more easily accept the loss of civilians than the loss of the Muslim community as a whole. The communique also justified suicide operations at length, pointing back to interpretations stemming from the era of the initial spread of Islam. Rahmani claimed that AQIM is also putting forth an argument that if the Prophet Mohammed and his companions were alive now, he would accept suicide missions. Rahmani pointed out that a true Muslim knows it is blasphemous to suppose anything for the Prophet and his companions. Splintering due to Ideology? -------------- ¶5. (C) Rahmani said he was not surprised to find AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdal and his companions on the defensive trying to justify the April 11 attacks. He told us June 21 that former leader of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) leader Hassan al-Hattab publicly had condemned the April 11 attacks, indicating that GSPC condemns killing of innocents. In our June 23 conversation, Islamist analyst Ayachi pointed out that in May 15 press reports, terrorist Abu Djaafar Mohamad Salafi of the group Protectors of Salafist Preaching (DHDS) also condemned AQIM and the April 11 attacks for their killing of civilians. Ayachi recalled that after the bombings of police stations in the eastern suburbs of Algiers last October, he received a call from an unidentified jihadi explaining that the bomb attacks were done early in the morning to avoid civilian casualties. Ayachi, like Rahmani, concluded that Algerian Salafists were divided on the propriety of killing civilians in their campaign against the government. AQIM Infighting Not New -------------- ¶6. (C) On June 17, El Watan newspaper reporter Salima Tlemcani, who has excellent sources among Algerian security officials, claimed that infighting among the GSPC leadership started long before Droukdal came to power in 2004. She asserted that Droukdal needed help securing his position and turned to al-Qaeda for help. Droukdal's was never an ideological conversion, a point Ayachi agreed with in our conversation with him. Ayachi claimed that the April 11 attacks aggravated existing cracks in GSPC-AQIM leadership -- cracks based not only on ideology but also power distribution. He recalled that GSPC leaders like Mohktar Belmohktar and Hassan al-Hattab were marginalized in the contest for GSPC leadership with Droukdal. Some GSPC figures denounced Droukdal's alliance with al-Qaeda and the attacks. Cracks in AQIM Causing Leadership Shuffles -------------- ¶7. (C) Tlemcani and well-connected Al-Khabar journalist and political analyst Mahmoud Belhimeur told us last week that some of the older AQIM members are weary and believe that surrendering and gaining amnesty is the easiest way to get off the terrorist treadmill. Belhimeur also asserted that older members acknowledge that establishing an Islamic state is not feasible. Ayachi, by contrast, speculated that the older AQIM members maintain their membership but are often marginalized if they do not approve of current tactics. In any case, all agreed the government has had some success in recent months convincing some mid-level AQIM figures to quit the fight. ¶8. (C) Since the AQIM website's launch there have been several press reports of zone leadership changes. Tlemcani asserted that the reported reorganization of AQIM's geographic zones after the April 11 attacks was due in part to members who did not agree on the tactics used. Tlemcani and Rahmani both thought also that constant turnover within the organization resulted from Droukdal's inability to maintain control of the GSPC-AQIM merger. Rahmani claimed that several ex-GSPC/AQIM leaders are reaching out to the security services via family members to negotiate surrender under the terms of the 2005 national reconciliation charter. The resulting leadership changes are perhaps, he speculated, leaving Droukdal weaker than thought. In particular, Rahmani said, the surrender of some mid-level AQIM members in recent weeks have provided Algerian military intelligence (the DRS) with information that has rolled up some networks, forcing Droukdal to keep changing zone commanders. Rahmani pointed to the surrender of Droukdal's close aide, Abou al-Haithem, after the April 11 attacks as an example. Ominous Forecast -------------- ¶9. (C) On June 21, Rahmani told the Ambassador and PolOffs that AQIM has issued notably few statements. He was convinced that this is a sign that AQIM is planning something spectacular. He added that Droukdal needs something spectacular to rehabilitate AQIM's image. Rahmani thinks that Droukdal will try either to target foreigners in Algeria or copy the al-Qaeda model of kidnapping a well-known figure and slitting his/her throat on television. Ayachi told us on June 23 that he is also in convinced AQIM is planning something spectacular because it raised the bar with the April 11 attacks. Anything less in magnitude would disappoint, he noted. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Historically, AQIM has come full circle. In the 1990s, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) killed civilians indiscriminately. The same debate about victims ensued and as a result the GSPC was born. Now AQIM is justifying suicide operations (almost unknown here in the 1990s) and murder of civilians. Tracking AQIM here is enormously difficult. Algerian analysts carefully study internet and TV communiques (usually on al-Jazeerah) minutely. These analysts themselves recognize that Algerian military intelligence is also a factor, sometimes resorting to its own disinformation campaigns. Tactical measures taken by the DRS, internal dissensions, the occasional success and press reporting can make AQIM seem strong one day and weak the next. Our contacts describe an AQIM that still has only a limited base but is trying to consolidate stronger support among the broader community of Algerian Salafists. Our contacts agree that more recruitment is clearly a priority for AQIM (see septel). It is also important to note our contacts' sense that another attack as spectacular as April 11 is likely, but that the target probably would be one less likely to cause controversy within that Salafist community, such as foreigners or the Algerian security establishment. FORD