LARGEST ALGERIAN OPPOSITION PARTY FACES EXCLUSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000282 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG SUBJECT: LARGEST ALGERIAN OPPOSITION PARTY FACES EXCLUSION FROM MAY 17 ELECTIONS REF: A. ALGIERS 247 ¶B. ALGIERS 109 Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Algerian Ministry of Interior has disqualified the opposition Islamist party Islah ("Reform") from participating in the May 17 parliamentary elections on the ground that its leader was not elected in a recent party congress. Islah, which has the largest number of seats in the current parliament of any party outside the presidential alliance and claims to be the largest opposition party by membership in the country, has appealed the decision directly to Interior Minister Zerhouni. Our discussions of the issue with the Islah leadership and legal experts have revealed an arcane series of events leading to the disqualification, but suggest strongly that the ministry's decision was not based in Algerian law and was likely political in motivation. In a March 5 meeting, the Ambassador told the MFA Secretary General that we were watching the electoral process closely, and hoped that it would be competitive and transparent. An inclusive process with broad participation by all political currents -- even peaceful Islamists -- is most likely to isolate extremism in Algeria, he stressed. We recommend that the Department consider making the same points to the Algerian ambassador in Washington. End Summary and Comment. SURPRISE! -------------- ¶2. (U) On February 26, local officials in the town of Setif informed Islah representatives that the Ministry of Interior (MOI) had barred them from giving Islah the forms necessary to register its candidates. Under the timetable established by a presidential decree in February (ref A),Islah and other political parties must file the forms with local election authorities in each wilaya (province) no later than April 1. Islah had successfully obtained the official forms from 15 other wilayas, according to press reports verified by Islah officials, before they were prevented from doing so February 26 in Setif. Setif officials gave Islah representatives a copy of an MOI instruction declaring that the party was ineligible to participate in the May parliamentary elections because it had not held a recent party congress to elect its leadership. ¶3. (C) Islah party president Abdallah Djaballah, who has led Islah since its founding in 1999, told DCM and PolEc Chief March 4 that this turn of events and the timing of the announcement were "a surprise for us and for everyone." Djaballah, accompanied by Islah MP Lakhdar Benkhellaf and party External Relations Director Bachir Kherfi, noted that his party had participated in the December 2006 Senate elections and in recent parliamentary by-elections without incident. Moreover, he said, Prime Minister Belkhadem met with him last fall in a round of discussions with party leaders to discuss possible amendments to the election law (ref B). Djaballah characterized the MOI decision, which was never officially communicated to Islah's party headquarters, as one grounded in politics, not law. Separately, we spoke with four reputable Algerian attorneys, all of whom oppose Islah's positions on political issues. All told us they agreed with Djaballah that the decision was not based in law. ¶4. (C) Djaballah recalled that Belkhadem's National Liberation Front (FLN) did not hold a party congress to elect new leadership from 1989 to 1997, but nonetheless participated in all local and national elections during that period. He stressed that his party was the third-largest in parliament and received 200,000 more votes in the last legislative elections than the National Rally for Democracy (RND) of former Prime Minister Ouyahia. Djaballah said Islah was committed to seeking power through free, fair and transparent elections; opposed violence; and believed the nation (not God) established political institutions. As part of its "constitutional vision," Islah believed that wide-ranging reforms in Algeria were needed. Unlike other political parties, he added, Islah would not compromise away its values to join the ruling coalition. COMPLICATED SHENANIGANS -------------- ¶5. (C) Djaballah recounted for us the series of events leading up to and following the February 26 surprise. He showed us copies of four requests that Islah submitted at various times between late 2004 and mid-February seeking required MOI approval for a party congress. The MOI denied each of the requests, according to Djaballah, on the basis that a legal action was ongoing against the party. The action in question was a challenge from Mohamed Boulahia, a former senior Islah member expelled by the party's disciplinary commitee in December 2004. The MOI had maintained that until the courts delivered a final ruling on Boulahia's complaint, the ministry could not establish with certainty the legitimate leader of the party for the purposes of organizing a party congress. Djaballah said an Algiers court ruled against Boulahia on June 12, 2006. An appellate court upheld the decision in October 2006. Despite the court rulings, the MOI still turned down Djaballah's requests to hold a party congress. ¶6. (C) The same day Islah learned of the disqualification, Boulahia filed a request with the MOI to organize a March 1 Islah party congress. The MOI approved the request in the minimum three days allowed under the Emergency Law for approving a public meeting, and Boulahia published an announcement of the meeting in the February 28 issue of El Khabar, Algeria's largest-circulating daily newspaper. Djaballah and his supporters saw the announcement and rallied the party's "legitimate" members to attend. They told us that when Djaballah's supporters tried to enter the meeting hall, Boulahia's supporters instructed police to deny entry to them and their supporters. The 1,567 Islah members denied entry, according to Djaballah, moved to another nearby location and signed a document attesting to the police action. Meanwhile, Boulahia was elected the new head of the party. (Note: Djaballah and his team remain the official leaders of Islah until the MOI certifies the election result. End Note.) Djaballah maintained that the decision to allow Boulahia to organize a meeting in Algiers was inconsistent with recent authorized meetings Islah had held in the towns of Annaba, Tlemcen, Constantine and elsewhere. ¶7. (C) Djaballah told us he met March 2 with Interior Minister Zerhouni and provided him with a thick file (a copy of which was shown to us) outlining why he believed the MOI decision to recognize Boulahia's party congress was incorrect. The file included evidence of the disciplinary action taken against Boulahia and his supporters, and outlined how party procedures had been violated in calling for the congress. According to Islah's relevant bylaws, which we reviewed, a party congress can be called every five years by the president of the party (Djaballah) or with the consent of two-thirds of the members of the national executive committee. Neither provision was followed in this case, said Djaballah. Djaballah also gave Zerhouni copies of the previous requests for permission to hold a party congress, plus the legal documents surrounding the Boulahia case. Zerhouni told Djaballah he would review them. LIMITED OPTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Djaballah said there was not enough time before the April 1 filing deadline to organize a new party of Islah members loyal to him under a different name. The only way for Islah to compete in the May elections under his leadership -- unless Zerhouni overturned the results of the March 1 "party congress" -- was to qualify candidates for the ballot as independents. The signatures of 400 registered voters are required for the name of an independent candidate to appear on the ballot. Djaballah said a party as well organized as Islah could easily collect the signatures. Qualifying independent candidates under the circumstances, he said, was nevertheless an uphill battle. ¶9. (C) Djaballah feared that local election officials would invalidate the signatures. The officials must conduct a random sampling of signatories to verify their identity. If even one voter who is summoned to appear at a specific date and time fails to show, all the signatures collected for the candidate can be invalidated. (Note: Djaballah's explanation of the signature process is correct according to other political party officials and attorneys we contacted. End Note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Interior Minister Zerhouni is a confidant of President Bouteflika, who has made no secret over the years of his dislike of Djaballah (though Djaballah painstakingly avoided criticizing Bouteflika during his meeting with us). The lengthy background to Djaballah's story suggests that the Ministry of Interior has been working for some time to keep Islah's legal status open to challenge. Given that lawyers we contacted have found no legal basis for the MOI decisions, and that Zerhouni himself has cited no particular Algerian law in publicly justifying his ministry's actions, we believe the decision to prevent Islah from fielding candidates in the May elections is political and unlikely to be reversed. In this regard, the MOI decision also theoretically applies to a number of smaller opposition parties, but according to Djaballah, none of them has been notified that it is disqualified. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador stressed to the number-two official in the MFA on March 5 that we wanted to see an open and fair electoral process leading up to the May vote. He underscored that the U.S. hoped the Algerian election would be inclusive -- even of Islamists -- so as to isolate extremists. The MFA SecGen did not challenge the thrust of the Ambassador's remarks, but responded by suggesting that Islah was a party riven be internal divisions. If Djaballah couldn't repair the divisions, the SecGen said, he could always run independent candidates. We will be watching that process as it unfolds, and looking for opportunities to press other GOA officials on the need for inclusiveness. We recommend the Department echo that message to the Algerian ambassador in Washington without being drawn into an argument about the legalities of Djaballah's case. FORD