COMING UP SHORT: ALGERIA'S GLOOMY GAS OUTLOOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001783 SIPDIS SIPDIS EEB/ESC/IEC/EPC FOR GLENN GRIFFIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 TAGS: ENRG EPET PGOV ECON EINV AG SUBJECT: COMING UP SHORT: ALGERIA'S GLOOMY GAS OUTLOOK REF: A. ALGIERS 710 ¶B. ALGIERS 1096 ¶C. ALGIERS 1694 ALGIERS 00001783 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (d) and (e). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Algeria will likely be unable to meet its natural gas production goals or fulfill its contract supply obligations in the coming years. Expansion of Algeria's gas production has been hampered by delays in high-profile projects like the Medgaz undersea pipeline and the Gassi Touil LNG project, and by an inadequate distribution infrastructure that hydrocarbon parastatal Sonatrach has no real plan to boost. Sonatrach's attention remains focused on gaining a greater share of downstream and value-added markets, and on diversifying its holdings. END SUMMARY. POOR INFRASTRUCTURE KEEPS ALGERIA FROM ITS GAS TARGETS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Algerians have said they intend to raise their gas export levels from 62 billion cubic meters of gas per year to 85 billion cubic meters by 2010. But BP Algeria President Gerry Peereboom told us on December 10 that Algeria will fall short of its gas production targets and its contract obligations in the coming years because it simply does not have sufficient infrastructure in place. Peereboom echoed comments made by Sonatrach's former Director General Abdelmajid Attar, who told the Ambassador on October 30 that Sonatrach has made contractual obligations based on grossly overestimated reserves and unrealistic production timetables. Attar said Algeria's best exploration days are behind it, and that future fields will likely be much smaller than current producers like Hassi R'Mel. Peereboom was not so glum, saying BP remains optimistic that Algeria's gas sector holds significant exploration promise, but he is not certain that the Algerians will be able to tap it effectively. He noted that the Medgaz project (a second undersea pipeline to Spain) is behind schedule, as is the large Gassi Touil LNG project. These delays alone will significantly reduce Algeria's expected output for 2010-12. ¶3. (C) Peereboom noted that BP has tried to invest in Algerian pipeline projects, not because it wants to own pipelines but because it wants to guarantee delivery of gas that the company will produce. BP was actually kicked out of the Medgaz project after an initial investment so that Sonatrach could garner a greater share of the revenue stream. The 2005 hydrocarbons law allows private companies to own pipelines (Sonatrach gets a 51 percent stake),and Peereboom suspects that Algeria will use that vehicle ultimately to build up its gas transport capacity. For example, BP is exploring what it considers to be a promising gas field at Ain Salah in the far south of Algeria. There is no existing transport system between the field and the Hassi R'Mel pipeline network, so Peereboom expects that once his company informs Sonatrach that it has reached exploitable gas (which may be before the end of 2007),Sonatrach will ask BP to build a pipeline from Ain Salah to Hassi R'Mel. Peereboom speculated that Sonatrach will have to re-negotiate many of its long-term supply contracts to avoid penalties when it fails to meet its contract obligations with its European customers. Otherwise, Algeria will have to buy gas on the international market to make up the difference. SONATRACH GOES IT ALONE AT GASSI TOUIL -------------- ¶4. (C) After several major development setbacks, including a deadly blowout, Sonatrach removed the Spanish firms Repsol and Gas Natural from the Gassi Touil project in September, citing major cost overruns and construction delays. BP's Peereboom said that production at Gassi Touil is facing major construction delays, and Attar said that the field is highly ALGIERS 00001783 002.2 OF 003 fragmented and faces severe engineering challenges. There was speculation at the time of the removal of the Spanish firms that Gaz de France might join with Sonatrach at Gassi Touil, but all indications are that Sonatrach will run this project alone. Peereboom said there is no reason to think Sonatrach cannot handle the project if it hires the right subcontractors. ¶5. (C) Spanish Commercial Counselor Maria Delores Loureda tried to minimize the Gassi Touil blow to Spanish interests by telling us on December 9 that the removed companies will not use the pending arbitration action as a means to be reinstated in the project. Rather, they will simply attempt to recover lost costs. Peereboom said that Sonatrach will likely go after Repsol and Gas Natural on a breach of contract claim similar to one it has undertaken against BP on a small oil field BP inherited from its merger with Arco. He said Sonatrach will likely claim that the Spanish companies had an obligation to finish the project on time and with the exact output of gas estimated at the outset of the project, and that they are liable for any shortfalls in Sonatrach's supply contracts associated with the LNG project. (Note: Ironically, Energy Minister Khelil complained to us in May 2007 of similar tactics used by the Spanish to squeeze out Algerian interests in Medgaz (ref A). End note.) MEDGAZ: ALGERIA WINS COMMERCIALIZATION ACCESS -------------- ¶6. (C) Loureda told us that the primary issue at the heart of the very public Medgaz fight between Algeria and Spain (refs A and B) has been resolved. Sonatrach, which has a 36 percent share in the Medgaz natural gas pipeline project, won the right to commercialize up to three billion cubic meters of gas per year directly to the Spanish market when the project comes on-line, which the consortium still projects for 2009. Loureda opined that Sonatrach will likely form a Spanish trading or marketing company to sell its share of the gas. She said this will represent the first incursion into the gas marketing monopoly in Spain. Loureda said that Sonatrach has negotiated the same three billion square meters per year commercialization volume in the Italian market, where it holds the same 36 percent pipeline stake. There are also reports that it has also done well in recent negotiations with Portugal. ¶7. (C) Loureda lamented Sonatrach's serious hardball with the Spanish this year, in which it played interests in Medgaz and Gassi Touil off of each other. She said the Spanish were led to believe that if they gave in on Medgaz, they would be safe from action on Gassi Touil. Instead, according to Loureda, once the Medgaz deal had been reached, the Algerians unceremoniously removed the Spanish from Gassi Touil. "They never would have done that if Medgaz hadn't been finalized," she said. COMMENT: CHASING THE VALUE-ADDED -------------- ¶8. (C) Even as Sonatrach announced on December 10 the discovery of two new gas fields in the far south of the country, the company seems more concerned with diversifying its holdings, investing internationally, and making itself into a downstream marketer (ref B) than in ensuring continuous gas supply from Algeria's fields. BP's Peereboom did not believe that Sonatrach was making the conscious choice to focus on downstream and international ventures at the expense of developing gas fields and building more pipelines to connect those fields, or that Sonatrach doesn't have the talent or ability to do both simultaneously. But it is clear that the company is pursuing value-added projects with particular gusto. The Algerians are using today's high oil profits to diversify Sonatrach quickly, rather than using the profits to expand production and the capacity to transport raw product. They seem to assume that their ALGIERS 00001783 003.2 OF 003 partners will ensure an adequate gas supply. Ultimately, the Algerians may simply not care if the supply is inadequate to meet international demand, as long has they have placed Sonatrach in a position to be a global player across upstream and downstream endeavors, maximizing its revenues through value-added product chains rather than through capacity pumping of raw product. Sonatrach's ex-chief Attar echoed what Energy Minister Khelil told us earlier in the year: it may be better for Algeria to leave more of its gas in the ground for future generations than to exploit it all now (ref C). That may make sense for the Algerians if their Sonatrach ventures pay out, but it is not a very comforting sentiment for their European customers. FORD