MANAGING A TOUGH MIL TO MIL RELATIONSHIP WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000977 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS ET SO SUBJECT: MANAGING A TOUGH MIL TO MIL RELATIONSHIP WITH ETHIOPIA Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- Summary: -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) In a difficult meeting, Ethiopian Chief of Staff General Samora outlined for visiting Combined Joint Task Force ) Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Commander Admiral James Hart on March 28 of Ethiopia's new military priorities: -- General Samora said air mobility was critical as a result of the conflict in Somalia. Repair of two C-130 and purchase of additional cargo planes are on the top of the list. The approaching rainy season makes this urgent. -- General Samora asked for U.S. assistance in assuring professional standards for the newly established command and staff college in Addis. He also talked about sending Ethiopian officers to U.S. war colleges. -- General Samora asked the U.S. to close the CJTF-HOA operating bases in Bilate and Hurso. He offered that the U.S. might re-establish itself in nearby Dira Dawa or Jijiga, but not in defended camps. (While Samora claimed that U.S. training was of limited utility and no longer needed, troops and sub commanders have all praised the U.S. training.) ¶2. (S/NF) It is not clear why Samora is so adamant that the long standing camps at Hurso and Bilate must be closed. It may be that recent U.S. and British press arguing that the U.S. was using camps in Ethiopia to launch attacks into Somalia may have forced the Ethiopians to close the camps, just as the AC-130 operations closed as a result of articles in the U.S. press. It is also possible that Samora is annoyed at what he sees as lack of respect and support for Ethiopia. It is very clear that we will need to engage the often prickly General Samora in an in-depth discussion. End Summary. -------------- New Priorities -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) General Samora outlined for Admiral Hart, his POLAD and Ambassador (notetaker) Ethiopia's new changing priorities. He said that air mobility was critical. As a result of the ENDF's experience in Somalia, it was clear that cargo planes and helicopters were key to Ethiopia's lift capability of troops to the battlefield and pursuit of targets. Samora cited the importance of repairing the two C-130 aircraft provided by the U.S. in 1997. One was somewhat functional while the second was being cannibalized for spare parts. Admiral Hart told a skeptical Samora that the U.S. is trying to repair the 2 C-130 aircraft. General Samora said he was waiting for the maintenance project for over seven years and replied that he is willing to buy some spare parts to try to repair the C-130 aircraft. ¶4. (S/NF) General Samora said Ethiopia established a command and staff college but wanted the U.S. to help with books and materials as well as a curriculum to train senior officers. He also asked for increased number of war college slots for Ethiopian officers. ¶5. (S/NF) He added that the British were helping with accounting and administrative training for his financial officers. The U.S. could help with providing training on the code of operations for the military. General Samora noted that they were still developing a list and would present it to the U.S. -------------- Past Problems Affect Current Operations -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) General Samora raised briefly past bilateral problems. He said the U.S. cancellation of two C-130 in 1998 due to Ethiopia's border war with Eritrea and suspension of some two dozen HUMVEES in 2005 due to use of the HUMVEES to transport soldiers to quell riots after the 2005 elections ADDIS ABAB 00000977 002 OF 002 severely strained bilateral relations. He did not see why the punishment still exists. He said he still needs C-130s and as for the HUMVEES, he is seeking alternate equipment. ¶7. (S/NF) Samora emphasized to the Admiral that the U.S. must leave Bilate and Hurso, not immediately, but eventually. Part of the problem may be the force protection measures; towers and fences. Just as Ethiopians cannot occupy a camp within a U.S. base, the U.S. should not expect to have a camp within an Ethiopian base. He said that the U.S. could relocate to Dira Dawa or Jijiga, but cannot establish defended installations. Samora went on to say that he no longer wants commando training because the Ethiopians can conduct the training themselves. He was quite dismissive of the training, saying that he only sent troops for their &entertainment8 and as a way of obtaining further US support. It should be noted that these statements contradict some of his previous comments as well as the opinions expressed by many Ethiopian commanders. ¶8. (S/NF) At the end of the conversation, the General had a further, private meeting with the Admiral. During this meeting Samora reinforced his determination to close the camps, even if it meant canceling civil affairs projects. Samora dismissed the projects, noting that &no one asked you to do them.8 Samora did agree to visit Camp Lemonier, but only after conditions in Somalia improve. Samora displayed signs of fatigue and discomfort from his multiple war wounds. -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) It is not clear what has lead Samora to this hostile position. Clearly, he is offended by past US efforts to criticize Ethiopia for the war with Eritrea and the violence against demonstrators following the elections. He clearly believes that the US has dealt with Ethiopia in bad faith. The focus on Bilate and Hurso may be due to the recent U.S. and British press reports of U.S. forces launching attacks into Somalia from U.S. camps inside Ethiopia. U.S. press reports led to the closure of the AC-130 operations at the end of January. It is clear that the U.S. Embassy must make greater efforts to develop and work with General Samora directly. After the recent firings of top Ethiopian generals and potential rivals, General Samora may be primus interparis among the generals, but he still has a long way to go before he earns the adoration of his staff. For the moment, General Samora wants to have complete control of the military and has demanded that all requests for training and offers of programs by the U.S. be given to him directly and not to the liaison office. Further, it is clear the U.S. Mission must continue contacts with Samora's generals and mid ranking officers, but must now focus on General Samora for all programs, events and activities. This will increase delays in response to U.S. and other types of training and could impact negatively on bilateral relations. The Embassy will work closely with Samora and determine how best to handle essential bilateral programs, without damaging or detracting from the more important strategic bilateral relationship. End Comment. ¶10. (U) This message has been cleared by CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral James Hart. YAMAMOTO