UNMEE SRSG ENNIFAR DISCUSSES ETHIOPIA-ERITREA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000908

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS KPKO MOPS MARR ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG ENNIFAR DISCUSSES ETHIOPIA-ERITREA

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 895


B. ASMARA 317

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Azouz Ennifar told Ambassador
that he sought to continue serving as head of the UN Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE),despite Eritrea's continued
refusal to recognize his official status. Ennifar said
Eritrea's protests arose from difficulties in its
relationship with the UN, not with him personally, and noted
that the UN had failed to acknowledge to Eritrea that
Ethiopia had informally rejected the earlier candidacy of UN
Assistant Secretary-General Kalomoh to head UNMEE. UN SYG
Ban was seeking to contact Isaias, Ennifar said, to determine
what the GSE wanted and its expectations of the UN. As both
parties had moderated their public statements, perhaps
seeking a joint statement underscoring Eritrea's rejection of
war, and Ethiopia's acceptance of the Ethiopia-Eritrea
Boundary Commission (EEBC) decision, was a tangible
objective. GSE distrust of Japan's PermRep hampered Japan's
ability to serve as a facilitator. Reviewing the current
military situation along the border, Ennifar said at least
6,000 additional Eritrean troops and militia had settled in
the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and in areas the EEBC had
awarded to Ethiopia, but that such movements were
"defensive". Ethiopia continued to maintain 12 tanks at
Bure, near Eritrea's port of Assab; and Eritrea continued to
maintain 12 tanks at Omhajer, near Humera. March 8 attacks
by Ethiopian rebels in Tigray had led to 40-60 casualties
among the Ethiopian military near Humera, but were not
considered a cross-border incident. Ennifar expressed
concern that if the GSE were to expel all of UNMEE's
humanitarian demining coordinators, then he would consider
recommending UNMEE's withdrawal. END SUMMARY.

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APPOINTMENT OF UNMEE SRSG NOMINEE SPARKED DISAGREEMENT
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2. (C) In a March 23 meeting with Ambassador and acting
pol-econ counselor (note-taker),Acting Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Amb. Azouz Ennifar, said he planned to
continue serving as UNMEE SRSG "as long as I am asked to."
Despite Eritrea's refusal to recognize his official status
since late 2006, Ennifar expressed doubt that a suitable
replacement could be identified who would be acceptable to
both Ethiopia and Eritrea. He noted that President Isaias
had refused to meet with the former UNMEE SRSG, Amb. Legwaila
Joseph Legwaila, for three years, permitting only a farewell
call immediately prior to Legwaila's departure from office.


3. (C) Ennifar explained that the GSE's refusal to recognize
his appointment stemmed from UN DPKO's failure to
acknowledge, when confronted by Eritrea, that Ethiopia had
rejected the candidacy of UN Assistant Secretary-General
(ASG) for Political Affairs Tuliameni Kalomoh (formerly
Namibia's deputy foreign minister) to replace Legwaila as
UNMEE SRSG. The UN had not sought formal agrement for
Kalomoh, but had approached both parties informally in 2006.
Eritrea had accepted Kalomoh, while Ethiopia had not (for
reasons unknown). Given lack of agreement on Kalomoh, the UN
had next proposed that then-Deputy SRSG Ennifar become SRSG.
The GSE had responded that while it liked Ennifar and
recognized that he hailed from a country that had been
helpful to Eritrea (Tunisia),it could not make a decision
about his appointment until being informed of the status of
Kalomoh's candidacy. UN DPKO had not formally informed
Eritrea, until later, that Kalomoh's candidacy had been
withdrawn, Ennifar said.


4. (C) To address this impasse, the UN had appointed Ennifar
as "acting" SRSG in August 2006; the appointment was meant to
be an administrative move that would not be formally
announced, Ennifar said. However, UNMEE Force Commander
Masadeh had mistakenly informed both parties of Ennifar's
appointment formally in writing. Eritrea's UN PermRep had
then protested the move to ASG for Peacekeeping Operations
Hedi Annabi, calling Ennifar's appointment "unacceptable,"
and complaining that the UN was seeking to impose decisions
on Eritrea. Eritrea subsequently refused to recognize

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Ennifar's official status.

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UN SYG BAN SEEKS TO ENGAGE ISAIAS
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5. (C) Ennifar said Eritrea's protests arose from
difficulties in its relationship with the UN, not with him
personally. The GSE had protested alleged bias in the
January 2007 UN SYG report. UN SYG Ban was seeking to
contact Isaias, Ennifar said, to determine what the GSE
wanted and its expectations of the UN. Ennifar said that
while Ethiopia had consistently stated it would support any
dialogue, Eritrea remained opposed. Ethiopia had endorsed
the February 2006 statement by Witnesses to the Algiers
Accord, as it supported dialogue, but not the subsequent UN
PRST. On the other hand, both parties had moderated their
public statements: Eritrea no longer called for war, and
Ethiopia no longer said it rejected the decision of the
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC). Perhaps a joint
statement by both parties, underscoring these positions, was
a tangible objective, Ennifar said.

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TROOP BUILD-UP ASSESSED AS "DEFENSIVE"
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6. (C) Reviewing the current military situation along the
border, Ennifar reiterated that Eritrean troops and militia
continued to settle in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and
in areas the EEBC had awarded to Ethiopia, but that such
movements were assessed to be "defensive" (ref A). Some
3,000 additional Eritrean forces had recently entered Sector
West; an equal number had entered Sector Central. While
Eritrean forces were capable of striking a single Ethiopian
town, they could not sustain an attack, he said. Eritrea had
expected Ethiopia to weaken its deployment along its northern
border, due to Ethiopian engagement in Somalia; however,
UNMEE had seen no evidence that this had occurred. Ennifar
noted that Ethiopia had withdrawn two brigades from the
border immediately after the December 2005 passage of UNSCR
1640; Ethiopian forces had made "small movements back," but
these did not constitute a violation of any accords, Ennifar
underscored. Ethiopia continued to maintain 12 tanks at
Bure, near Eritrea's port of Assab; since October, Eritrea
continued to maintain 12 tanks at Omhajer, near Humera, and
to control a cross-border bridge there that had formerly been
controlled by UNMEE. Ennifar lamented that lack of
commercial flights and of refueling capability prevented
UNMEE patrols from traveling to Bure.

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ETHIOPIAN REBELS ATTACK ETHIOPIAN MILITARY
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7. (C) Ennifar reported that the Ethiopian military commander
of Sector West had reported 40-60 casualties (including at
least one civilian) as a result of a March 8 attack by two
groups of Ethiopian rebels near Humera. Ennifar noted that
Humera had also been the location of 12-15 bombings earlier
this year. He said the March 8 incident would not/not
necessarily be included in the next report of the UN SYG, as
it did not appear to be a cross-border incident involving
Eritrea.


8. (C) Ennifar subsequently provided poloff an internal UNMEE
report with additional details: According to Ethiopian
military sources, approximately 200 rebels from the Tigray
People's Democratic Movement, and the Southern Ethiopian
People's Front For Justice and Equality, had attacked Adi
Goshu village, in Tigray, intending to destroy the
agricultural, hospital, and administration office. Ethiopian
forces opened fire, killing 18 rebels and capturing 26.
During the firefight, two Ethiopian troops were injured, as
were a pregnant woman; one civilian woman was killed. (NOTE:
There are contradictory accounts of casualties; Ennifar
noted that the Paris-based "Sudan Tribune" reported that the
two rebel groups claimed to have killed 193 Ethiopian
soldiers in their attack and to have wounded another 100,
while destroying the Ethiopian military's arms depot at Adi
Geshu. The fact that Ethiopia formally notified UNMEE of the
incident suggests that the Ethiopian military likely did

ADDIS ABAB 00000908 003 OF 003


suffer casualties in this engagement. END NOTE.)

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INABILITY TO TRANSFER INEFFECTIVE WORKING-LEVEL STAFF
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9. (S) Ennifar cited the difficulty of maintaining two
headquarters for UNMEE, in Addis Ababa and Asmara, and his
inability to visit UNMEE personnel in Eritrea. Addressing
UNMEE's relations with Eritrea, Ennifar confided that he
considered Asmara-based Deputy SRSG Lebohang Moleko (Lesotho)
"weak" for failing to rebut the GSE's criticism of the UN.
For example, Moleko had sought the GSE's approval for UNMEE
Addis Ababa Head of Office Joseph Stephanides to visit
Asmara, rather than simply inform the GSE. Eritrea had
promptly denied the request, Ennifar said, due to
Stephanides' Cypriot nationality. Citing the
ineffectiveness of some UNMEE personnel who remained in their
positions for as long as five years, Ennifar expressed a
desire to replace them, but said he had difficulty effecting
their transfer elsewhere.

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MACC CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR DEMINING
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10. (C) Commenting on the GSE's recent expulsion of UNMEE
Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) manager David Bax
(ref B),Ennifar noted that, ironically, just prior to his
expulsion, Bax had received a request from Eritrean
presidential advisor Yemane Gebremeskel to conduct demining
in an area of Eritrea that had not been in MACC's area of
operations. UNMEE had instructed Bax to assent to the GSE's
request, believing it could help improve relations with the
GSE. Ennifar said Bax's expulsion arose principally from his
relationship with the U.S. Embassy, particularly his
misjudgment in deciding to take a dismantled Embassy vehicle
to a MACC site within the TSZ rather than to other, less
sensitive MACC sites throughout Eritrea.


11. (S) UNMEE's recent downsizing (from 2,300 to 1,700) had
led to the departure of Bangladeshi and Kenyan troops who had
been active in humanitarian demining; UNMEE therefore now
relied heavily on MACC for demining, Ennifar said. Were the
GSE to expel MACC in its entirety, Ennifar said he would have
to consider recommending UNMEE's withdrawal.


12. (C) Discussing the role that countries other than the
U.S. could play in addressing Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions, in
accordance with UNSCR 1741, Ennifar said the GSE was critical
of Japan, as it blamed UNSCR 1640 (and its threat to sanction
both parties) on Japanese UN PermRep Kenzo Oshima (who had
visited the region in November 2005, in response to Eritrea's
curtailing UNMEE flight operations).


13. (C) COMMENT: UNMEE SRSG Ennifar offered little insight
into possible future actions that the UN SYG would recommend
in his forthcoming April 2007 report to the UNSC. UNMEE's
current mandate expires in July, and the EEBC is to cease
operations in November 2007, the deadline for both parties to
accept that the EEBC's decision to demarcate the border by
coordinates. UN SYG Ban's desire to engage Isaias should be
encouraged, as other efforts to address Ethiopia-Eritrea
tensions appear to remain at a standstill, while Eritrea
continues to expand its military occupation of the TSZ. END
COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO