ETHIOPIAN-U.S. MIL TO MIL RELATIONS: SHIFTING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000751 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS ET SO SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN-U.S. MIL TO MIL RELATIONS: SHIFTING SANDS, CHALLENGES AHEAD Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Ethiopian Chief of Staff Lt. General Samora made it clear to the Ambassador and DATT March 8 that Ethiopia wants U.S. support in specific areas, namely logistical support (repair of two C-130 aircraft, a request pending for over seven years, and delivery of two additional C-130s promised eleven years ago),support for upgrading their command and staff college, training at U.S. war colleges, and equipment procurement. While appreciative of CJTF infantry training programs at Bilate and Hurso, Samora said these programs do not meet Ethiopia,s needs, and that an advanced special forces training program would be more suitable. Humanitarian projects by CJTF can be discussed separately, he added. Samora made it clear that he personally will decide which programs his troops will attend, which equipment will be procured and future direction of training for his force. It was clear that Samora wants to redefine our mil to mil relations. ¶2. (S/NF) Samora affirmed the Prime Minister,s acceptance of re-establishing ties between his troops and U.S. teams in support of Somalia operations. This would be discussed later in greater detail, he said. Samora stated that the ENDF would be out of Somalia completely within 6 weeks. It has been speculated that cost is the major factor driving their decision to leave Somalia as soon as Ugandan troops have been deployed in Mogadishu. End Summary -------------- A Redefined Relationship -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) After ruling party meetings concluded this week, Ethiopian Chief of Staff General Samora finally met with Ambassador (notetaker),DATT and a DOD representative on March 8. Samora underscored the importance of the U.S. to Ethiopia,s security and praised the bilateral relationship. He stated that he would determine personally which training would be suitable for his troops, which equipment to procure and which international programs ENDF officers would participate in. He said basic infantry and marksmanship training programs provided by CJTF-HOA at Hurso and Bilate did not meet his needs. He said he had made this clear to AFCENT commander LTG Whitcomb and former CJTF commander Admiral Hunt. He suggested that a more advanced special forces training program would be more useful. He said that the U.S. soldiers at Hurso and Bilate can relocate to another camp nearby. ¶4. (S/NF) Samora clarified that what he really wants from the U.S. is the repair of the two C-130s that were provided to Ethiopia by the U.S. eleven years ago. (NOTE: The Defense Department agreed to help meet maintenance requests about seven years ago. It was only recently that a DOD team was able to assess the cost of repair and maintenance. The cost of USD 13 million cannot be currently met. Efforts will be made, however, to repair just one of the C-130s, but payment would come from the State Department,s FMF program. DOD has no funding to meet the ENDF request. END NOTE.) ¶5. (S/NF) General Samora also requested delivery of two additional C-130s promised by the U.S. eleven years ago. Only two of the four were ever delivered, he said. He understood that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war resulted in forgoing delivery of the final two C-130 aircraft. But Samora said that four C-130s were essential for Ethiopia to carry out its peacekeeping operations as well as its other requirements. He added that Ethiopia would be willing to look into procurement of two C-130 aircraft. ¶6. (S/NF) Samora wanted U.S. assistance in upgrading and professionalizing Ethiopia,s command and staff college by bring in U.S. military experts to help train Ethiopia,s future officers. Further, he liked and wanted to expand IMET funding for war college training. ¶7. (S/NF) An upset Samora complained that invitations for ADDIS ABAB 00000751 002 OF 002 Ethiopian participation in U.S. training programs often dictated whom he could invite. He made it clear that he will determine if Ethiopia will participate and who will attend. -------------- A Mature Relationship -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) General Samora said that he has a good wo2f-YwCQQ5ded to LTG Whitcomb. ¶9. (S/NF) For the General, it was clear that he appreciated CJTF operations. On CJTF-HOA humanitarian programs, he noted that this could be discussed separately. -------------- Somalia: Departure Soon -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) In a surprise, the General informed us that all Ethiopian troops would depart Somalia within six weeks as soon as Ugandan troops are deployed. Troops that recently were deployed to Somalia would soon be withdrawn. He did not wish to explain the reasons for this action, but noted that with Uganda in Somalia, the ENDF,s mission was complete. ¶11. (S/NF) He confirmed, however, Prime Minister Meles, agreement to re-establish relations between the ENDF and U.S. special teams in support of Somalia operations. They could work together, but noted that it could be shortlived since the ENDF would pull out of Somalia. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) The ruling EPRDF's leadership met for several days to discuss policy issues just prior to our meeting with Samora, who was a part of these meetings. Somalia was certainly a focal point. Samora has complained bitterly in the past at the huge cost of Somalia operations and expressed his desire to get troops out. If we want the ENDF to continue operations in Somalia, particularly with force protection for Amisom, support for the TFG, and security at the airport and port areas, then we will need to engage the ENDF and also address the issue of expenses. We find Samora's comments odd since the Prime Minister has indicated that he wants ENDF troops embedded with the TFG to ensure security in Mogadishu. Further, the Prime Minister views some limited but extended ENDF presence in Somalia as essential to advancing stability in Somalia, keeping extremists out and avoiding a significant return of Ethiopian engagement, an expensive proposition. ¶13. (S/NF) Samora's redefining mil to mil priorities has taken us by surprise. We will discuss how this will affect CJTF-HOA and its training schedule. We will look at operations at Bilate and Hurso. It is clear that in addition to the Ambassador, senior U.S. military officials will also need to engage Samora. The Ambassador plans to try to meet regularly with General Samora and is working with other Ethiopian officials close to Samora on improving U.S.-ENDF dialogue. Finally, Ambassador will discuss Samora's "new direction" with the Prime Minister in the coming weeks. End comment. YAMAMOTO