ETHIOPIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS MAKE IT A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000446 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS SWAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KISL KPKO ET SO SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS MAKE IT A MAJOR FACTOR IN RESOLVING SOMALIA'S FUTURE Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Ethiopia,s December 2006 military incursion into Somalia clearly shows that the GOE was willing to undertake serious risks to advance its national security interests in Somalia. Ethiopia is committed to playing a significant military and diplomatic role in advancing its two-pronged objectives of eliminating extremists, including HVT/HVI, and establishing a government capable of securing the support of the other clans and ensuring that extremists will have no role in Somalia society and government affairs. Further, Ethiopia wants to eliminate safe havens in Somalia for Ethiopia,s domestic rebel groups, such as the ONLF and OLF. With Muslims soon to comprise over 50% of the population, Ethiopia,s senior leadership views extremism from Somalia as a threat to the balanced and harmonious relationship between the Christian and Muslim communities. ¶2. (S/NF) In defense of its interests, Ethiopia will continue to maintain troops in Somalia, albeit low profile and relatively low numbers, for the foreseeable future to counter extremist elements. Ethiopia will continue to play a significant role mediating among the various clan elders and pushing the TFG towards reconciliation beyond its Darood clan, especially with the Hawiye/Haber Gedir/Ayr clans and subclans, which the Ethiopians see as key to reaching stability in Somalia and particularly in Mogadishu. Finally, the Ethiopians will try to maintain control of interrogations of foreign fighters and extremists captured in Somalia or deported from Kenya. ¶3. (S/NF) U.S. and Ethiopian interests overlap with our shared commitment to pursue HVT/HVI, eliminate extremist elements, and interrogate foreign fighters. The Ethiopian military needs U.S. intelligence and technology to pursue extremists and the Ethiopian leadership needs U.S. political sway to secure an AU military force for Somalia and to coordinate the international community to finance reconstruction in Somalia and resolve property disputes among the clans, a major point of contention in the reconciliation process. Ethiopia will remain a dominate force in what happens in Somalia. The AU, UN and international community must understand and deal with Ethiopia,s position in Somalia. We must also be cautious that our shared interests do not divert our attention from our priority goals of advancing political reform and conflict resolution among various groups within Ethiopia. End Summary. -------------- Evolving Posture in Somalia -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) We have seen in our private discussions with Prime Minister Meles and other members of his ruling TPLF hierarchy that their thinking on how to achieve stability in Somalia evolved significantly over the past several months. While analysts in Washington viewed Meles as seeking a divided Somalia, weak and ineffectual, it was clear through our several private conversations with the Prime Minister and TPLF leadership that they felt it was in Ethiopia,s interest to advance two goals. First, it was essential to have a Somalia free of extremists and, second, to establish a leadership capable of influencing the other clans, through strength or persuasion, to ensure that extremists would have no place in Somali society or government affairs. International support, particularly U.S. backing, would be critical. In addition, Ethiopia would need to be fully committed militarily and diplomatically in Somalia for the long-term. -------------- Be Mindful of Ethiopians in Somalia -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Ethiopia committed three divisions (15,000) of troops to Somalia operations. Their unexpected success in disbanding the CIC and pursuit of extremists and HVT/HVI, led the ENDF to adjust and expand their operations. Skeptical at first, the GOE has embraced IGASOM/AMISOM as essential in securing international support for the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia. Foreign Minister Seyoum and Prime Minister Meles made it a diplomatic priority to engage the EU ADDIS ABAB 00000446 002 OF 002 and Arab League as well as AU members on the merits of a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. Meles was so focused on diplomatic efforts that he cautioned the U.S. not to under-take any prominent, headline-making military operations in Somalia, such as AC 130 gunship strikes. ¶6. (S/NF) Further, Meles believed that AMISOM would enable Ethiopia to reduce its military presence and allow it to take a lower, though no less significant, profile in its operations in Somalia. With the anticipated arrival of Ugandan and other AU troops, Ethiopia has removed over one division from Somalia and will soon have two full divisions back in Ethiopia. But its plans call for keeping a division of troops in Somalia to pursue extremists, protect the TFG and advance stabilization through reconciliation of the clans. It will also have troops embedded in the TFG forces, particularly as clans join the TFG force to form a national military force. The Ethiopians would provide training and assistance. Prime Minister Meles has consistently told us that the process of stabilizing Somalia will take time and that Ethiopia will be involved throughout the process. ¶7. (S/NF) Kenya,s announcement that it has handed over to the TFG some two dozen foreign fighters and persons captured crossing the Somalia border means that Ethiopians will be very much involved in the interrogation and ultimate disposition of these persons. Further, Ethiopian intelligence and military will take control of materials obtained in Somalia and be a source of information on foreign and extremist activities in Somalia. Our shared interests with the GOE and Ethiopia,s need for U.S. intelligence and technical skills will advance our cooperation and enable us to share with the Ethiopians the information obtained in Somalia. We must be mindful of Ethiopia,s strategic interests in Somalia and that Ethiopia will remain a dominant force, playing a significant role in Somalia,s security, political dialogue, and national reconciliation efforts. -------------- Don,t Lose Sight of Objectives -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) The U.S. must also remain mindful of core objectives in continuing to move forward on political reforms in Ethiopia. Significant progress has been made in establishing more open and transparent procedures in the Parliament, advancing new reforms in the electoral board and media law, and in addressing the detention of opposition leaders. In addition, we must get Ethiopia focused on reconciliation with the Oromo and Somali populations. They cannot use the war on terrorism or our shared interests in Somalia to avoid reaching out to these groups. The OLF and ONLF pose serious threats to the GOE, but reconciliation will help undercut support for these militant rebel groups and encourage a dialogue between the GOE and Oromo/Somali populations. The successes in Somalia have surprisingly given Prime Minister Meles more political space within his ruling TPLF and greater freedom to act. Meles has in turn been supportive of our private requests to open up political dialogue and to resolve the detainee issue. We need to encourage these actions. YAMAMOTO