SOMALIA: PM MELES AFFIRMS NEED FOR ETHIOPIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000040 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS KPKO ET SO XA SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PM MELES AFFIRMS NEED FOR ETHIOPIAN TROOPS TO WITHDRAW Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JANET WILGUS. REASONS: 1.4 (A), (B),(D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. In a 90-minute meeting on January 4 with A/S Frazer, Prime Minister Meles said that Ethiopia sought to withdraw its forces from Somalia as soon as possible, as their prolonged presence would only serve to make them a target of possible terrorist attacks from remaining CIC fighters. Meles called for the rapid deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force, possibly comprised of troops from Rwanda, Uganda, and Yemen. Meles appealed for international humanitarian assistance to foster security sector reform in Somalia, and agreed that the TFG needed to foster political dialogue among all Somali clans immediately, in order to combat the influence of warlords and establish broadbased grassroots support. Meles hailed bilateral military cooperation with the United States, and called for continuing and improved joint intelligence operations to target terrorists. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met January 4 with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who was accompanied by Personal Assistant to the PM Gebretensai Gebremichael. Charge, Amb. Michael Ranneberger, Amb. John Yates, CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, CJTF-HOA POLAD Fred Cook, AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh, AF/E Somalia Desk Officer Nole Garey, and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker) accompanied A/S Frazer. A/S Frazer noted that she would co-chair the January 5 meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia, discuss IGASOM deployment with President Museveni, and visit Djibouti and Yemen Frazer said she hoped to travel to Mogadishu with Kenyan FM Tuju and UN SRSG Francois Fall, to consult with PM Ghedi, Somali civil society, and clan leaders. The United States would provide significant assistance to underscore that its interest in Somalia was not limited to searching for high-value targets but also included supporting the Somali people, she added. ¶3. (C) PM Meles welcomed support from the United States and called for continued cooperation to capitalize on the situation on the ground. He called for "a new division of labor" to stabilize Somalia, and identified three priorities for the international community: 
-- Support the quick introduction of peacekeepers, under a Burundi model (i.e., an initial African operation leading to a UN PKO),as the AU lacks resources; -- Provide a "quick injection" of humanitarian assistance (e.g., financial assistance to provide compensation for those surrendering weapons, as they currently received only an assurance of possible hiring preference for the police or army); -- Insist that the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) foster an internal political process with Somali stakeholders, to establish an inclusive government. As the majority of ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia were Darod, and the principal clash in Somalia was between Darod and Hawiye, Ethiopia would support such a process, but would have to minimize its involvement, Meles explained. -------------- -------------- REMAINING CIC MAY ENGAGE IN TERRORISM, NOT GUERRILLA WARFARE -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Discussing the current security situation, Meles said terrorism, not guerrilla warfare, was a concern. The GOE anticipated "mopping up military operations quickly," as Ethiopian forces now had "military momentum." However, remaining Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) fighters could regroup and conduct terrorist attacks. Ethiopia therefore sought to withdraw its troops from Somalia as soon as possible, not only due to the economic burden of their continued deployment, but also because their prolonged presence only served to provide a "quasi-legitimate" target for CIC fighters. Citing signs of "sleeper cells" being organized in Mogadishu, Meles said the GOE lacked adequate intelligence on such cells, which could be targeted only through enhanced intelligence operations, not military operations. ¶5. (S) Meles called for changing the framework of ADDIS ABAB 00000040 002 OF 004 intelligence cooperation from "passive collection" to a more operational stance: while the USG and GOE shared intelligence, there was now a greater need to act on it, he said. The main focus for the upcoming week should be cooperation on intelligence operations in order to disrupt terrorists, Meles said. ¶6. (C) Mogadishu was now stable, he said, with Ethiopian forces at the airport. Following consultations with Mogadishu clan leaders, Ethiopian troops had been deployed to static locations and were not conducting patrols, he said. Ethiopia was now trying to pursue "a significant number" of "hard-core elements" remaining in southwestern Somalia near the border with Kenya, and hoped "to neutralize them" within days. Somali Ogadeni clan leaders from Ethiopia would hold talks with Ogadeni clan leaders representing areas around Kismayo, he added. Ethiopian Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) insurgents were suspected to be in central Somalia, but were not highly sought-after targets, Meles said. ¶7. (C) Asked about Ethiopia's cooperation with Kenya, Meles replied that while there was not a "serious lack of will" among Kenyan authorities, Kenyan activities were often "unwieldy." Meles noted that Kenya had erroneously accused ENDF helicopters of attacking a Kenyan border outpost, and that Kenya's susceptibility to "financial inducements" threatened to jeopardize Ethiopia's operations. Meles called for the USG to highlight to Kenyan authorities the need to capture extremists. -------------- -------------- NEUTRAL DETERRENT FORCE MUST BE DEPLOYED URGENTLY -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) Questioned about a timetable for withdrawal, Meles said that he hoped Ethiopian troops could withdraw within two weeks, following one week of "mopping up." While ENDF needed to withdraw visibly, before terrorists had the opportunity to regroup and target them, Meles noted that some ethnic Somali Ethiopians could change uniforms but remain embedded within Somali TFG units for command and control, and Ethiopian trainers could remain in Baidoa. Meles noted that significant ENDF forces would remain at the Ethiopia-Somalia border, from which re-entry into Somalia would be easy, if required, due to the end of the rainy season. ¶9. (C) Meles highlighted the need for urgent deployment of a neutral deterrent force "to back up clan leaders, not to replace them." Ethiopia would prefer Rwanda, Uganda, and Yemen as troop-contributors, he said. As such a neutral force required troops who had not been previously involved in the fighting, Ethiopia would not visibly play a role in supporting such a force, Meles said. "The real peacekeeping must be done by the Somalis," he observed, "and should be responsible for day-to-day policing." -------------- -------------- SOMALI-OWNED POLITICAL PROCESS NEEDED TO COUNTER WARLORDS -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Noting that ultimately, "war against terrorists will be won or lost on the political front," Meles underscored the need for the expedient launch of a "prolonged political process" among Somali clans. The key to eliminating warlords' influence was not their individual removal, but rather disbanding their militias, Meles said. Co-opting warlords by providing them with government or diplomatic posts was preferable to detaining them. A national political process, which could require months of talks, would also help eliminate warlords' control of specific geographic areas, he added. Meles hailed the stability of Puntland and Somaliland and their use of traditional Somali structures: relying on business and religious leaders, rather than on warlords. Observing that "warlordism is the biggest enemy of the Somalis," Meles recommended a phased process that would include dialogue at both the clan and national levels: -- Establishing provincial authorities, with clan backing, especially in Mogadishu and Benadir, to provide an alternative to warlords. ADDIS ABAB 00000040 003 OF 004 -- Reconfiguring parliament, possibly to include CIC moderates, to ensure clan representatives were not warlords. -- Having the TFG take control of all sources of national revenue, in order to avoid fiefdoms. ¶11. (C) Meles complained that the TFG was "moving too slow" on political engagement. Whereas TFG PM Ghedi, representing Abgaal interests, had been able to rally support earlier among clan leaders in north Mogadishu, the non-Abgaal in the south now had growing concerns. Amb. Ranneberger, noting that 48 TFG parliamentarians resided in Kenya, underscored the need for the TFG to engage in an inclusive dialogue that occurred in Somalia. Meles agreed with the need to address as many Somali clan leaders as soon as possible, and stated that consistent with the United States position, Ethiopia was not backing a specific clan or individual, but rather a political process supported by the Somali people. A/S Frazer noted the shared vision of an inclusive political process, but emphasized the USG concern that Somalia could revert to warlordism. It is important that the TFG follow positive statements with positive action, and A/S Frazer urged PM Meles to use his influence with the TFG to do the right things and be held accountable for their actions. ¶12. (C) Questioned about CIC leaders, Meles observed that with its defeat, the CIC had now lost its "aura of continued victory." Whereas the Ayr sub-clan had been the CIC's primary backer, CIC Executive Committee Chairman Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was Abgaal and now wielded little influence. Ayr leaders were now acting in the name of the Ayr, not in the name of the Islamic Courts. Meles added that while the Union of Islamic Courts no longer existed, individual Islamic courts could continue to operate in co-existence with the government, just as they did in Ethiopia. ¶13. (C) Asked about the future role of TFG Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who had opposed Ethiopian intervention but supported an international peacekeeping operation in Somalia, Meles said that Adan, as a Rahanweyn clan member, had held an important position but lacked personal influence. The key political issue in Somalia involved balancing Darod and Hawiye clan interests, Meles said. It was unimportant who replaced Adan as Speaker, although the position should be held by a Rahanweyn. Rahanweyn controlled the Baidoa region, and therefore needed to be included, Meles said. Meles noted that Baidoa was part of Ethiopia's "buffer zone," as it had traditionally been "friendly" to Ethiopian interests. -------------- BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH USG HAILED -------------- ¶14. (S) In response to a query by CJTF-HOA Commander RADM Hunt, Meles highlighted the "excellent" working relationship between Ethiopia and the United States, and said ENDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus had been given "very clear guidelines" to cooperate with the USG, including on identification of foreign fighters in Somalia. ¶15. (C) Following A/S Frazer's introduction of Amb. Yates, Meles noted that Ethiopia had had an "excellent working relationship" in the past with then-Special Envoy to Somalia Amb. Robert Oakley. Meles concluded by noting that he was "extremely delighted" with USG support, and cited cooperation with CJTF-HOA as an example. RADM Hunt acknowledged the important strategic relationship between the United States and Ethiopia. ¶16. (C) In a subsequent private meeting with A/S Frazer, PM Meles appealed for 3,000-4,000 tons of Title I food assistance, in order to help address the needs of urban poor in Ethiopia. (NOTE: USAID is awaiting a reply to its formal request made in late 2006 for approximately USD 5 million in such aid. END NOTE.) ¶17. (C) COMMENT: Meles' remarks underscore that following the military defeat of the CIC, Ethiopia now seeks to diminish the public role it is playing in Somalia, and acknowledges the key role of political engagement of Somali stakeholders ADDIS ABAB 00000040 004 OF 004 by the TFG. Concurrent with the TFG launching a broad-based political dialogue to consolidate grassroots support, urgent deployment of a stabilization force to Somalia is desperately needed, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. END COMMENT. ¶18. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Frazer. YAMAMOTO