USAID FIELD ASSESSMENT IN THE OGADEN

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 003334 SIPDIS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, DAS AF JSWAN, AF/E, AF/PDPA, OES, A/S PRM SAUERBREY, AND PRM/AFR AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS, KNELSON, CTHOMPSON DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, CCHAN, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL DCHA/FFP JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, RTILSWORTH, AND LPANASUK NAIROBI FOR OFDA/ECARO JMYER, GPLATT, RFFPO NCOX, USAID/EA ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA, HSPANOS BRUSSELS FOR USEU PBROWN GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA USUN FOR TMALY NSC FOR PMARCHAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PHUM SENV EAGR PGOV ET SUBJECT: USAID FIELD ASSESSMENT IN THE OGADEN REF: A) ADDIS ABABA 3046; B) ADDIS ABABA 2566; C) ADDIS ABABA 3200; D) ADDIS ABABA 3254 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A small USAID team traveled to conflict-affected areas of the Ogaden November 4-8, 2007 to try to obtain some ground truth on humanitarian, conflict and commercial trade conditions. Following the field assessment, USAID confirms the situation to be very serious and a continued cause for alarm on the humanitarian and human rights front, despite recent movement on trade and access following international and media pressure. The USAID team traveled to Jijiga, Hartesheik, Kebribeyah, and Degehabur, interviewing over 30 people. Although the flow of commercial goods has begun to trickle back into Degehabur town and other urban areas over the last week, field investigations uncovered mainly superficial changes as residents report limited commercial food in rural areas and urban areas south and east of Degehabur town, ongoing intimidation tactics by the ENDF, commandeering of commercial goods by the military, minimal livestock trade, and restricted movement. The UN recently opened field offices in Degehabur and Kebridehar, but humanitarian access on the ground remains highly restrictive and limited to urban areas despite increased negotiation between GoE and UN officials over operational modalities. ¶2. (SBU) Major findings from the field include: a) widespread pervasive fear persists for personal security by the civilian population including fear of retribution; b) access to commercial food remains limited either due to minimal availability in rural areas or increasingly limited economic means to purchase food in urban areas; c) pockets of famine already exist with deteriorating health and nutrition conditions with excess mortality a certainty during the upcoming long dry jilaal season; d) GoE line ministry civil servants are increasingly being pressed into military service which will also affect humanitarian services; e) alarming human rights abuses continue; and f) the nature of the conflict has shifted recently with increased fighting anticipated in the coming months. Based on these field observations, the need for intensified international pressure is essential to minimize the impact of the crisis on civilians. End summary. USAID TEAM TRAVELS TO THE OGADEN -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The two-person assessment team represented the first USAID road travel within the Ogaden in more than three years due to ongoing security concerns. The USAID team traveled with an international partner NGO to Degehabur without military escorts. Despite the low profile, most people were terrified to talk with any international organization following threats and promised retribution by the military. Through discreet individual interviews with a range of people, the team learned of continued repercussions stemming from the recent UN assessment. This included the re-arrests and disappearance of some villagers who had spoken openly with the UN assessment team. ¶4. (SBU) In nearly all interviews with civilian populations, the USAID team encountered a pervasive fear for individual safety and security. Many expressed a frustration at being caught between the ENDF and ONLF and increased concerns over the continued presence of landmines. International agencies underscored the constant harassment of their local staff by regional government and security officials about staff, programs, intent and indicated local NGOs are often more harassed. In meetings in Degehabur and Jijiga, government officials advised the USAID team that they were not aware of challenges faced by the NGOs and that there was no problem for travel and access. ¶5. (SBU) Note: Despite receiving verbal approval from senior government and security officials for Ogaden travel, local staff of the U.S. NGO accompanying the USAID team were told by local officials that the team was in Degehabur illegally and admonished the NGO staff to take the foreigners back to Jijiga. Local officials later harassed and threatened the NGO as to the intent of the mission. The USAID team met with the Head of the Pastoral Development Bureau who is also the new humanitarian coordination focal point and with the Somali Region President to advise them of the nature of the monitoring and humanitarian assessment trip. Although the situation seemed to be defused, USAID will closely monitor the status of the NGO staff to ensure no further fallout will occur following the visit. End note. FOOD SECURITY AND ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL FOOD -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The food security situation will continue to worsen progressively if commercial and livestock restrictions are not immediately improved in the areas of military operations. While there has been some movement on trade and commercial food to major urban areas over the last week between Jijiga and Degehabur, tangible improvements remain elusive for vulnerable households. Livestock trade remains highly disrupted, commercial food does not appear to be reaching the large majority outside of urban areas, commercial food is often commandeered by the ENDF, food aid is diverted primarily by the ENDF, and the overwhelming climate of fear prevails. GoE action continues to be construed as a policy of collective punishment against Ogadeni clans and during interviews informants indicated to the USAID team that the form of collective punishment is starving the population. In spite of the risks, some brave small scale traders or desperate villagers are attempting to transport food from towns to rural areas via donkey or on human backs. Locals interviewed by Mission personnel report that if people are caught by the military or militia transporting food to rural areas, the food and animal are confiscated, and occasionally the person shot (ref D). ¶7. (SBU) Over the last week, commercial goods seem to be moving to Degehabur town more easily with military escort. Limited commercial deliveries of food are reportedly coming via Togwachale, Hartesheikh, and Aware. However, movement of food to the vast majority of the population off the main road and in remote villages remains highly restricted. Commercial traders explained that all trucks must pay for military escort. Initially many trucks were bottlenecked in Kebribebaya until traders understood that arrangements had to be made with the military, usually requiring large cash payments to obtain permits for access between Jijiga and Kebribebaya, and onwards. [Note: Ref D describes payments up to 1,500 birr/USD 165 needed for military escorts. End note.] Traders indicated that up to 70 percent of all commercial trucks are being commandeered by the ENDF for military purposes, and many truck owners are attempting to hide themselves from the military. Truck drivers also expressed fear over routes they were being ordered to take by the ENDF. In two separate examples this year, truck drivers were ordered to drive on a specific rural road; both incidents resulted in landmine explosions. Where there are no military operations, Somaliland traders can reportedly still enter and the ONLF leaves them alone. Traders also noted that the highland trucks allowed into the Ogaden in September/October due to special arrangements were no longer present since people began boycotting purchase of goods from the Tigrayan traders. ¶8. (SBU) Commercial access is still fairly restricted south and east of Degehabur; however, the recent increase in food availability in urban areas is leading to a decrease in the prices of cereals in urban locations like Degehabur. The team verified that prices of sugar, rice, sorghum and oil appear to be stabilizing (In August, the price of food in local markets doubled compared to pre-conflict prices; prices are now approximately 20 percent higher than pre-conflict prices). These reflect market prices only in Degehabur town, as traders and agencies operating further south in Kebridehar and indicated prices there are double or even triple the pre-conflict amounts. In addition, some traders cited specific examples when the ENDF had taken truckloads of commercial food prior to Ramadan and warned the traders that they were not to speak of it to anyone or face serious consequences. In some cases, payment was promised, however only one businesswoman indicated that the ENDF returned three bags of rice from her original truckload as payment for goods taken. Traders also stated that humanitarian food aid is now referred to as "operational food" by the military. ¶9. (SBU) During interviews, traders, women, and civil servants advised the USAID team that the recent food availability and lower prices in Degehabur town will have minimal impact on poor populations until households can access cash through livestock sales. Shop owners complained in town that it does no good to have foodstuffs since there are so few customers. Pastoralist livelihoods are completely dependent upon selling livestock to purchase food grains. Livestock prices remain at half of their pre-conflict value in Degehabur and likely worse in more remote areas. This deterioration in the terms of trade has seriously impacted already-depleted coping mechanisms and livelihoods. In the absence of trade, food aid alone will not have a significant impact on the affected population due to diversions. ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The September UN assessment team reported a pervasive lack of food in the conflict-affected areas. Although availability of food is improving slightly in urban areas, actual household access to food remains highly restricted. Food aid deliveries have been delayed; in mid-October, the DPPA allocated 70,000 MT for 956,000 beneficiaries in Somali Region, including 53,000 MT specifically for 642,000 people in the Ogaden reflecting the first allocations of the calendar year. As of November 6, WFP and DPPA reported 2,935 MT in 108 trucks had been dispatched from Dire Dawa for Fik and East Imi (88 trucks) and Kebridehar (20 trucks),reflecting less than 6 percent of the overall allocation to the Ogaden dispatched to date. Delivery and actual distribution of this dispatch are still pending confirmation. In an effort to better monitor DPPA's distribution in the Ogaden, particularly as food aid is being taken by the military as reported reftels, WFP is deploying international/local teams in Degehabur and Kebridehar. WFP has recruited 24 new staff, including 12 food aid monitors, who will be located in these areas. ¶11. (SBU) DPPA's intended reduction in the number of food distribution points (FDPs) in Somali Region is still a concern. Prior to the recent crisis, DPPA maintained 500 FDPs in Somali Region, including approximately 300 within the five conflict affected zones. The Somali Regional authorities recently proposed a food distribution plan limited to 74 FDPs, of which only 28 were in the conflict-affected areas. WFP developed a counter-proposal advocating for 186 distribution sites in the five conflict- affected zones which was approved on November 7. [Comment: While the 186 FDPs are significantly better than the 28 proposed by the GoE, the 186 FDPs still reflect a 38 percent reduction in previously utilized FDPs in the conflict-affected zones. According to WFP field staff, the 186 FDPs are considered manageable. If security and humanitarian access improves, additional FDPs should be considered in the future in other rural areas. End comment.] LIVESTOCK TRADE AND DETERIORATING LIVELIHOODS -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The livestock trade still remains significantly hobbled due to the commercial restrictions. In Degehabur, livestock prices are still only fifty percent of pre-restriction levels (roughly 2,500 birr for a male camel now, previous rates were 5,000 birr). The quantity of animals brought to market is also very low, likely due in part to restricted movement and pastoralists unwilling to sell at such low prices. Low livestock prices are also reported in Fik and Kebridehar, despite historically high livestock prices in the Ethiopia and Somalia markets. Prior to the conflict, traders estimated that 10 truck loads of goats and sheep were transported daily for trade, in addition to the sale of camels. Traders in Degehabur complained that the trucks which formerly came to the market to transport livestock to Hargeisa and through the Berbera port in Somaliland are no longer able to come. ¶13. (SBU) This localized collapse of livestock trade comes at a time when animal exports and domestic sales for pastoralists have just begun improving after a decade of low prices. The restriction of live animal trade to Saudi Arabia imposed due to Rift Valley Fever in 1998 was only partially lifted at the end of 2006. After 1998, the decrease in livestock prices/sales left many pastoralists highly vulnerable, evidenced by the 1999-2000 famine in Somali Region. Since 2000, an average of one million Somalis require food assistance (ref D) each year, having lost their animals and livelihoods during previous droughts. Restrictions on livestock trade in the Ogaden have also undermined recent progress of USAID-funded program supporting pastoralists. ¶14. (SBU) The convergence of multiple shocks have strained livestock herds and resulted in increased vulnerability to famine and destitution through loss of livelihoods. Forced movement of pastoralists and their herds earlier this year and underlying pervasive fear has had pastoral populations trapped between military and insurgent elements and has greatly restricted traditional pastoral livelihood patterns. Some pastoralists confided to the USAID team that people were moving deeper into the bush and forced to move every week to avoid the military sweeps. [Comment: the Degehabur mayor, who accompanied the USAID team to the livestock market, was almost physically assaulted by angry traders complaining about the collapse of the market. Other pastoralists who had been threatened by security elements not to talk about the situation, stated scornfully "I am an old man, they can shoot me, I only fear Allah..." End comment.] ¶15. (SBU) Despite good rains earlier in the year, the short season deyr rains have been poor since their onset in mid-October to date. The very poor distribution and quantity in most areas have raised early concerns about the prospects of the season and discouraging crop planting activities in most agro-pastoral areas. The short season rains end in November and are followed by the "jilaal" or long dry spell which stretches from the Ogaden into neighboring Somalia. Within the Somali context, malnutrition rates normally spike during this period due to the drying up of milk supply and lack of other food supply. Entering the jilaal season with already high levels of malnutrition means severe malnutrition and under five mortality rates will increase significantly. NGOs have expressed concern that high mortality rates are a future certainty, even if unfettered humanitarian access were to be granted immediately. Food security conditions are also complicated by desert locus swarms which appeared in Somali Region last month, detailed ref D. HEALTH AND NUTRITION CONCERNS -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Per reftels, two recent nutrition surveys within and along the periphery of the Ogaden reflect crisis malnutrition levels, and in some locations, over twice the normal threshold levels for emergencies. Malnutrition levels are projected to be much higher in non-accessible locations and recent anecdotal reporting seems to confirm this. OCHA reported that villagers who recently walked long distances to reach Degehabur town for medical treatment indicated up to 14 children died recently from marasmus and kwashiorkor (severe malnutrition) in the woreda. The Degehabur Hospital Administrator and other medical staff confirmed a significant increase in malnutrition within the area, but stated increased fear and restricted movement in the countryside was preventing villagers from coming and/or staying at the hospital for treatment. Amidst fears of the deteriorating humanitarian crisis, the GoE has dismissed NGO concerns as political statements and has recently labeled some nutritional assessments as "fictitious". ¶17. (SBU) Endemic health problems such as malaria, shigella, and AWD in the area will aggravate an already fragile situation. UNICEF reported an increase in documented cases of malnutrition, shigella, measles and other diseases in the limited areas where information is available. UNICEF has delivered supplies to nine of the ten designated health posts in Somali Region, with the exception of Kebridehar which is still pending GoE approval. USAID confirmed the recent arrival of medical and water purification supplies in Degehabur town, but noted bureaucratic delays from the regional government meant that hospital officials were not yet authorized to use the medical supplies even though the supplies were physically stored on the hospital premises. [Note: USAID and UNICEF raised this issue with the Jijiga regional government officials and authorization was underway. End note.] ¶18. (SBU) The USAID team believes health and nutrition conditions are rapidly deteriorating but serious impediments remain to rapid response efforts. Full humanitarian access and security for NGOs and UN agencies to mobilize essential services, provide community therapeutic feeding, conduct immunization campaigns, and deliver emergency supplies is critical, particularly as the GoE does not have the capacity to implement activities, even in normal times. Without the easing or lifting of restrictions on food availability, health and nutrition activities will have minimal impact and only serve as a temporary stopgap measure to the crisis. CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS -------------- ¶19. (SBU) As part of the counter-insurgency efforts during the past few weeks, the GoE has focused on major recruitment into local militias or "tadaqis" in an effort to shift the balance of fighting from the Ethiopian military (ENDF) to local Ogadeni sub clans. Civil servants and local contractors who receive funding from the GoE are being mobilized to join the militias and increasingly being pressured to go to the frontlines. This trend has pitted inexperienced and poorly equipped local populations against the relatively better equipped insurgency. In Degehabur, the USAID visit coincided with a major security meeting with civil servants to join the militia, organized by the Head of Security for Somali Region and the Deputy Chair of the Somali wing of the ruling party. ¶20. (SBU) In private line ministry agriculture and health officials discussed the details of the process of militia recruitments. Direct refusal is not an option, otherwise officials are deemed aligned with the ONLF and "tortured and killed", but some officials have managed to avoid joining to date by avoiding meetings or going on trips. Civil servants are terrified of either refusing or joining the militia, particularly after an incident in Gunu Gedu (near Degehabur) where 17 civil servant/militias were killed by the ONLF and local people a few weeks ago. ¶21. (SBU) The recruitment of health workers and teachers has further reduced the inadequate basic services even in major towns. USAID obtained a confidential list of schools and health posts which are currently closed and occupied by the military as bases. Most schools seem to be closed with teachers either having fled or joined the militia. Twenty-one schools are currently closed in seven woredas (districts) of Degehabur, Fik, Korahe and Warder zones. The recruitment of health workers into the militia is also a major concern, compromising the ability of a functional health system in rural Ogaden and diminishing the small number of available health workers. UNICEF reports that many regional health bureau workers slated for joint training of the mobile health and nutrition teams did not appear as expected, even though the incentive of per diems was provided. Eight health posts in the four zones are reported as being occupied by the military. [Note: During discussions with the Degehabur Hospital Administrator, military officials were banging on the windows to summon health workers to go to the recruitment. End note.] ¶22. (SBU) During interviews, local informants expressed concern that the scale of fighting appeared to be increasing, citing specific incidents and new trends. A relatively new development is the pursuit of "blood money" for the Ethiopian soldiers and militia killed by the ONLF. In Somali tradition when someone is killed, the responsible sub clan is expected to either pay blood money of 100 camels (roughly 500,000 birr/USD 55,000) or to suffer a retribution killing. Although not always actively pursued in the past, the Somali Regional Council declared two months ago that seeking blood money for any killings by the ONLF was now mandatory. The GoE has subsequently required the sub clans in Degehabur area to pay for the 74 people killed in Abule, where Ethiopian and Chinese oil workers and Ethiopian troops were killed in April. Each member of the local sub clans, determined by family status, has been allocated an amount to pay, which was 300 birr for the individual who described the situation. Similar payments are demanded from subclans in any area where ENDF or militia are killed. ¶23. (SBU) Villagers also described the early November fighting in Degehabur and Fik zones, and the atmosphere of fear, focusing on the recent ENDF visit to Hascoli. The village in Fik was suspected to be an ONLF supported area and there is an allegation that the ENDF killed an 11 year-old child, the mother, and another child. The situation escalated with the local community mobilizing and wounding three soldiers, with the community now awaiting retribution. The USAID team also heard first hand accounts of the following incidents: a) four people garroted three months ago in the military compound in Degehabur and their bodies displayed in town; b) eleven elders hung in public in Damot in July, with one woman escaping to Somaliland; c) pastoralists from Damot town forcibly relocated to "protected" villages; among other accounts. ¶24. (SBU) The cumulative affect of the actions around the conflict seem to be deepening local animosity against the GoE and likely translating into sympathy/support for the insurgents. Apart from government sources the team spoke with, the key issue raised against the ONLF was their unequivocal killing of ENDF or militia, even of some civil servants forced to join the militia against their will. NGOs described being stopped by both the ONLF and GoE, with both sides of the conflict indicating the humanitarian agencies should not be associated with the other side. The concept of operational neutrality and humanitarian corridors is not well understood; this issue will become increasingly critical as aid agencies seek humanitarian access without enforced military escorts. LACK OF HUMANITARIAN SPACE -------------- ¶25. (U) Humanitarian access remains challenging. Aid agencies operating on the ground still report a significant disconnect in directives pertaining to humanitarian access between GoE officials Addis and Jijiga. In October, the UN provided the GoE a list of 37 NGOs willing to work in the Ogaden. On November 2, DPPA advised UN agencies only 12 international and local NGOs were "approved" to operate in the conflict-affected areas of the Ogaden. Approved NGOs include Save the Children/US, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)-Greece, Oxfam GB, Pastoralist Concern Association, OWDA, Save the Children/UK, Islamic Relief, International Rescue Committee, Partnership for Pastoralist Development, Save the Rural Society, Wabi Shebelle Development Association, and Fafan Development Organization. On November 13, the DPPA approved an additional seven NGOs: Mercy Corps, MSF-Belgium, MSF-Switzerland, International Medical Corps, Cooperazione Internationale (COOPI),Mother and Child Development and German Agro Action. ¶26. (SBU) The DPPA and Somali Regional officials offer no explanation for the selection of the approved agencies. Of particular concern is that several key NGOs currently operational in Kebridehar did not make the list including Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and Medecins du Monde (MDM),yet agencies not operational were approved. In the first humanitarian coordination forum in Jijiga on November 7, Somali Region officials were at a loss to explain how agencies were selected, but assured agencies that this only reflected the first round of approvals. When non-approved international NGOs asked what this meant, they were advised that "unless they have specifically been told not to go ahead, NGOs should feel free to go ahead or continue with activities." However, when an international NGO subsequently requested permission to travel to Degehabur, they were advised they could not go. Agencies in Kebridehar relate similar experiences. Some NGOs have also been privately advised that agencies will not be permitted any access to certain areas with ongoing military operations in the foreseeable future. In discussion with staff of various agencies in the field, the staff advised the USAID team that they expected harassment to continue and that free access to rural areas was highly unlikely in the near future. ¶27. (SBU) Although the GoE has agreed to the establishment of UN offices in Kebridehar and Degehabur towns, they also insisted on a list of names and addresses of staff that will be based in the sub-offices to determine appropriateness. It remains uncertain if UN agencies and NGOs will be granted unfettered access to rural areas for program implementation and monitoring. Nevertheless, NGOs state that the presence of UN agencies will raise visibility and could create a more favorable working environment. ¶28. (SBU) COMMENT: While the GoE is taking important actions to respond to the humanitarian situation - dispatching food, approving UN offices and FDPs, allowing access to select NGOs - largely in response to international pressure, the situation is a "crisis" with little end in sight. The GoE's political and military counter-insurgency strategies now include shifting operational responsibility to local militias which are being manned through forced conscription of civil servants including in the health, agriculture and education sectors and taxing blood money payments for oil workers and ENDF soldiers killed by the ONLF from the local population. These actions are further fueling popular support for the rebellion that they are meant to undermine. As such, it is likely to provoke even harsher measures that will, in the end, be even more counter-productive and increase levels of conflict, further exacerbating the humanitarian situation. End comment. YAMAMOTO