UPDATE ON HUMANITARIAN DYNAMICS IN THE OGADEN

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 003254 SIPDIS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, DAS AF JSWAN, AF/E, AF/PDPA, OES, A/S PRM SAUERBREY, AND PRM/AFR AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS, KNELSON DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL DCHA/FFP JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, RTILSWORTH, AND LPANASUK NAIROBI FOR OFDA/ECARO JMYER, GPLATT, RFFPO NCOX, USAID/EA ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA, HSPANOS BRUSSELS FOR USEU PBROWN GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA USUN FOR TMALY NSC FOR PMARCHAN, JMELINE SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PHUM SENV EAGR PGOV ET SUBJECT: UPDATE ON HUMANITARIAN DYNAMICS IN THE OGADEN REF: A) ADDIS ABABA 3046; B) ADDIS ABABA 2566; D) ADDIS ABABA 3200 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Recent discussions between Post and UN agency, donor, and NGO interlocutors over the past two weeks highlight the challenges facing the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali region. Ongoing commercial restrictions, limited operational access due to internal security operations in response to counterinsurgency, and population displacement have exacerbated the plight of the already vulnerable. NGOs report that physical indications of severe malnutrition are manifesting themselves. Collapse of the livestock market (backbone of pastoralist livelihood),persistent and increased prevalence of Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD),consumption of wild foods, and declining caloric intake in some parts of the severely affected zones are aggravating factors for famine. Despite recent good rains, the convergence of multiple shocks have strained livestock herds and resulted in increased vulnerability to famine and destitution through loss of livelihoods. ¶2. In response to conditions on the ground, Ethiopian Government (GoE) ministries and UN agencies have prepared joint response plans for Somali Region based on recommendations of the September UN mission report. On October 31, the U.S. Embassy hosted a donor, UN and diplomatic corps meeting on the Ogaden. Key donor and implementing partners agreed on an action plan to sustain diplomatic pressure on the GoE to take expeditious action to address the humanitarian crisis. The UN has compiled an internal matrix of recommendations on response activities, focusing on proposed actions, which has been shared with key humanitarian donors. Key humanitarian donors continue to meet regularly to discuss funding strategies, priority programs, and funding gaps particularly in the non-food arena. End Summary. ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Approximately 1.1 million of the Somali region's 4.6 million people are chronically food insecure (600,000 of 1.2 million in the Ogaden are under stress). The September UN assessment team reported a pervasive lack of food in the conflict-affected areas (Ref A). Limited food aid deliveries continue to be significantly delayed. Of the 5000 MT allocated for the Ogaden area in June -- the first food aid sent to the Ogaden in calendar year 2007 -- only 81 percent has actually been dispatched; the percentage that has actually reached the beneficiaries remains unclear. In mid-October, the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency (DPPA) allocated 70,000 MT for a three-month food ration for 642,000 beneficiaries in the five conflict affected zones. As of October 29, only 182 MT (0.26 percent) of this allocation had been dispatched. Delivery and distribution of this dispatch are still weeks away and transport contracts for the 70,000 MTS are not yet finalized. ¶4. (SBU) DPPA's intended reduction in the number of food distribution points (FDPs) in response to counterinsurgency operations, lack of resources and ability to control food distribution in Somali Region is of additional concern. Prior to the recent crisis, DPPA maintained 500 FDPs in Somali Region, including approximately 300 within the five conflict affected zones. The Somali Regional authorities, seeking to prevent diversion of food, have proposed a food distribution plan limited to 74 FDPs, of which only 28 are in the conflict-affected areas. By distributing food only to woreda headquarters, trucks will drive past beneficiaries for FDPs and then require them to walk to the distant site and back again. Donors argue that this plan is not viable as it will force already vulnerable populations to walk hundreds of kilometers to reach the food, posing a significant protection issue in a militarized zone. WFP has developed a counter-proposal advocating for 190 distribution sites in the Ogaden area. USAID/FFP and Post are reluctant to proceed with the most recent contribution of $24.6 million (equivalent to 30,000 MTS of food commodities) until the GoE agrees to increase the number of distribution sites in the Ogaden area and has conveyed this concern to DPPA. UNOCHA is in the affected areas looking at additional sites, which the GoE has approved but still far short of what is necessary. ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL FOOD -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The food security situation has steadily deteriorated over the past several months following restrictions on commercial trade imposed in June. Although the GoE opened four major trade routes into Somali Region -- including two in the North, one in the East and one in the Southeast -- aid agencies report no tangible change on the ground. Trucks are bottlenecked in Kebridebaya, just south of Jijiga and outside the Ogaden area. The few commercial trucks that do get through must pay the military 1,500 Ethiopian birr (approximately USD 165) for escorts. These levies, coupled with increased insurance rates for trucks operating in these areas, further inflate already-high food prices. ¶6. (SBU) The lack of commercial food in the Ogaden is exacerbated by restrictions on population movements. Villagers report that if the military catches anyone moving food from towns to rural areas, they confiscate the food and, in some cases, shoot the people. Rural populations are similarly forbidden from entering urban areas to sell milk or other products. As a result of commercial trade restrictions and limitations on the movement of people, informal market surveys now indicate tripling of many of the already high food prices. At the same time, livestock prices are not believed to have fallen to half their pre-conflict value. This deterioration in the terms of trade has seriously impacted already-depleted coping mechanisms and livelihoods. According to the UN, the local population in some areas is surviving by collecting wild grasses and grains and slaughtering livestock in response to the starvation tactics used by the military. MALNUTRITION AND MORBIDITY -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Two recent nutrition surveys within and along the periphery of the Ogaden reflect crisis malnutrition levels, and in some locations, over twice the normal threshold levels for emergencies. Malnutrition rates are projected to be much higher in non-accessible locations. A Save the Children/UK survey from Fik zone indicates crisis levels of malnutrition present with 20.8 percent Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and 1.4 percent Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) among children under five. (Note: The World Health Organization classifies GAM rates over 10 percent as warranting immediate nutritional support interventions. End Note). The levels of crude and under-5 mortality rates are 0.56 deaths/10,000/day and 1.5 deaths/10,000/day respectively. A late September, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) nutrition survey in Kelafo Woreda, Gode Zone, and Somali Region identified a GAM rate of 13.2 percent and a SAM rate of 3.4 percent. The ADRA survey identified crude mortality rates (CMR) of children under five at 2.93, well above the acceptable rate of 1.03 per 10,000 for least developed countries. The continued high SAM rates are worrying, a reflection of the acuity of the food security situation in the woreda. (Note: In an emergency context, high levels of malnutrition are considered to be a late indicator of a humanitarian crisis. End note.) NGOs have expressed concern that high mortality rates are a future certainty, even if unfettered humanitarian access were to be granted immediately. ¶8. (U) Measles vaccination rates for the surveyed area were estimated to be 3.2 percent documented by vaccination card and 37.2 percent by card and mother's recall, well below the 70 percent targeted for the region by UNICEF and the Ministry of Health. UNICEF has also highlighted endemic health problems such as malaria, shigella, and AWD in the area will aggravate an already fragile situation. (Note: GoE is disputing the 20.8 percent malnutrition rate urging that over 600 cases is too small a sample. But the GoE still remains an impediment.) ¶9. (SBU) Although the GoE has provided federal approval for UNICEF to deploy 15 mobile health and nutrition assessment and response teams to the Ogaden, additional modalities and approvals need to be worked out at the regional level. UNICEF has begun providing emergency supplies to limited health facilities. Supplies -- including emergency drugs to treat 235,000 patients for six months, water purification items, nutrition and therapeutic food to cover 16,000 children, and non-food supplies -- were delivered in mid-October to eight designated health posts including Elkere (Afder zone),Gode, Kelafo, Denan (Gode zone),Fik, Aware, Gashamo, and Warder. GoE approvals are still pending for deliveries to Kebri Dehar and Degehabur. EXACERBATING CONDITIONS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) As detailed in reftels, forced movement of pastoralists due to insecurity from fighting and their herds earlier this year and underlying pervasive fear reported by the UN assessment team has had pastoral populations trapped between military and insurgent elements and has greatly restricted traditional pastoral livelihood patterns. During the past week, desert locust swarms from Somalia crossed the border into Somali Region, further aggravating the situation. The FAO Desert Locust Information Services reported a desert locust infestation in Kebri Dehar, parts of Korahe and Degehabur zones, and throughout Warder zone. To date, control operations have not been possible. The infestation is destroying browse and pasture and will likely spread to other areas. The locally-laid hoppers will fledge and could form a small immature swarm within a month. The Somali Region is planning to conduct aerial chemical spraying to contain the spread. SECURITY OPERATIONS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Pockets of violence and human rights violations from both sides of the conflict continue according to agencies on the ground. Ongoing military operations and GoE regulations have restricted humanitarian access in Warder, Korahe, Degehabur, Fik, and parts of Gode zone over the last five months. While most soldiers have remained in their barracks since early-October, NGOs, UN agencies, and even regional government officials confirm that civil servants from various line ministries in Somali Region have now been directed to mobilize militias along clan and community lines to take up arms against the insurgents. This trend has pitted inexperienced and poorly equipped local populations against the relatively better equipped insurgency. The ONLF has announced two rounds of large military victories against "the military," but in reality local communities have suffered the casualties due to regional government-led mobilization. It is not clear the mobilization of civil servants will affect the regional health bureau or other regional bureaus that would normally be involved in humanitarian response activities. What is clear is the increased ONLF attacks have raised insecurity in the region affecting food deliveries. THE US AND DONOR RESPONSE -------------- ¶12. (SBU) On August 16, 2007, a complex emergency was declared for Somali Region (Ref B) following growing concerns that a severe humanitarian crisis was imminent in the Ogaden. USAID/FPP has provided USD 40 million of emergency food assistance to WFP since July 2007 and USAID/OFDA provided USD 3.7 million in August 2007 for Somali Region response activities. The United States remains the only donor providing food aid specifically for Somali Region and continues to coordinate directly with WFP and the DPPA. ¶13. (SBU) The GoE has agreed to the establishment of two joint UN support offices in Kebri Dehar and Degehabur towns to strengthen monitoring and humanitarian assistance. The GoE has requested the UN to provide a list of names and addresses of staff that will be based in the sub-offices to determine appropriateness. While a few UN agencies remain more cautiously optimistic; most operational agencies agree that recent GoE outreach has not translated into increased operational access to date. The UN provided the GoE a list of 37 NGOs willing to work in Somali Region. In a meeting on November 2, the GoE informed the UN that only 11 of these NGOs were "approved." Of these 11, only a handful are international NGOs and some current key partners active in the region are not among them. MOVING FORWARD -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Following the October 31 donor and NGO roundtable hosted by Ambassador Yamamoto, donor Ambassadors, NGOs, and UN agencies agreed to coordinate closely on information sharing and to present a consistent and persistent message to Ethiopian officials of the need for an immediate and sustained GoE response, but to do so in a quiet and non-confrontational manner. Key points would include: --Informing the GoE of the crisis situation in the Ogaden, --Acknowledging what the GoE has done in opening corridors for humanitarian relief, but noting that more needs to be done and the donors, UN and NGOs are ready to help, --Recognizing the counter-insurgency problem in the Ogaden, --Expressing a commitment to help meet the GoE's call for food and medical supplies, --Committing to work with the GoE on relief in the Ogaden, --Seeking the GoE's views on, and suggesting possible proposals for resolving, tensions in the Ogaden with the ONLF (i.e. facilitate dialogue with ONLF and or broader discussion with Ogaden elders), and --Pressing a strong message of the need to push food aid and open commercial trade and livestock trade throughout the Ogaden. ¶15. (SBU) Ambassador and DCM arranged to meet with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu and National Security Advisor Abay Tsehaye to raise these concerns (Septel). EU Ambassadors agreed to raise these points with Prime Minister Meles in a pre-arranged October 31 meeting. Ambassador and Political Counselor have met Ogaden officials. While a group of Ambassadors from the Ethiopian Partners' Group will seek an appointment with Prime Minister Meles and Foreign Minister Seyoum in the coming days, Ambassador Yamamoto and Post's principal officers will continue to raise these points with GoE officials at every opportunity. Ref D provided specific talking points for Washington-based officials to draw on in urging GoE authorities to address this crisis. YAMAMOTO