UN ON OGADEN: POCKETS OF CRISIS, ALARMING HUMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002805 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, OES, AND PRM USAID/W FOR A/AID USAID/W DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL AFR/EA KNELSON, BDUNFORD, CTHOMPSON DCHA/FFP WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA BRUSSLES FOR USEU PBROWN GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA ROME FOR HSPANOS USUN FOR TMALY NSC FOR BJPITTMAN, CHUDSON, AND JMELINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017 TAGS: PHUM EAID EAGR PGOV PREF MOPS ET SUBJECT: UN ON OGADEN: POCKETS OF CRISIS, ALARMING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS REF: ADDIS 3226 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator and head of the UN Assessment Mission to the Ogaden, Paul Hebert (strictly protect),briefed Ambassador Yamamoto and Embassy and USAID staff on September 13 on the findings of the United Nations, August 30-September 6 Assessment Mission to the Ogaden. The Mission found that both Government of Ethiopia (GoE) policies and insurgent attacks by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) area have created &pockets of crisis8 and the potential for a full-blown crisis throughout the region in the coming weeks to three months if conditions do not change soon. The UN Mission traveled to Jijiga, Degehabur, Kebridehar, and Gode, visiting 10 villages and interviewing over 100 people. Major findings include: a) pervasive fear persists for personal security by the civilian population; b) a serious lack of food in the conflict-affected areas; c) pockets of humanitarian crisis already exist with deteriorating health and nutrition conditions; d) urgent need for humanitarian access; and e) &alarming8 human rights abuses by all sides of the conflict. ¶2. (SBU) The United Nations is expected to release a report on the Mission's findings formally on Sept. 17 from New York. A subsequent human rights-oriented report will be released later to a significantly restricted audience. The Sept. 17 report is expected to note that both the GoE and ONLF are contributing to the humanitarian impacts in the region and will pose six recommendations to the GoE and international community: 1) allow an increased flow of commercial food into the region, 2) permit food to be transported from towns to villages and rural areas, 3) allow significantly increased �00A;monitoring of food deliveries, 4) provide dramatically increased health care resources and medical supplies, 5) provide open access to the region for humanitarian food, commercial food, and livestock transfers, and 6) immediately provide three-months of food rations for 600,000 people in need in the region. End Summary. -------------- -------------- DELAY AND INTIMIDATION TACTICS UTILIZED ON THE TEAM -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The UN assessment commenced on August 30 in Jijiga to negotiate modalities of field travel with regional and security officials. The Somali Region President underscored to the UN that although the GoE was fighting a war on terrorism, they did not intend to hurt the civilian population and did not believe the situation to be abnormal. Despite the stated commitment to support the assessment team, GoE security officials significantly harassed the team's national staff during the two days of negotiations. In particular, security officials accused two national staff from OCHA and UNICEF of ONLF links and threatened their relatives with physical harm if the staff members participated in the Mission. (Note: The UN felt that these particular staff were seen as threats for having too many ADDIS ABAB 00002805 002 OF 005 local contacts. The UN removed them from the Mission for their own safety, but refused to substitute out any of the five other non-Ogadeni Somali staff despite intimidation tactics). ¶4. (C) Despite an earlier assertion that the assessment team would travel without military or government officials, the UN acquiesced to military escorts to ensure that the Mission could proceed. Regional officials agreed that the escorts would not mingle or stay with the team while they were stopped in villages. The military escort consisted of five trucks along with an additional vehicle for GoE administrative and security support. (Note: the UN highlighted that the escorts were cooperative, but that their task was clearly to control the assessment team to the extent possible). ¶5. (C) Through interviews, the UN learned that an advance party had been sent to every village to meet with elders and local populations prior to the UN assessment. Villagers reported being advised not to meet with the UN; to do so would mean serious consequences. In some cases, people were reportedly arrested and some villages by the road were deserted, as villagers were told to leave prior to the Mission's arrival. Despite intimidation tactics and death threats, most people were anxious to speak with the UN about what was really happening. The UN team attempted to speak randomly with smaller groups, particularly women and elders, and villagers were quick to identify which people were legitimately from the village. The UN relayed that on three separate occasions, the GoE arranged elders to meet with the UN team; those elders later indicated to the UN that they had been told what to say in the official meetings. ¶6. (C) The UN outlined the challenging aspects of the assessment and came close to canceling the Mission at Degehabur. There the UN learned that two people were immediately arrested after speaking with the UN and 60 other people had been arrested that day for suspicion of sharing information. The UN team protested their arrests and advised military escorts that the UN team would keep track of those detained with the intent to raise it at the highest political levels; they were subsequently released. -------------- KEY UN ASSESSMENT FINDINGS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Pervasive Fear: The United Nations assesses the situation in the Ogaden to be serious and a cause for alarm on the humanitarian and human rights fronts. Pervasive fear clearly persists for personal security by the civilian population. People fear both the GoE and ONLF and told the UN team that being sandwiched between the two sides is having a significant impact on movement and daily livelihoods. ¶8. (SBU) Pervasive Lack of Food: Although the situation has slightly improved in the last few weeks due to approximately 10 trucks that have gone to Degehabur and Kebridehar, it only reflects a small percentage of the need. It is clear that the military is involved in all aspects of food aid delivery, ensuring that food does not go to &anti-peace8 elements or communities perceived to support insurgents. The UN observed one location where four trucks filled with WFP-provided food was stored in a military ADDIS ABAB 00002805 003 OF 005 compound. The UN team also encouraged food distribution and noted that only a small proportion of the overall designated food stocks were distributed and distribution modalities were suspect. ¶9. (SBU) Although there has been minimal disruption of commercial transport in the non-Ogadeni areas, the impact of the lack of commercial food in the Ogaden, particularly in the rural areas, is profound. Even if small amounts of commercial food is available in towns, villagers reported that the military confiscates any food found to be transported from towns to rural areas ) and in some cases, the perpetrators are shot. The situation also applied to rural populations trying to enter urban areas to sell milk or other products; it is forbidden. The starvation tactics used by the military in the area are resulting in visible signs of pre-famine indicators. The UN reported that people are surviving by collecting wild grasses and grains and slaughtering livestock. ¶10. (SBU) Pockets of Crisis Already Exist: The Team assesses that it will only be a matter of weeks, and certainly no more than three months, before a large scale crisis emerges if conditions do not improve substantially. Market prices of food have doubled over the last three months and livestock prices have declined by roughly 33 percent. The poorest have left urban centers since there are no casual jobs linked to commercial trade and have reportedly moved into the interior, to Jijiga or out of the Ogaden to other areas. Traditional livestock trade is not occurring; the military is accused of arbitrarily confiscating livestock for their own use. Cash will only become available if livestock export reopens, but none of the traditional livestock traders are present due to security concerns. The few commercial trucks that have gone to Degehabur with military escorts have been from the highlands. ¶11. (SBU) Urgent Need for Better Humanitarian Access: Humanitarian access is limited and recent landmine fatalities underscore the challenge operational humanitarian agencies are facing. Despite recent GoE press statements urging agencies to work in Somali Region with unlimited access, the reality on the ground is much different. Very few NGOs are operating in the military zones because almost all movements are restricted due to security reasons. Access for UN agencies is virtually non-existent in military areas. WFP noted that although monitoring food aid deliveries is critical, it is currently impossible due to underlying security conditions. Although WFP has invited local NGOs to do monitoring on their behalf, no one has accepted due to security fears, though agencies are willing to share the limited information they possess. There have also been recent reports that certain access to basic services -- such as the capping of water sources and refusing delivery of medical supplies -- are being denied in some villages. ¶12. (C) Human Rights Conditions are &Alarming8: The UN characterized the human rights situation as serious and alarming, equally on the side of the Ethiopian military and the ONLF. Supporters, or perceived sympathizers, of either side continue to be targets of the opposite side. Although the focus of the UN assessment was the humanitarian situation, protection and human rights issues emerged, specifically accounts of rape, extrajudicial killings, and ADDIS ABAB 00002805 004 OF 005 burning of villages. The UN team visited one of the burned villages, were advised others that had been burned, and were given lists of people killed and detained and the names of burned villages. Hebert said that the numbers of villages burned and people killed were in the hundreds. (Note: Often &villages8 are hamlets of a dozen homes build in close proximity rather than large established villages in the western sense.) The UN team was also told of forced desertion of villages along with cases where people left due to security concerns. In the cases of rape, the medical doctors on the team were able to confirm that women had been raped. The UN was told of an incident where the elders who went to complain to the militia about the rapes were killed. While the UN Team was hesitant to declare that human rights abuses were systemic, they did note that the employment of identical tactics throughout the region (by insurgent and counter-insurgent forces alike) certainly gave the impression that human rights abuses were systemic. ¶13. (C) While Hebert's official read-out to the Ambassador paints a stark picture of the Ogaden, he was obviously cautious in timing and presenting his report to Post. On September 7, a UN security officer who participated in the Assessment Mission unofficially told Embassy officials that in Huuraale, the team saw people who were too weak from hunger to stand. The officer noted the price of grain and rice had quadrupled since early May while the price of livestock had fallen significantly as people were trying to sell off their herds for cash. The team also drove by burned villages along their route at Huuraale, Lasdencaree, Kabdinact, Dadine, part of Galadid, and Delaad. Town people told the team of 53 burned villages and 16 villages where the residents had been forcibly displaced by the government. Residents of Dalaad reported to the team of &mass graves8 where civilians were hung by the government for being ONLF supporters. The reported sites include one eight kilometers east of the Dalaad with 17 bodies, a second with nine bodies (unlocated),and a third with three bodies (unlocated). The UN team was unable to verify the claim of mass graves. The officer also reported that the government had detained clan elders in Kebridehar to prevent them from talking to the UN team and had released food in the town just prior to the team's visit to make it appear more normal, but returned the food to the warehouse after the team departed. -------------- UN RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The UN wants to proceed cautiously on extrapolating the data from their assessment. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator and UNOCHA met briefly with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 11 to share preliminary results of the assessment mission, including a draft report. The UN intends to release the final humanitarian report to the international community on September 17 in New York. The UN believes that it would be better to release the humanitarian and human rights findings separately. They believe the GoE will be more receptive to overall findings if the human rights recommendations are shared on a more confidential basis with a few agencies. The UN is recommending a separate, more detailed, human rights mission later. ADDIS ABAB 00002805 005 OF 005 ¶15. (SBU) Following the assessment, the UN is recommending: --Urgently increasing the availability of commercial food and goods, --Resumption of some normal livestock trade in the region, --Immediate additional humanitarian food aid in critical areas as a short-term solution, --Increased immediate humanitarian access for partners in all affected areas for assessment and interventions, --UN representation full time in larger towns in the region for better monitoring of the evolving situation, --Monitoring of humanitarian assistance, particularly food aid, --Urgent health, nutrition, livelihood, and other non-food interventions, and --Additional technical assessment missions (human rights, health, nutrition, etc.) particularly in areas of concern. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) The Ambassador fully agrees with the assessment of the UN and Diplomatic Corps that a food crisis will happen in the Ogaden and preventive actions will only serve to mitigate the impacts. In the longer run, sustainable food security in the region requires broader reconciliation between the Government and the people of the Ogaden. NGOs have told Assistant Secretary Frazer and Post that at least 40 percent, not the previously believed 15 percent, of the region's population are vulnerable to food insecurity. While Assistant Secretary Frazer and the Embassy have raised these concerns with Prime Minister Meles and other GoE officials and continues to press for greater humanitarian and commercial food access to the region, USAID/Ethiopia continues to coordinate contingency planning and emergency response options with humanitarian partners including the UN and NGOs. Ambassador Yamamoto continues to lead the diplomatic community in coordinating a common approach to press the GoE to minimize the humanitarian impacts of its legitimate counter-insurgency efforts. The U.S. is pressing the GoE to establish modalities to open the region to commercial food and trade with Somalia, which historically provides up to 80 percent of the Ogaden's food needs. Agencies are working on modalities to begin humanitarian interventions in locations as close to the non-accessible areas as possible in the hope that if/when more widespread access to the Ogaden is possible, agencies can be partially pre-positioned. Post continues to dialogue with DPPA and WFP on the possibility of increased food dispatches to the region, despite DPPA's reluctance to respond. Regardless of the possible food and non-food emergency interventions, access and security are the underlying constraints that limit response options until political/military solutions can be negotiated. YAMAMOTO